Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

250. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, May 8, 1957 .

OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE WITH RESPECT TO POLAND

I. Introduction

A. References:

1. U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, NSC, 5705/1 (with particular reference to para. 17(a)), approved by the President February 25, 1957.

2. Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary, NSC 5616/2, approved by the President November 19, 1956.

3. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, NSC 5608/1, approved by the President July 18, 1956.

C. Current Situation in Poland.

5. Following the establishment of the Gomulka regime October 19–20, 1956, Poland has moved in an evolutionary development in the direction of our objectives. The Gomulka regime, which was born in defiance of the Kremlin leadership, has achieved a relative degree of independence from Soviet control notwithstanding Poland’s continued membership in the Warsaw Pact. This relative independence has been exemplified by decollectivization, cessation of jamming, the church-state agreement, and the return to Moscow of Rokossovsky and other Soviet military officials and intelligence advisers. It has also been evidenced by a Polish desire to reestablish contacts with the West. On the other hand, by remaining in the Warsaw Pact and the Communist camp, and by restraining thus far the Polish population from revolutionary uprisings, the Gomulka regime has been able to avoid the fate of Hungary. Bracketed as they are by Soviet military power, the Poles have little prospect at present of achieving full national independence. Nevertheless, the Gomulka regime represents an important crucial step in the desired direction, not only so far as Poland is concerned, but also, in its potential effect, so far as the other satellite countries and the Soviet Union itself are concerned. For the future, the Polish example may be even more important in Eastern Europe than the Tito example has been in the past.

6. The Gomulka regime is engaged in a complicated balancing act. On the one hand, it has been subject to unremitting pressure from the Natolin group and the Soviet Union seeking to regain control; on the other hand, Gomulka is being pressed by the liberalizing forces inside and outside the Party to ameliorate economic and political conditions in the direction of a freer society. The Natolin group has some backing from the disaffected Communist bureaucrats who may have lost their jobs or previous privileges as a result of the Gomulka regime, but it has no popular support. The “liberalizing” elements—called “revisionists” by the Soviets and they are revisionists in the classical sense—would like to move rapidly towards a brand of social democracy unacceptable to the USSR. The overwhelming majority of the Polish people are strongly anti-Russian and particularly opposed to Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet system. If the Natolin group were clearly to regain control of the Party and government apparatus, it might well lead to a popular uprising, followed in turn by Soviet armed intervention. If the “revisionists” were to obtain control of the Party and the Government, or if the Polish people were to get out of hand, it may be expected that the Soviets would move in with armed might. Gomulka and his “centrist” group are the only force in Poland capable of maintaining the delicate balance among these other forces: The Natolin group, the “revisionists”, the people, and the USSR.

7. The Gomulka regime is leaning over backwards to avoid trouble with Moscow. However, although it appears ready to go nearly all the way with the USSR in foreign affairs, nevertheless it has not yielded on what it undoubtedly regards as the decisive point—control of affairs inside Poland and defense of Poland’s economic interests. Likewise, recent concessions to the Natolin group, such as leaving Zenon Nowak as Deputy Prime Minister, as well as recent indications that the most outspoken proponents for liberalization are being curbed should not be misinterpreted; they are necessary shifts in Gomulka’s balancing act. The basic post-October achievements in domestic policy remain unchanged.

10. Economic.

a. So long as the Polish Government retains relative independence from Moscow the United States should expand economic relations with Poland gradually in a manner designed to enable the Polish Government to lessen the economic dependence of Poland on the Soviet bloc, to increase its economic ties with the West, and, where possible, to allow greater internal economic freedom to the Polish people. Parallel policies by other Western countries should be encouraged, especially through NATO.

b. Such economic assistance as is given to Poland should be designed to contribute insofar as possible toward: (1) facilitating the reorientation of Polish trade toward the West; (2) promoting internal economic reforms, e.g., decentralization of industrial management, greater freedom of labor, agricultural decollectivization, and the elimination of compulsory farm deliveries to the state; and (3) reducing Soviet power to manipulate the economy of Poland.

c. Measures should be taken seeking to relax gradually governmental barriers which impede the normal conduct of trade between Poland and the West.

d. Efforts should be made to encourage the resumption of contacts and transactions between private business and charitable organizations in the West and Poland.

e. The settlement of long-standing economic issues between Poland and the United States resulting from the actions of the Polish Government prior to October 1956 should be sought.

