Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

35. Paper Prepared by the Interdepartmental Escapee Committee¹

Washington, November 2, 1955.

DETAILED DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR ACTIONS CONCERNING ESCAPEES UNDER NSC 86/1² AND OTHER RELATED POLICIES, . . .

From December 17, 1954 through November 2, 1955

(Policy Approved by the President April 19, 1951)

1. Program to Counter Soviet Efforts to Demoralize the Emigration.

In December 1954, the Department of State requested a detailed study be undertaken of what appeared to be an intensive campaign intended to demoralize the Soviet and satellite emigration. The campaign has taken the form of spurious offers of amnesty, letters from home beseeching relatives to return, special bulletins urging redefection and attacking Western information organizations and exile associations and the creation of new radio stations beamed to the émigrés. The Communist efforts are not confined to propaganda but include such undercover techniques as assassinations, kidnappings, and pressure by agents provocateurs. The conclusions of the several interested agencies of the Government are that the Soviets and satellites are attempting to sow dissension among Eastern European émigrés, to disrupt anti-Communist activities in which they participate, to induce those who are responsive to propaganda or pressure to return to their native lands, and to lay the groundwork for subversion among those who cannot be lured to return. The campaign has as one of its goals to discredit the free world program to care for and rehabilitate the refugees. Were it to achieve notable success, the task of implementing NSC 86/1 would become extremely difficult.

The Interdepartmental Escapee Committee developed a program of countermeasures which was concurred in by the OCB on April 13, 1955.³ The program called for (a) increased material assistance to the emigration, (b) a propaganda counter-offensive, and (c) protection and security of the émigrés.

State:

It was recommended that the program be launched by a statement from the President reiterating the policy of asylum and of continued assistance to the refugees. On several occasions the Department prepared and submitted to the Special Assistant to the President draft material for possible use in the Presidential statement. Unfortunately, the statement was never made, thereby delaying implementation of other segments of the plan. Presently, and without benefit of the high-level statement, the Department is preparing to ask the governments of countries of asylum and international agencies to augment their current refugee resettlement programs.

ICA:

The Soviet campaign is being partially countered by intensification of orientation programs and through an intensive 90-day counseling scheme. All USEP missions have been requested to follow this problem closely and to undertake measures required to counteract it.

USIA:

To counter the Soviet redefection efforts, USIA, in consultation with interested U.S. agencies, has made plans to launch a counter-offensive designed to achieve the following goals:

a. Expose the true purposes of the Soviet campaign.

b. Explain the problems and accomplishments of the West in dealing with Eastern European refugees.

c. To reemphasize continuing Western interest in escapees.

d. To challenge the Soviets to prove that iron curtain conditions have been improved.

It is still too early to report on the results of the initial efforts. Although the Agency has endeavored to obtain statements and other material essential to a vigorous counter-offensive, there has been a conspicuous scarcity of authoritative, high-level, official statements with which to work.

2. Problems Arising from Austrian Independence.

State:

Successfully opposed inclusion in the Austrian Treaty of an article (16) proposed by the Soviets⁴ which would have jeopardized the security of at least 50,000 refugees from the Soviet orbit in Austria.

In consultation with the Committee, State informed Embassy Vienna in June 1955⁵ that USEP should be continued without change except that exploitation of assistance and attribution to the U.S. Government in Austria should be discontinued and emphasis should be placed on resettlement.

3. Admission of Former Soviet Orbit Nationals to the U.S. Under Refugee Relief Act.⁶

State:

As of October 7, 1955, the Refugee Relief Program had issued 4,788 visas to former Soviet orbit nationals, 2,341 of whom were reported to have actually reached the United States.

Reviewed proposals for legislation to liberalize immigration of escapees to the United States, leading to the introduction of the Watkins Bill (Congressional Record of May 31, 1955).

ICA:

USEP suggested and the Department of State has agreed to accord operational priority to cases presented by the U.S. Escapee Program for processing for entry into the United States under the Refugee Relief Act, and to process U.S. escapee cases before an assurance is secured when the Escapee Program states that an assurance in all likelihood will be forthcoming. Although this action has been instituted only recently, it has already had a favorable effect and the rate of resettlement in the U.S. under the Refugee Relief Act is expected to increase rapidly. Additional and expanded assurance search projects have been undertaken. To date these projects have produced 8,360 assurances.

