Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

294. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, December 24, 1956—7 p.m.

893. 1. Re Deptel 505,² was unable reach Foreign Secretary or Defense Minister December 22 but made presentation suggested to Popovic this morning. I also mentioned subject to Tito during hunting party yesterday and he quickly responded that he might later want to talk to me personally about it. In view conversation with Tito reported Embtel 892³ which indicates Tito’s intervention with Soviets, resumption military aid now may raise problem of timing for Yugoslavs and I was not surprised to find Popovic somewhat reserved in his comments.

2. Foreign Secretary said he fully realized it impossible to avoid publicity if regular shipments resumed. While he thought it unfortunate shipments had been suspended, there had been a difference of political appreciation and we had to deal with facts as they are. He would not try to give me definite answer today as in such important matter he must consult both Gosnjak and Tito. He had three personal observations which he would present re present situation.

(A) Yugoslav Government does not think there will be a general war.

(B) Yugoslavia does not feel immediately menaced by USSR and

(C) US policy in recent crises has wholehearted Yugoslav approval.

3. With these points as background Foreign Secretary said he was happy for opportunity to consult re military aid. He said that in spite of remarks of Yugoslav military to Waters there was growing feeling in top military circles that Yugoslavia should henceforth rely more on own efforts and less on foreign aid, although he was first to pay tribute to great assistance US had given in critical days. Difficulties which had arisen in execution of MDAP and uncertainties of deliveries (although he recognized there were many technical difficulties involved) had created great planning difficulties for Yugoslav defense. Questions such as licenses and future spare parts deliveries had never been resolved and our frequent inability to give definite information on deliveries had led to growing inclination in Yugoslav Government to look for different solution.

4. I made appropriate replies to this not forgetting to mention fact that Yugoslav Government had never replied to our proposal for conference to discuss future military aid and indeed Prica had suggested that whole subject be held in abeyance.

5. Foreign Secretary did not contest this but remarked there was another approach. Yugoslav Government attached greatest importance to its proposals for long-term economic aid which he sincerely hoped we would view favorably. If it were possible to be assured of this kind of support, which involved largely agricultural surpluses for us, that would free other resources for defense purposes, would eliminate past friction and would hasten solution of pressing economic problems. He thought that thanks to arrangements concluded in November, we now had time to consider these proposals. He concluded by reiterating he was speaking personally and he would revert to question of military aid after he had opportunity for high-level consultation within Yugoslav Government.

6. I reminded Foreign Secretary that only existing authority for long-term economic arrangements was PL 480 on which there was a ceiling and under which many requests were already pending. As he knew there were exhaustive studies now under way re future aid and I anticipated administration would make recommendations to Congress where final decision would lie. It was impossible now for me to make any firm predictions, but importance of such groups as Fairless Committee³ was obvious and I was happy to note he and Tito would receive them.

7. I find it difficult to believe Yugoslav Government losing interest MDAP in spite Foreign Secretary’s remarks. Certainly there has been no indication this from military side. Two theories are possible:

(A) Hungarian revolt has impressed upon Yugoslav Government necessity raising living standards to assuage growing discontent and therefore less emphasis (and less money) will be given to defense and more to civilian production thereby reducing interest in military aid.

(B) Resumption of deliveries presents at this stage, particularly if Tito is engaged in serious negotiations with Soviets on Hungary, very real problem of timing for Yugoslavs. Soviets may be insisting on some loosening Yugoslav military ties with US as price for concessions in Hungary. I think we agree here and in Department loosening ties has been primary target of USSR since Khrushchev visit,⁴ and in spite of press polemics, Soviets may be pressing again for some gesture. Convergence of (A) and (B) may make Tito hesitant to have resumption MDAP announced following closely on news his visit to US. Now that we have opened subject, think best posture for us is relaxed attitude while awaiting clearer formulation Yugoslav position.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/12–2456. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Telegram 505, Decemberr 21 [1 page of source text], was not declassified.
3. In telegram 892 from Belgrade, December 24, Riddleberger reported on a conversation he had with Tito concerning Hungary. Tito informed Riddleberger that he had written a letter to the Soviet Government concerning the situation in Hungary and that he thought he could influence Soviet decisions there. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/12–2456)
3. Reference is the the President’s Citizen Advisers on the Mutual Security Program (Fairless Committee), chaired by Benjamin F. Fairless. The committee was commissioned to examine U.S. foreign assistance programs.
4. Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia September 19–27.