Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

34. Memorandum From George T. Lister of the Office of Eastern European Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Polish, Baltic, and Czechoslovak Affairs (Trivers)¹

Washington, October 20, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Comment on NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities”

The following suggestions and comment are submitted in response to the request for information concerning various actions taken to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Polish Government in accordance with sections 26 through 45 of the Draft Progress Report to the NSC on NSC 5505/1, “Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities.”²

I do not feel that the form of the Draft Progress Report is really suitable for an effective and clear description of the Department’s exploitation of Satellite vulnerabilities. Perhaps an overall statement could be inserted as an annex or at the beginning of the sections on the Satellites. That statement could point out that:

(1) Much of the Department’s activity in this regard consists of providing information, suggestions, advice and guidance for other branches and agencies of the Government; and

(2) the Department itself has taken direct action through such channels as: direct negotiations with the Polish Government, including some diplomatic notes which have been made public; negotiations and speeches in the UN; official statements by Departmental spokesmen referring to conditions in Poland or to our official attitude towards the Polish regime or towards the Polish people; official messages to anti-Communist Poles, frequently on the occasion of Polish national holidays or anniversaries; official statements at press conferences and in reply to questions raised on those occasions; Departmental letters in response to inquiries of many kinds regarding our policy and views concerning Polish affairs or conditions in Poland; publicity for appropriate detectors and escapees; friendly and close relations with Polish émigrés and our recognition of them, both implicit and explicit, as unofficial representatives of the Polish people; and influences exerted on other governments and peoples with respect to our policy and views vis-à-vis Poland.

It might also be pointed out that in practice, of course, there is a great overlap in the vulnerabilities listed in the Draft Progress Report, and most of the abovementioned activities of the Department would simultaneously cover several, if not most, of them. Even more important, all of the vulnerabilities listed have been exploited in many ways and on many occasions through the methods indicated above. These numerous actions simply do not lend themselves to concise and complete enumeration. Therefore, the examples cited below are included not as representing a complete list of total effort but rather as a very few typical instances of exploitation of Polish Communist vulnerabilities.

(26) ³ Nationalism and religion are probably the two most important factors working against the USSR in Poland. Many of the various Departmental activities listed above have encouraged Polish nationalism, without attempting to evoke active resistance or rash conduct which would lead to nothing but reprisals. As one example there is attached a message, drafted for the President’s signature, relating to nationalism and patriotism in Poland.⁴ There is also attached a note sent to the Polish and Soviet Governments on April 21, 1955.⁵

(27) ⁶ We have not accepted the present Polish-German frontier as permanent, although that is the only point of any importance on which the Communists can arouse anti-American feeling in Poland.

(28) ⁷ See introductory statement and No. 26.

(29) ⁸ See introductory statement and No. 26. There is attached a letter sent by the Secretary to Mr. Rozmarek,⁹ of the Polish National Alliance, expressing our desire for conditions which would permit the captive peoples of Eastern Europe to participate “in the community of Europe.”

(30) ¹⁰ See introductory statement and point 26. There is attached a letter drafted for the President to the American Council of Polish Cultural Clubs,¹¹ referring to the existence of foreign oppression and an alien ideology in Poland.

(31) ¹² Although there is undoubtedly a great deal of potential unrest in Poland it has not been translated into actual action against the regime on any noteworthy scale in recent years.

(32) ¹³ The defection of Jozef Swiatlo, former Polish UB agent, provided the Department and various agencies of this Government with considerable material exposing opportunism and dissension in the Polish Communist Party. Most of this material has been published and broadcast to Poland, and has been dropped by balloon in pamphlet form in that country.¹⁴

(33) ¹⁵ See No. 26.

(34) ¹⁶ See introductory statement.

(35) ¹⁷ See introductory statement and No. 32.

(36–38) ¹⁸ See No. 26 and introductory statement.

(39) ¹⁹ There is attached a letter²⁰ referring to the discrepancies between Communist propaganda and actual achievements in Poland.

(40) ²¹ See No. 26.

(41) ²² There is attached a letter²³ referring to difficult living conditions in Poland and to the Department’s views and action regarding high customs duties imposed on gift parcels sent to Poland.