4. Yugoslav Refugee Problems.

State:

a. Satellite Refugees in Yugoslavia. There are approximately 1,000 satellite refugees held under concentration camp conditions in Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslavs are under strong pressures to repatriate the refugees as part of their “normalization” of relations with the satellites, they have agreed to permit the departure of this group to the West. The problem has been to find a haven for the refugees in the West, the U.S. Escapee Program providing a support function. Working jointly with ICA/USEP, the Department of State has taken the following measures:

April 1955: Authorized Embassy Rome⁷ to try to induce the Italian Government to admit the escapees temporarily. The negotiations have continued slowly but not unfavorably. The Italians have tentatively agreed to accept 250 of the escapees.

July 1955: U.S. Ambassador Belgrade requested Yugoslav Government to reduce its pressure to move the refugees out of the country.⁸ Requested Embassy Vienna in concert with British and French to approach the Austrian Government in support of a policy of asylum if necessary to assure reception of 125 satellite refugees who “escaped” from Yugoslavia into Austria.⁹

August 1955: Approached the Greek Embassy Washington and authorized Embassy Athens¹⁰ to continue negotiations with the Foreign Office for admittance into Greece for all or part of the escapees in Yugoslavia. Authorized Embassy Paris¹¹ to seek permission of the French Government to admit the escapees either on a temporary or a permanent basis.

b. Limitation of Assistance to Yugoslav Refugees under USEP.

Prepared a recommendation that OCB reconsider its earlier decision limiting assistance to Yugoslav refugees to 20 per cent of the total new arrivals accepted into the program. Recommend instead that assistance be limited to 15 per cent of the total budget of USEP in order to facilitate operations for voluntary agencies. The change was approved by the OCB.

ICA:

In the period under review the Escapee Program, after consultation with other interested agencies and the OCB, has taken measures to implement the Board’s decision that expenditures for Yugoslav refugees may not constitute more than 15 per cent of the Program’s total budget. This decision was taken by the OCB in recognition of the fact that Yugoslav refugees are not greatly important to the objectives set forth in NSC 86/1, and that exploitation of assistance to them is not in the national interest; consequently, assistance to this group is limited in recognition of their relatively low priority.

5. Entrance into the U.S. of Escapees from Soviet Orbit Ships.

State:

Reviewed and recommended favorable consideration be given the application for entry into the U.S. of certain seamen of the Soviet orbit ships Praca, Gottwald and Tuapse, which were taken into custody by the Chinese Nationalist Government.¹²

6. Assistance to Former Soviet Nationals.

ICA:

The U.S. Escapee Program has intensified its efforts to render further assistance to former nationals of the USSR in recognition of their greater importance to U.S. national objectives. At present a 90-day period of intensive counseling and visits to the homes of each Russian on the USEP caseload is under way. Escapee Program Field Units have been instructed to be lenient in the application of eligibility criteria to this group.

7. Assistance to Escapees in the Far East.

ICA:

A limited exploitation of Escapee Program activities in the Far East has been undertaken. Field arrangements for this exploitation have been made and appropriate policy guidance issued. Also in the Far East, the movement of 845 KMT disabled veterans from Rennies Mill Camp in Hong Kong to Formosa was commenced on May 16. This action which is evidence of the responsibility of the Chinese Nationalist Government to those who have served it faithfully will remove a serious negative psychological factor.

8. The Alien Enlistee Program (Lodge Bill).

Defense:

Implementation of regulations and the validity of testing devices for the enlistment of persons under the Lodge Bill are now under review in order that the enlistment of escapees in this program will not be minimized by too stringent and unrealistic standards. During the period 30 June 1950–31 August 1955, 934 enlistments have been accepted. This is regarded within Defense as an unrealistically low figure and the survey mentioned above was accordingly instituted. It should be stressed however that the Alien Enlistee Program must remain a highly selective one, and cannot be considered in any sense a mass disposal mechanism. Latest figures give 934 enlistees as the total to date. Attention is invited to the fact that personnel enlisted under this program are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship upon the completion of five years honorable service and must therefore be carefully screened on a basis not exclusively related to the objectives of NSC 86/1.

However, recognizing, among other things, the overall value of the program to NSC 86/1 objectives, the Department of Defense sponsored a two-year extension of this bill (June) and on 18 July the Department of the Army sent a cable to field agencies requesting a step-up in recruiting activities. There is presently underway a Department of the Army study on ways and means whereby alien enlistees can be more effectively utilized.

