Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

204. Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington , July 17, 1957 .

PROGRESS REPORT ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD BERLIN (NSC 5404/1)²

(Policy Approved by the President January 25, 1954)

(Period covered: December 5, 1956 through July 17, 1957)

A. Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives³

1. OCB Recommendation Regarding Policy Review. See paragraph Al of Progress Report on Federal Republic of Germany.⁴

2. Summary Evaluations. The Western position in Berlin has been maintained without basic change. Although the Soviets have continued to make difficulties for certain categories of Allied personnel travelling to Berlin with regard to their travel documentation, there has as yet been no significant interference with Allied access to Berlin. An evaluation of actions taken in the implementation of U.S. policy follows:

a. Making clear the Western position. We have continued to impress upon the Soviets our alertness to developments in Berlin by reacting vigorously to Communist-inspired incidents and activities which contain any implication of a threat to the status of the City or the Allied position there.

The departure of Ambassador Conant⁵ provided an opportunity for reiterating publicly the U.S. determination to maintain its position in Berlin and to regard an attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack against ourselves.

b. Bolstering the economy and morale. While the rate of the progress of the economy recently has not been as great as in previous years, the Berlin economy is now, in general, about 10% above the 1936 level. However, it still lags considerably behind West Germany. A continuing upward trend in West Berlin’s economic activity remains an important element in maintaining the morale of the city and serving as an attraction for the citizens of East Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

c. Continuing Special Soviet Zone projects. West Berlin continues to serve as a powerful magnet attracting the population of the Soviet Zone, and thus serves as a focal point for special projects financed by the U.S. and the Federal Republic to influence these persons. (See East Germany Progress Report.)⁶

d. Military planning regarding Berlin access. Some limited progress has been made in the field of tripartite military planning regarding action to be taken in the event of serious interference by the Soviets with access to Berlin. During the period the three Allied Commanders-in-Chief in Germany completed and submitted to the three Ambassadors a study regarding the feasibility of using limited force in the event of such interference for the purposes of (a) determining Soviet intentions and (b) attempting to reopen access to Berlin. This study concluded in essence that the use of limited force would be feasible for the purposes indicated above in the case of serious Soviet interference with Allied access to Berlin by the road and air routes, but not in the case of such interference with access by the rail or water routes. The State and Defense Departments instructed our Embassy in Bonn to seek British and French concurrence in a further request to the three military commanders to initiate tripartite planning with regard to the specific military measures which could be taken in those areas where the use of limited force had been determined to be feasible.

e. Maintaining stockpile and airlift planning. Regular meetings of the quadripartite Berlin stockpile committee were held in Bonn. The mild winter in Berlin plus a step-up in deliveries of brown coal from East Germany have kept withdrawals of coal and coke from the stockpile at extremely low levels.

The Allied airlift planning groups have also met to prepare up-to-date details of military planning for an airlift. Full-scale planning sessions with German participation await completion of this military planning.

f. Planning countermeasures to Communist harassments. Progress in planning effective Western countermeasures against possible Communist harassment of Berlin continues to be blocked by the failure of the West Germans to produce trade statistics regarding the pattern of West German exports to the GDR without which no meaningful assessment of East German vulnerabilities can be made.

3. Progress in Carrying Out Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services or Other Programs. Agreement has been reached on the programming of FY 1957 mutual security aid for Berlin in the amount of $6 million. Of this sum, $5.5 million is being provided in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, the sale of which will generate local currency for financing the projects involved. The FY 1957 program includes a student housing project for the Free University, aid to the city’s Reconstruction Program and a small technical exchange program. This U.S. aid, while very modest in comparison to economic assistance granted by [to?] the Federal Republic, has an important political effect in maintaining Berlin morale and in furnishing tangible evidence of the U.S. determination to maintain its position in Berlin. The Federal Republic will contribute about $240 million in grants and loans to the city in the coming year to meet the city’s budget deficit and further the development of low-cost housing.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