11. Information and Exchanges.

a. U.S. information programs should seek to (1) influence the new Polish leaders to continue their implementation of commitments for reforms that are conducive to the attainment of U.S. objectives; (2) strengthen confidence among Poles that American policy and actions are in accord with the best interests of Poland; and (3) convey a favorable presentation of American achievements, aspirations, and culture. Emphasis should be placed on the basically Western character of Polish culture; the great interest of the American people in the peaceful activities and accomplishments of the Polish people; appreciation of Poland’s new and more independent status; and the encouragement of confidence that eventually Polish aspirations for full independence can be realized through peaceful means.

b. Information media should avoid any material that (1) invites, or treats as desirable, resort to violence; (2) appears to justify charges that changes in Poland are being inspired from without, or that the U.S. seeks military, economic or political advantage for itself or its allies in an independent Poland. Programs should be developed which indirectly discourage recourse to violence by the Polish population.

c. The United States should initiate and actively promote contacts and exchanges with Poland in economic, scientific, cultural and other fields in the context of NSC 5607. These should be coordinated through the Department of State. In addition to officially arranged activities, unofficial contacts and exchanges should be encouraged, including visits by tourists, businessmen, cultural leaders, educators, technicians, and students.

II. Current and Proposed Programs

A. Diplomatic.

1. Encourage the Free World countries to accord in their foreign relations different and more favorable treatment to Poland than to the Soviet satellites.

2. Continue to initiate and support, as appropriate, discussion of Polish problems in the North Atlantic Council to the end that the NATO countries may develop coordinated policies toward Poland consonant with U.S. objectives.

4. Consider initiating discussions with Nehru and the other neutralist leaders to emphasize to them the hazards of the present Polish situation and to explain U.S. views on the importance of maintaining gradual, orderly change in Poland. In this way prepare for the possible use of their influence in order to prevent Soviet intervention in Poland.

5. Support the inclusion of Poland in UN specialized agencies or other multilateral bodies, and election of Poles to offices in such bodies, if such inclusion or office is sought by Poland and if it is regarded in each case as appropriate and consonant with U.S. objectives. In the UN General Assembly and in the UN Commission and Committee meetings, try to avoid statements or actions which tend to imply that Poland is a member of the Soviet bloc.

6. Supplemental to the existing circular instruction to U.S. diplomatic missions for increased contact with Polish representatives (issued November 23, 1956),² issue further instructions to seek more cordial relations with Polish representatives, having in mind the need to be discreet in accordance with local circumstances and cautious in view of the uncertainty about the particular position with many Polish representatives. Such instructions should call for (1) treatment implying that the Poles are no longer puppets, (2) expressions of respect for and interest in the activities of Polish intellectuals, (3) satisfaction over the progress made toward settlement of the Church issue, and (4) genuine concern over Poland’s economic problems and difficulties.

7. Consider, if appropriate at a future time, inviting appropriate top leaders to this country for an official visit. Be prepared to send American leaders to Poland for an official visit.

8. Screen official communications to the Poles from the standpoint of insuring that they contain nothing which if reported to Moscow could legitimately serve to arouse suspicions as to U.S. purposes. In public statements avoid expressions which might cause difficulties and embarrassment to the Polish regime in its relations with the USSR.

B. Economic Programs.

The responsible agencies plan to undertake the following types of economic programs with respect to Poland over a period of the next 6–12 months:

9. The sale to Poland, for zlotys, of surplus agricultural commodities under Title I of Public Law 480.

10. The opening of credit facilities to Poland, financed under Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act for the purchase of United States products.