Interesting sidelights include the following: Army produced a film on the alien enlistee which has been received favorably wherever shown. A check of alien enlistees serving in Korea showed a considerable number in the rank of sergeant. Two alien enlistees are warrant officers, one has already been commissioned and one is presently being considered for a direct commission as captain.

9. Information Programs.

USIA:

During the reporting period USIA continued to place emphasis on the primary propaganda objectives of the program (a) to reflect U.S. concern, not only for the welfare of the escapees from behind the iron curtain, but also for the enslaved people they represent, and (b) to encourage defection of Soviet and key satellite nationals.

In support of the objectives outlined in NSC 86/1, USIA issued to the field several guidances regulating escapee exploitation including basic information policy guidance with respect to (a) escapees in general, and (b) escapees in the Far East; an information policy guidance on current Soviet redefection efforts; and instructions to posts in the resettlement areas of Brazil and Australia as to how to handle interviews of successfully resettled escapees.

In addition, special guidances were prepared for the third anniversary of the U.S. Escapee Program, as well as for special escapee arrival ceremonies in the U.S.

Information media output, notably the press service and radio broadcasting continued to make good use of news items, feature articles and commentaries and interviews covering escapee arrival, care, training, transportation and resettlement. A decided increase in interviews of resettled escapees in the U.S., Panama, Australia, Turkey, Lebanon and Europe took place during the reporting period reflecting the results of planning described in the previous report to OCB.

The Motion Picture Service sent to the field a film—“Poles are Stubborn People,” which reenacts the experiences of two Polish escapees, Korowics and Hajdukiewics. Research assistance throughout the period was provided by USIA’s Office of Research and Intelligence.

Arrangements were made to use the diverse language abilities of an ex-VOA producer, now resident in Brazil, to obtain interviews with suitable resettled individuals in that area.

Plans were advanced to familiarize USIA personnel in detail with Escapee Program operations and the Information Agency’s responsibility to publicize its achievements. A paper was prepared for both new and returning field personnel on the Escapee Program for use in the Agency’s training program.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Escapees, Defectors—Documents. Secret. Prepared and concurred in by the Interdepartmental Escapee Committee (an OCB group chaired by a representative of the Department of State with representatives from Defense, CIA, USIA, ICA, Justice, and the OCB staff). The report is a compilation of reports from State, Defense, ICA, and USIA and was not formally submitted to the OCB, but rather circulated informally to member agencies, the NSC Staff, and others for background and reference. The report was submitted to the OCB Board of Assistants by the OCB Secretariat under cover of a memorandum of November 14.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Escapee Program—1955)
4. For documentation on the final drafting of the Austrian State Treaty, see vol. V, pp. 1 ff.
5. In telegram 3631 to Vienna, June 21, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 760.00/5–2755)
6. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953, P.L. 203 (67 Stat. 400), approved August 7, 1953, provided 209,000 nonquota U.S. immigration visas in recognition of surplus population and refugee problems. Of this number, 45,000 could be issued to Soviet Bloc escapees.
7. In telegram 3407 to Rome, April 22, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 760.00/4–2255)
8. No record of this request has been found in Department of State files.
9. As instructed in telegram 70 to Vienna, July 8, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 760.00/7–855)
10. No record of these approaches has been found in Department of State files.
11. Apparent reference to telegram 937 to Paris, September 9, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 760.00/9–155)

12. Chinese Nationalist forces intercepted the Polish tanker Praca on October 4, 1953, the Polish merchant ship President Gottwald on May 13, 1954, and the Soviet tanker Tuapse on June 23, 1954. The Polish and Soviet Governments protested these seizures on the high seas and charged the United States with responsibility for them in notes of October 12, 1953, May 15, June 24, and July 2, 1954. The United States rejected the charges in notes of October 12, 1953, May 20, June 26, and July 4, 1954. The texts of the Polish note of October 12, 1953 and the Soviet notes of June 24 and July 4 and all U.S. replies are in Department of State Bulletin, November 9, 1953, p. 640; May 31, 1954, pp. 824–825; July 12, 1954, p. 51; and July 26, 1954, p. 131. For documentation on the seizures and their repercussions, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIV, Part 1, pp. 472 ff.

    Twenty-two members of the crews of the Polish ships defected and were granted asylum in the United States in October 1954. Nine more Polish crew members and nine members of the Tuapse had subsequent requests for U.S. asylum pending. Documentation on the seizures, protests, and the defections is in Department of State, Central Files 948.53, 748.00, and 761.00.