(41–45) ²⁴ See introductory statement.

There are several vulnerabilities, or sectors of activity, which are omitted from the Draft Progress Report. Religion is briefly noted under No. 37 but is actually one of the two greatest vulnerabilities. Some others entirely omitted are: the Polish Government’s very great need for foreign exchange, especially dollars, and its sources of that exchange in this country; the Polish Government’s vulnerability abroad among émigrés and hyphenated groups, where Warsaw is very active at present; and the Polish regime’s extreme vulnerability and sensitivity regarding anything which weakens or casts doubt on its claims to legitimacy, such as our position that the elections of January 19, 1947 were fraudulent.

In conclusion it might not be inappropriate to include at this time a personal opinion regarding the total effect of our efforts against the Warsaw Government. Admittedly that opinion is not necessarily correct or completely informed on all aspects of our operations, but it is based on a large and rather representative circle of personal contacts in this country and abroad and on a huge mass of reading material from every source of information available to me relating to current Polish affairs.

Very approximately, and in very general terms, I would say that we are usually just about able to hold our own with the Warsaw regime in propaganda and operations, although at the moment the Communists have an advantage through their clever exploitation of the “spirit of Geneva.” On the other hand, if one judges from the results from the point of view of what we should be achieving with the opportunities available to us, as compared to those available to the Communists, then I feel that our record is quite poor. In other words, although we are in a much stronger position than Warsaw the Communists make up for this disadvantage by making far better use of the few opportunities they do have. This is unavoidable to some extent because of the handicaps with which any democracy must contend in trying to combat and outmaneuver a dictatorship. But there are other causes which can by no means be excused on these grounds. Among these I would include Warsaw’s superiority in energy, experience, money (probably) and, above all, in coordination of all operations.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.48/10–2055. Top Secret.
2. The undated draft progress report was attached to a memorandum from Rockefeller to Hoover, Robertson, and Allen Dulles, October 7, requesting submissions from the Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA on the nature and progress of programs for which each agency was responsible. Sections 26 to 45 listed types of vulnerabilities in Eastern European satellites. (Ibid., 611.60/10–755) Regarding the approved progress report on NSC 5505/1, December 14, see footnote 2, Document 49.
3. This refers to section 26 of the draft progress report, “Nationalism in the Satellites.”
4. Not found attached.
5. The note, not found attached, requesting information on leaders of the Polish underground arrested by Soviet authorities on March 28, 1945, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 2, 1955, pp. 737–738.
6. Section 27 read, “Germany striving for reunification.”
7. Section 28 read, “Passive resistance in the Satellites.”
8. Section 29 read, “Desire of the Satellites to be part of a European community.”
9. Not found attached.
10. Section 30 read, “Reaction to Russian or Pan-Slavic nationalism and imperialism in the Satellites.”
11. Not found attached.
12. Section 31 read, “Unrest caused by the subjugation of Satellites to a traditionally hated power.”
13. Section 32 read, “Confusion, dissension, and opportunism in Satellite regimes.”
14. So-called “Operation Spotlight.”
15. Section 33 read, “Patriotic sentiments of the Satellite people.”
16. Section 34 read, “Questionable political reliability of the satellite armed forces.”
17. Section 35 read, “Conflicts between the Soviet Communist Party and the parties of the various Satellites.”
18. Sections 36, 37, and 38 read respectively, “Popular dissatisfaction with Communism and Soviet domination which will continue to slow the attainment of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe;” “Opposition to the regime based on anti-Communism, nationalism, liberal opposition to socialism, and the desire for freedom from controls over person, press, religion, and education;” and “Peasant opposition.”
19. Section 39 read, “Inconsistencies in ideology and weakness in leadership.”
20. Not found attached.
21. Section 40 read, “The persistence of many historical and cultural ties with the West.”
22. Section 41 read, “High cost of living.”
23. Not found attached.
24. Sections 42, 43, 44, and 45 read, respectively, “Resentment against Soviet economic control;” “Conflict between the demands of the Satellite consumer and the requirements of the USSR upon productive capacity;” “Shortages of materials, labor opposition, incompetent planning;” and “Low investment in agriculture.”