Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

201. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, June 8, 1957—1:39 p.m.

3491. Berlin’s 1178 sent Bonn 1043 USAREUR 171 pouched London, Paris, Moscow.²

1. Political Advisers’ June 1 meeting with Kotsiuba has made clearer than ever a) that current Soviet objective is to deny use of Autobahn and military trains for purpose leave travel to and from Berlin by Allied personnel not stationed Berlin, and b) that solution of various problems relating to form of orders, stamps, etc. will turn on our decision how to deal with this principal issue.

2. In reaching decision whether we should continue to insist on maintaining type of travel in question we feel following considerations should be taken into account:

a) Distinction exists between our basic interests in Allied access to Berlin and those marginal interests which are without significant effect on our basic position. Fundamental function of Berlin access is to enable Western Allies to discharge their responsibilities in connection with occupation of Berlin. This includes supply of Allied personnel stationed in Berlin, leave travel to West for such personnel, and travel to Berlin of Allied officials to perform duties in connection with administration and occupation of Berlin and maintenance of City’s welfare.

b) We must continue insist that Ambassadors and Commanders alone have right to decide whose travel to Berlin is necessary. However we would not be on particularly firm ground in insisting that travel to Berlin of large number of leave personnel from West is based on determination by Ambassadors or Commanders that such travel is essential to carry on Allied occupation functions in Berlin.

c) General references in original four-power agreements on Berlin access to “free access by air, road and rail from Frankfort and Bremen for US forces” do not in context (previous clause refers to “garrison of Berlin”) provide unassailable legal basis for travel to Berlin for purposes personal pleasure. Value of 1949 New York agreement in providing for restoration situation existing prior March 1, 1948 considered limited in view our understanding that in period 1945–1948 leave travel to Berlin as such was discouraged (because of limited facilities in Berlin) and that published military regulations, probably available to Soviets, forbade such travel except in special circumstances. Presumably therefore prior to March 1, 1948 there was little or no Allied leave travel from West to Berlin authorized as such (request Embassy verify this point). In any controversy we would of course seek to make effective use of the Paris June 20, 1949 communiqué³ particularly references to “normal” access. However, whether we can argue effectively that this agreement imposes on the Soviets specific legal obligation (particularly in view of references to German authorities) requiring them to pass leave personnel on same basis as duty personnel is not clear.

d) Current difficulties with Soviets have now been going on for over 7 months during which Soviet attack has increasingly centered on documentation failing to establish travel to Berlin is for official purpose. While we probably could live with present situation more or less indefinitely, despite annoyance and inconvenience caused in individual cases, Soviets are likely try to bring matter to a head in not distant future. While difficult to foresee exact means they might use to do so, one possible line would be for Soviets to notify us that unless by certain specified date Allied documentation is changed to meet Soviet requirements Allied travelers will not be permitted to proceed past Soviet checkpoints. Upon arrival specified date, assuming no action has been taken by us to meet Soviet demand, Soviet course might be to challenge arbitrarily one or more travelers on military train as traveling for unacceptable purpose. They would then confront us with alternative of either removing such personnel from train or returning to point of origin. While on first such occasion, and possibly a few times thereafter, we would probably choose latter alternative, we could not long continue this course of action of imposing rail blockade on ourselves solely on behalf of interests of leave personnel.

e) There appears no likelihood that our protests at local level against Soviet action, which would presumably be based on express instruction from Moscow, would be any more effective than in recent instance of protest against Soviet action in checking individual identification US military convoy personnel. Any tripartite demarche in Moscow, which would be difficult to make without becoming publicly known, would engage Soviet prestige in manner unlikely produce favorable result unless Three Powers were in position exert effective political or psychological pressure or take further measures in case of rebuff. Previous examinations of feasibility exerting pressure by retaliatory measures have led to conclusion that under existing circumstances results unlikely be productive. Moreover Soviets are aware that public opinion in US and other Western countries, including Federal Republic, unlikely to support strong measures involving risk of serious crisis in situation where Soviets were not interfering with movement of personnel to and from Berlin on legitimate occupation business and where Soviets would be in position to present issue as involving nothing more than inexpensive leave and recreational travel.

f) Certain disadvantages would of course be involved in eliminating or drastically restricting leave travel to Berlin by Autobahn or military train. Since only alternative means of travel would be by more expensive commercial air (travel via other land routes involving acceptance GDR visas is of course out of question for official personnel) there would be many fewer leave travelers to Berlin. Cheap leave travel to Berlin has contributed to morale of forces, and expenditures of leave personnel in Berlin have helped Berlin economy. These factors are however subsidiary to importance maintaining fundamental aspects our Berlin access position.

3. We note from Bonn’s 4713 sent Berlin 551 rptd USAREUR 671⁴ that both British and French are prepared “for present” to hold out against Soviet position that personnel stationed outside Berlin be authorized for duty travel only. We believe we should follow same course. In light considerations advanced above however, question arises whether we should not be prepared, if at some future point in negotiations with Soviets such action appears necessary, to take steps (but without indicating to Kotsiuba we are doing so) to protect our basic interest in Berlin access by internal measures to restrict Berlin leave travel via Autobahn or military train by those persons not stationed there. Should we do so we would avoid involving our prestige on issue where strong public support would probably be lacking and on which it highly doubtful we would win out in any event. In addition we could thus prevent issue from developing in manner which might compromise vis-à-vis Soviets their recognition, at least thus far, of right of Ambassadors and Commanders to determine what travel necessary in connection with occupation of Berlin. Such decision would not prevent limited issuance temporary duty orders (without per diem) to leave personnel in cases issuing authorities believed important. It would on other hand require barring advertising by American Express of package tours to Berlin from West for military personnel using military trains. It would be preferable, if such decision were made, to implement it, so far as possible, gradually and without dramatic impact.

4. If this decision were made, we would then be in position if necessary to develop some phrase for travel orders under heading “purpose of trip” such as “official government business”. Obviously no specific designation of duties or occupation of traveler should be given since detail under this heading would open door to challenge by Soviets in individual cases and arguments over definition and interpretation which could jeopardize position of each person traveling to and from Berlin.

5. Re mechanical problems of form and language of travel orders, stamps, etc. raised by Kotsiuba, we believe these can best be worked out by various interested headquarters in Germany. On language point, however, we would see no real objection in principle to having both travel orders and stamps prepared in all four languages—English, French, Russian and German—if this considered practicable and proves necessary. As concerns use of German for travel orders, however, it might be preferable have this set out as fourth language on uniform version travel order for use by nationals all three Western Powers (allowing for necessary variations from uniformity for different flags each national element, designation of issuing authority, signatures, etc.) rather than preparing separate complete document in German.

6. Request comments Embassy. Views Berlin and USAREUR should be sought.⁵

7. Defense concurs in this request.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6–857. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Lisle and Creel on June 7; cleared with Reinstein, Beam, Eleanor Dulles, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Supra.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 1062.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/6–657)
5. On June 13 and 15, the Mission in Berlin and the Embassy in Bonn replied that they were in general agreement with the substance of this telegram. They further agreed that official travel must have complete freedom, but stated that leave travel would probably have to be sacrificed if the Soviets became adamant about it. (Telegram 1070 from Berlin to Bonn, repeated to the Department of State as 4853; and telegram 4852 from Bonn; both Ibid., 762.0221/6–1557)