296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia1
546. This message intended for action by Ambassador following his return and departure Fairless Committee.2 Ambassador should make approach noted below either to Tito, Vilfan or Koca Popovic, in his discretion. If Ambassador has serious doubts about utility of approach, he should delay action and report views to Dept.
FYI. Premature leak to press of plans for Tito visit has as anticipated aroused considerable opposition domestically, most important but not sole source of which is American Catholic organizations and their adherents. Following discussion of details of trip by President and Secretary, they agreed visit suitable around end March or start April. However they believed that US domestic political situation should be explained Tito and that he should show understanding our position by making appropriate move on Yugoslav domestic scene (perhaps on behalf Cardinal Stepinac) which would mollify American opposition groups. At same time, in view well-known Tito recalcitrance in face foreign pressures and necessity for Tito take account of hostility felt by dominant Serbian population group towards Stepinac, it is clear that unless delicately handled such approach could cause serious deterioration US-Yugoslav relations and damage to US policy Eastern Europe. End FYI.
Suggest following line for approach:
President and Secretary Dulles have discussed specific timing and program of Tito visit. They suggest Tito arrive Washington about March 26, remain three days, and then [spend] up to about week traveling around country, especially West Coast. This time most convenient here and strongly hope Tito could conform this schedule.
At same time both consider it desirable apprise Tito in all frankness of domestic US reaction to unfortunate premature leak of story to press. As Tito indicated in his August 26 letter to President,3 he is aware of long history of opposition by certain members of Congress who represent sizable number of citizens to our policy towards Yugoslavia. These groups particularly lay Catholic organizations have raised loud cry against visit. They have alleged Yugoslav regime discrimination against Catholic Church and have especially contrasted [Page 762] recent Polish developments in this field (such as new status Cardinal Wyszynski)4 with conditions Yugoslavia.
US has of course followed policy of scrupulously avoiding official mention these matters which pertain to Yugoslav internal affairs. However President and Secretary both anxious have visit proceed smoothly and successfully as possible. They certainly would want avoid mass picketing and protests which have been threatened in certain major cities where Catholics and citizens of East European descent make up important element of population. While such demonstrations would not be allowed involve safety of Tito party, while they could be kept away from his line of travel (particularly if he did not visit sensitive cities), and while we would seek discourage them by official statements and actions, their occurrence in lawful manner might not be wholly preventable and they would tend mar visit in way we would consider most unfortunate.
Accordingly and without any thoughts of own on subject, President and Secretary suggest that Yugoslavs might examine situation to see whether it feasible for Tito or regime make some gesture at appropriate time between now and visit which would tend mollify American opposition groups and create atmosphere good feeling throughout this country. We would be happy discuss this further with FonOff during conversations on detailed planning for visit.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–557. Secret; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Dept. Drafted by Mark, cleared with Beam, and signed for Dulles by Murphy.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 294.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 284.↩
- Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, Primate of Poland. His ecclesiastical functions were suspended by the Polish Government in 1953, but restored in 1956.↩