11. The establishment of facilities whereby the Commodity Credit Corporation may extend credits to United States exporters for the exportation of surplus agricultural commodities to Poland, which credits may be re-extended to Poland either directly or indirectly, via third countries.

12. Study of other Polish requests for economic assistance.

13. On appropriate advice by the Department of State, the amendment by the Treasury Department of Treasury Circular 655³ to permit the resumption of remittances to payees in Poland of checks or warrants drawn against funds of the United States Government or its agencies. The continuation of the flow of such remittances, if authorized, would depend upon the continuation of satisfactory conditions in Poland.

14. Encouragement of the Polish Government to come to an agreement with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council with respect to defaulted dollar bonds of the Polish Government.

15. The negotiation with the Polish Government of a lump-sum settlement of American property claims against Poland arising out of the taking of property by the Polish Government.

16. The unblocking of blocked Polish assets in the United States, provided that a satisfactory settlement is reached with Poland on American property claims.⁴

17. Subject to appropriate assurances from the Polish Government with respect to diversion, transshipment and re-export, and introduction of certain moderations in the present application of the export control system toward Poland,⁵ consideration should be given to:

a. Removal of the present requirement that individual export licenses must be obtained for a range of items not on the Positive List of

b. Issuance of licenses for reasonable shipments of Positive List items in Categories C–III⁶ and C–IV.⁷

c. Applications to export C–I items (International List I embargo) and C–II items (International List II quantitative control) would only be considered on a case-by-case basis.

d. Modification of the U.S. export controls and efforts to modify COCOM export controls to permit the shipment to Poland of civilian aircraft, within appropriate limits.

18. The negotiation with Poland of arrangements which would (1) permit the entry into Poland under reasonable conditions of gift parcels donated to Polish individuals by persons in the United States, and (2) permit the operation in Poland of United States charitable organizations.

19. Participation by the United States in the Poznan Fair through an American Exhibit and an American Trade Development Mission.

20. Consideration by the United States, in the course of 1957, of the restoration to Polish trade of most-favored-nation treatment which was suspended in 1952 pursuant to Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.⁸

C. Information Programs.

21. Utilize USIA and other resources to ensure appropriate publicity for official public statements designed to encourage the Poles to seek independence from Soviet control gradually, and without internal disorder and without causing any situation to develop which the Soviets would feel they had to repress with military force.

22. Report, particularly to Poland and other countries of the Soviet orbit, world reactions which accord with or endorse the publicly expressed position of the United States.

23. Report to Poland reactions from respected sources which assure the Poles that the free world is aware of actions effected by the Poles themselves, without violence, to secure greater independence from Soviet control, and that such peaceful accomplishments by the Poles are regarded as favorable to Polish national interests.

24. Report and interpret all positive results of the economic discussions between the United States and Poland as evidence of genuine U.S. concern over Poland’s economic problems and difficulties, and, simultaneously, make clear that the agreements reached are free of any Polish subservience whatsoever to the United States.

25. Discourage, through judicious selection of news items, Polish actions likely to result in Soviet efforts to reimpose earlier predominant controls over Poland.

26. Expand, discreetly and gradually, the distribution of publications, wireless file material, documentary motion pictures, television films, radio broadcasting material, and approved books translated into Polish and copyright-cleared for use in Poland.

27. Seek opportunities for presenting exhibits which would demonstrate various aspects of American life and culture, including a major architectural exhibit for showing in Warsaw and other Polish cities.

28. Exhibit an “American Book Store”—consisting of selected literature in the fields of science, fiction, and the social sciences, etc.—as an attraction along with other American exhibits at the Poznan Fair; circulate this book exhibit to other cities in Poland; and, finally, donate the books to appropriate Polish institutions.

29. Undertake, depending on Polish acceptance and on a reciprocal basis if necessary, the publication and distribution of a Polish edition of America Illustrated magazine.

