Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, July 19, 1957—7:20 p.m.

182. Deptel 142 to Bonn rptd Berlin 29 USAREUR.² Following are Department’s views on current phase Berlin access problem for reference in preparing for subsequent discussions between Berlin Political Advisers and Kotsiuba.

1. Reviewing key problem leave travel to Berlin in light of considerations contained Deptel 3491 to Bonn rptd Berlin 552³ and of circumstances obtaining this phase discussions with Soviets, Department does not believe any action should be taken at this time to restrict leave travel beyond measures described USAREUR’s SX 4217,⁴ which it is hoped may prove useful in correcting aspect of situation which may have promoted Soviets’ attempt impose tighter controls last November.

2. Department continues believe problems of form and language of travel documentation can best be worked out in interested headquarters in Germany and would be prepared approve any changes of form which (a) would not further complicate or delay documentation procedures or clearances at checkpoints and (b) could not be exploited by Soviets as pretext for more harassment or construed by Soviets as commitment by us to restrict scope or reduce present volume Allied travel to Berlin. On other hand we perceive no real point our engaging in discussion with Kotsiuba over meaning or interpretation of Russian word “Komandirovka” (Bonn’s 181 rptd Berlin 20).⁵ Factor of primary importance to us is interpretation we put on English word (“instruction”) which would be used on heading of stamp to be placed on back of travel orders, and on this basis Soviets should be free to use any Russian word they wish as its equivalent.

3. To prevent any misunderstanding on part of Soviets, therefore, Department believes idea should be clearly conveyed to Kotsiuba that in our view “instruction” stamp (what Soviets refer to as “Komandirovka”) authorizing travel “in connection with occupation of Berlin” adds nothing essential to travel orders now in use, that all current travel to Berlin is authorized “in connection with occupation of Berlin”, and that documentation changes accepted cannot be taken as representing any commitment our part to restrict or reduce present travel. Soviets should be left no valid basis for subsequently charging us with bad faith or subterfuge.

4. While we do not believe it would be appropriate to force showdown with Soviets on access question at this time, we consider it would be useful, in next discussions with Kotsiuba, to explore present Soviet intentions and attempt estimate pressure Soviets currently intend apply. This might be done by setting forth our position in restrained but firm language and attempting bring discussions to conclusion while at same time leaving door open for consideration further suggestions to eliminate practical difficulties at checkpoints if Soviets prove unwilling settle for changes of form to which Allies have agreed to date. We infer from superficially amicable tone conversations with Kotsiuba, lack new Soviet threats, milder form in which Kotsiuba set new deadline, and absence reports of recent incidents involving Allied access that Soviets may not at moment be prepared force issue on travel to Berlin. Possibility Soviets might be content with Allied “concessions” on form of travel documentation and that discussions might be terminated without significant reduction present volume leave travel to Berlin is one which, even if slim, Department believes should be explored this juncture.

5. Department therefore recommends Embassy propose to British and French that Political Advisers in next meeting with Kotsiuba (presumably after Kotsiuba’s return from Moscow) recapitulate documentation changes which Allies prepared accept and that Chairman, speaking for all, make oral statement and leave with Kotsiuba memorandum along following lines:

In discussing Berlin travel questions with Colonel Kotsiuba, Political Advisers have been concerned solely with question of revising documentation procedures in order facilitate processing of Allied travelers at Soviet checkpoints. Soviet suggestions have been received and studied and certain counter-suggestions have been made, and it is believed that new procedures under consideration will definitely assist in accomplishing that very practical objective. Political Advisers wish emphasize, however, that any suggestions regarding documentation procedure which they may have made or any changes to which they may agree must not be construed as representing departure from long-standing position with respect to right of access to Berlin of which Allies have reminded Soviets on several occasions in past. Should Soviets consider that travel instruction stamp on reverse of travel orders certifying bearer has right to travel to Berlin in connection with occupation of Berlin would contribute to easier and more rapid clearance of Allied travelers, Allies are prepared follow such procedure. If proper Russian translation for “instruction” or “ordre de route” in this sense is “Komandirovka”, Allies have no objection use of that word. However Political Advisers wish reiterate that in view their governments possession of a properly completed travel order should be adequate without additional documentation to establish both that bearer has right proceed to Berlin and that specific voyage described is authorized. Allied Ambassadors, Commanders-in-Chief, and Commandants in Berlin are not at this time authorizing any travel to Berlin which they do not believe essential or desirable in connection with occupation of Berlin, and they have no intention of doing so in future. However they must insist that determination of what travel is to take place in connection with occupation is right which is theirs alone. Allied authorities will continue take full responsibility for all persons traveling to Berlin on basis Allied travel documentation, and they expect Soviet control officers to clear without question or delay any traveler properly documented. Political Advisers would be pleased at any time discuss with Colonel Kotsiuba any practical problems which may arise in connection clearance Allied travelers. They feel discussions to date have been useful in clarifying situation and trust Colonel Kotsiuba shares their view that, with proper show of good will on either side, there should be no need for further difficulties.

6. For your background information Department considers that phrase “in connection with occupation of Berlin”, which we have for long time thought might appropriately be added to Berlin travel orders (see Deptel 1736 to Bonn Dec 27, 1955 rptd Berlin 324 USAREUR Paris 2396 pouched London; Deptel 1869 to Bonn Jan 11, 1956 rptd Berlin 340 USAREUR Paris 2530 pouched London)⁶ should be interpreted to cover all travel to Berlin by Allied military and civilian, personnel, including dependents, personnel on leave, etc., whose presence in Berlin is considered by Ambassadors and Commanders as contributing to welfare, morale and normal needs of our occupation personnel in Berlin.

7. In summary Department in outlining above approach guided by two main principles: (a) desirability demonstrating to Soviets measure of flexibility in our approach to documentation problem, while carefully avoiding any compromise or concession on our basic rights, in hope this will make possible solution problem palatable to Soviets and arrival at modus vivendi re system for processing military train and Autobahn travelers, and (b) necessity for making our basic position this problem sufficiently clear to Soviets so that there can be no valid basis for subsequent charge by them of bad faith or subterfuge our part.

8. Defense concurs above.

9. FYI. Should situation ultimately develop to point where it becomes clear continuation leave travel from West Germany to Berlin on present scale would jeopardize more essential duty and leave travel of Berlin occupation forces themselves and duty travel from West Germany to Berlin, Department would be prepared reconsider possibility restricting leave travel to Berlin. Department relies on Embassy and Mission to inform it when and if they consider such critical situation actually reached.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7–1957. Confidential. Drafted by Creel and McKiernan; approved by Jones; and cleared with Lisle, Eleanor Dulles, the Department of Defense, and Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Telegram 142 indicated that Kotsiuba must not be given the impression that the Western Allies would countenance a reduction in the volume of travel to Berlin, and stated that a fuller expression on subsequent discussions with the Soviets would be forthcoming. (Ibid., 762.0221/7–1657)
3. Document 201.
4. Not found in Department of State files.
5. In telegram 181, the Embassy in Bonn stated that it shared the Mission in Berlin’s reservations about the use of the word “Komandirovka.” (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7–1757)
6. Telegram 1736 is printed as Document 174; telegram 1869 is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/1–656)