4. Difficulties Regarding Allied Access to Berlin. Since November, 1956 the Soviets have been creating difficulties for Allied travel to Berlin by military train and Autobahn by their action in questioning the documentation carried by certain categories of Allied travelers. While these difficulties have resulted in no significant interference with Allied travel to Berlin, they continued throughout the period despite a number of Allied protests. On April 20 the Soviets presented, at the Berlin Commandant level, a list of specific requirements regarding the documentation to be carried by Allied travelers to Berlin,⁷ indicating that unless these requirements were met travelers without such documentation would not be permitted to pass Soviet checkpoints. The position taken by the Soviets raises the basic issue of whether they have the right under Four-Power Agreements to question the determination by the Western Powers as to what categories of Allied personnel are entitled to travel to Berlin by military train or Autobahn. In his first call on Mr. Pushkin, the Soviet “Ambassador to the GDR”, on April 29 Ambassador Bruce raised the matter and restated the Allied position fully and firmly.⁸ The entire problem is still under discussion between Allied and Soviet officials in Germany.

5. Vulnerability to Harassment Continues. Despite these recent Soviet attempts to exercise control over certain aspects of Allied road and rail traffic to Berlin, West German access to Berlin has continued to be remarkably free of interference. The great bulk of Allied traffic has also continued to flow unimpeded. Although no clear pattern could be discerned in the recent Soviet measures, the difficulties have served to point up the continuing vulnerability of both Allied and German traffic to Soviet and East German harassment. The threat of Soviet exploitation of this vulnerability to compel the Western Powers to grant some measure of recognition to the GDR remains as great as ever.

C. Listing of Other Major Developments During the Period

6. Internal Political Developments. Governing Mayor Suhr continued in poor health during the period under review. With Suhr alternately working full-time and taking rest cures, leadership was uncertain and minor issues claimed a disproportionately large amount of the attention of local political leaders. West Berlin politicians of all parties have continued to press for the removal of Allied objections to the direct election of Berlin’s Bundestag representatives and to their being given voting rights in the Bundestag. The Berlin CDU (Christian Democratic Party) was not successful, however, in overcoming the opposition of Chancellor Adenauer to these steps, and it has not been necessary for the Allies to take a fresh position on the matter.

7. U.S. Legislation Makes Research Reactor Possible. The President on April 12 signed legislation which makes it possible for the United States to enter into an atomic energy agreement with the Federal Government for a nuclear reactor for Berlin, and an agreement was initialed on June 19.⁹ The city has already ordered a reactor in the U.S. and it is scheduled for delivery in the autumn.

8. Intra-City Travel. Although most German travel within the city continues to move with little difficulty across the East-West sector border, the East Berlin police have recently introduced punitive measures against some West Berlin merchants who have engaged in selling goods at their establishments to East German residents for Eastmarks and who later visit East Berlin. Controls on West Berliners visiting cemeteries in outlying districts in the Soviet Zone have also been tightened.

9. International Building Exposition. The mild winter made it possible to accelerate construction on the buildings which will be the main attraction of the International Building Exposition which will open this summer. The U.S. exhibit, a Conference Hall, is nearing completion and plans for the opening ceremony on September 19 are well advanced. The formal dedication of the building will provide an appropriate opportunity for re-emphasizing the U.S. interest in Berlin’s future.

10. German Traffic Between Berlin and the West. German traffic to and from Berlin has flowed with virtually unprecedented freedom from Communist harassment. No confiscations and fines were reported on the highways, and barge and train traffic has proceeded without interruption.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Germany. Secret. Regarding the composition of this report, see footnote 1, Document 127. An attached Financial Annex is not printed.
2. See Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1390.
3. The latest NIE for Berlin is NIE 11–3–56, dated 2/28/56. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11–3–56 is printed as Document 178.]
4. Document 127.
5. Conant left Bonn on February 19, 1957.
6. Document 235.
7. See Document 191.
8. See Document 195.
9. For a summary of this agreement, which was signed at Washington on July 28 and entered into force on August 1, see Department of State Bulletin, July 27, 1957, p. 149.