30. Establish an Information Media Guaranty program in Poland, if the Polish Government is willing to accept it.

31. At an appropriate occasion, seek opportunity to establish a U.S. reading room and reference library in Warsaw and, eventually, in other cities.

32. In connection with visits to Poland of outstanding American leaders, scientists, technicians, performing artists, etc., exploit these visits as concrete indications of U.S. interest in the people of Poland.

D. Exchanges.

33. Continue to initiate and promote exchanges of individuals and delegations, on a generally reciprocal basis, including:

a. Technical experts such as the currently planned visits concerned with the coal, housing, steel, food distribution and road-building industries, as well as agriculture.

b. Delegation to conferences, such as the forthcoming congress of actuaries, the assembly of the Lutheran World Federation, the symposium on cosmical gas dynamics, etc.

c. Academic exchanges, such as exchanges of professors, research workers, lecturers, technicians and students.

d. Cultural contacts, such as visits by orchestras, college jazz bands, choral groups, and individual artists.

e. Athletic participation, such as exhibitions by champion athletes, participation in sports contests, etc.

f. Literary contacts, such as planned contributions by American sociologists of articles for the “Warsaw Cultural Review.”

34. Encourage U.S. foundations to initiate and subsidize exchanges, by large-scale grants, scholarships, and other measures for promoting visits by large numbers of Poles to the United States and smaller numbers of Americans to Poland. In this connection the Polish universities, particularly Cracow, should be encouraged to hold summer seminars for foreign students.

35. Encourage unofficial travel between Poland and the United States, and foster ties between Poles and Americans, with special reference to Americans of Polish descent and to the Polish-American press. Consideration is being given to the resumption of service by the Batory to New York.¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Poland and Hungary. Top Secret. Prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Contingencies in Poland, a working group of senior officers including Bowie and Beam, in response to a decision taken at the OCB meeting of February 27 to develop contingency plans to implement paragraph 17 (a) of NSC 5705/1 together with related courses of action as stated in NSC 5616/2 and NSC 5608/1. (NSC 5705/1 was not declassified; NSC 5616/2 and NSC 5608/1 are printed as Documents 196 and 80) (Preliminary Notes by Richard, February 27; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Minutes)

   A covering memorandum by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant of the OCB, noted that the OCB had revised and concurred in this Operational Guidance and had requested the Working Group to develop agency action assignments for the implementation of the proposed programs.

2. CA–4374, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 607.1148/11–2356)
3. Treasury Circular No. 655, dated March 19, 1941 (31 CFR Part 211), as amended, listed Poland as one of several Communist nations U.S. Treasury checks would not be sent to because the payees might not actually receive them or be able to negotiate their full value.
4. A position paper drafted by William Frohlich (OFD:FN) and Valdemar N.L. Johnson (EUR/EE), dated February 25, on “Unblocking or release of Polish assets in the United States” is in Department of State, EE Files: Lot 76 D 232, US/Polish Talks—P–2.
5. On January 25, 1957, the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) recommended that negotiations be started with Poland looking toward a less restrictive export control policy. If it appeared feasible, ACEP urged that assurances be sought from Poland that it would use U.S.-origin goods solely for its own domestic purposes and would not divert or re-export any items to the Soviet Union, its satellites, or Communist China without prior U.S. authorization. This point was included in the February 25 Department of State position paper on “Export Licensing.” (Ibid., US/Polish Talks, Draft Position Papers and Assignments)
6. Category C–III corresponds to International List III, i.e., items subject to surveillance. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. Category C–IV are items which are not on the International Lists, which are nevertheless considered strategic by the U.S., and which are susceptible of unilateral control by the U.S. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Trade Agreements Extension Act, Public Law 50, approved June 16, 1951. (65 Stat.72)
10. The Batory had been used by fugitive Communist Gerhart Eisler to escape from the United States in May 1949. Its service to New York had been terminated in 1951.