80. National Security Council Report1
NSC 5608/1
Washington, July 18,
1956.
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN EASTERN
EUROPE
REFERENCES
- A. NSC 174
- B. NSC 5505/1
- C. NSC 5608
- D. NSC Actions Nos. 1530–b and
15802
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, Mr. Amos J. Peaslee for the Special Assistant to the
President for Disarmament, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at
the 290th meeting of the Council on July 12, 1956, adopted the statement
of policy contained in NSC 5608,
prepared by the NSC Planning Board
pursuant to NSC Action No. 1530–b,
subject to amendment and editing as set forth in NSC Action No. 1580–b.
The President, subject to further amendments as indicated in the Note to
NSC Action No. 1580, has this date
approved the statement of policy in NSC
5608 as amended and edited at the 290th NSC meeting.
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The statement of policy in NSC 5608, as
amended, edited, and approved by the President, is enclosed herewith as
NSC 5608/1 for implementation by all
appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government,
under the coordination of the Operations Coordinating Board.
The statement of policy in NSC 5608/1
supersedes NSC 174, except with respect
to policy toward East Germany, which will be the subject of separate
policy recommendations3
being prepared pursuant to NSC Actions
Nos. 1530–b and 1575–c.4
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN
EASTERN EUROPE
General Considerations
- 1.
- Soviet control over the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe
(Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and
East Germany6) has contributed importantly to
the power disequilibrium in Europe and to the threat to the
security of the United States. Despite economic dislocation and
administrative difficulties, the Kremlin has made considerable
progress in exploiting the industrial capacity of the satellites
and expanding their military capabilities for use as a
coordinated whole with those of the Soviet Union. Formation of
the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 as a counter to NATO, which had just admitted West
Germany, institutionalized and extended existing Soviet
coordination and control over the military potential of the
Eastern European bloc. The Soviet military position in Europe
was affected little, if at all, by the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Austria in October 1955.
- 2.
- Impediments to the consolidation of Soviet control over the
Eastern European satellites are:
- a.
- The anti-Communist attitude of the great majority of
the population in each satellite. This anti-Communism is
intensified particularly by loss of personal freedom and
a reduced standard of living, as well as by outraged
religious and national feelings; but its undiminished
survival over the long run is jeopardized by Communist
control over every aspect of the lives of the people,
particularly the young, as well as by the new Moscow
policy of allowing the satellites greater latitude in
the conduct of their own affairs.
- b.
- The continued presence of nationalist sentiment among
the people and even within the satellite Communist
parties themselves.
- c.
- The continued refusal of the West to accept the
permanence of the imposed satellite regimes as
compatible with the freedom and self-determination of
nations.
- 3.
- Despite these impediments, Soviet domination of the Eastern
European satellites remains firm and there appears little
immediate prospect of basic change in this regard. While the
satellite regimes have not been able to overcome widespread
popular dissatisfaction with their Communistic program and with
their inclusion within the Soviet world, nevertheless there are
no known underground groups capable of coordinated, sustained
resistance activities to the governments in power in any of the
countries concerned. As long as a Moscow-dominated Communist
leadership remains in power in these countries and is backed by
Soviet military force or threat of force, it is unlikely that
Soviet ability to exercise effective control over and to exploit
the resources of the European satellites can be appreciably
reduced.
- 4.
- On the other hand, the many changes in the USSR since the
death of Stalin—particularly the introduction of collective
leadership, Moscow’s acceptance of Titoism and acknowledgment
that there are “different roads to Socialism”, and the
denigration of Stalin—are being reflected in current satellite
developments. These developments have varied in pace and scope
in each of the satellites and are continuing, but common to them
all are a reduction in the role of the secret police embodied in
the emphasis on the need for “socialist legality” and the
admission of past errors attributed to the “cult of
personality”. Some personnel changes have occurred at the top in
certain satellite
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governments and others may follow. Although the basic political
and economic policies and objectives have not been successfully
challenged nor the fundamental subjection of the satellites to
the Soviet Union effectively threatened, there are indications
that Moscow now recognizes the advantage of using greater
flexibility as well as more camouflage in its control of the
satellites, and of giving them certain latitude or
responsibility of decision on matters of local detail within the
general framework of Soviet bloc policy.
- 5.
- Nationalism in the satellites, even within the Communist
movement itself, remains a disruptive force in Soviet-satellite
relations. There is a real and growing split in most satellite
parties between those amenable to close Soviet control and the
“national Communists”. However, since the combination of basic
factors which made possible the successful Yugoslav break with
Moscow is lacking in the satellites, it is unlikely that the
Yugoslav experience will be repeated in any of them. Moreover,
by its reconciliation with Tito, Moscow has sought with some
success to neutralize the competing attraction originally
exercised on the satellite governments by Belgrade’s independent
position and policies.
- 6.
- Tito’s establishment of an independent Communist regime
provides a standing example of successful defiance of the
Kremlin and a demonstration that the West is prepared to assist
nationalistic Communist leaders to assert their independence of
Moscow. Despite Moscow’s apparent reconciliation with Belgrade,
it may be still possible to exploit Yugoslavia’s unique position
in promoting future changes in the Soviet satellite
relationship. Any diminution of Yugoslavia’s independence of the
Kremlin will limit its usefulness in this regard. On the other
hand, a Yugoslavia which maintains a position of independence
between East and West would be an important asset in promoting
possible future changes in the Soviet-satellite
relationship.
- 7.
- U.S. strategy and policy with respect to the German problem
and the satellite issue are so closely interrelated that each
must be considered in the light of its effect on the other. The
intransigence of the Soviets on German reunification, at Geneva
and subsequently, arises in part from their German policy and in
part from their regard
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for Eastern Germany as an advanced position for control of the
satellite area. These considerations provide strong Soviet
incentives for postponing an agreement on German reunification.
The inability of the West to make the satellite issue an agenda
item at the negotiating table or to offer substantial promise of
the early elimination of Soviet control depresses the hopes of
the satellite peoples for freedom and reduces their will to
resist, thereby increasing the tendency to accept accommodation
with Moscow.
- 8.
- Nevertheless, Eastern Germany poses a special and more
difficult problem of control for the USSR than do the other
satellites. While the Eastern German regime has made some
progress with the program of basic industrial development and
socialization, and while there are various factors operating to
weaken resistance of the Eastern German population to the
Communist regime, there is little likelihood that the East
Germans can be brought to accept the Communist system imposed on
them. The fact that the main body of the German nation in the
Federal Republic has made considerable advances in freedom and
well-being, and the fact that West Berlin provides a means of
contact with the Free World, serve to keep alive in Eastern
Germany the hope for an escape from Soviet domination. The
situation in East Germany provides opportunities for the West to
continue to exploit strong popular anti-Communism, to maintain
East Germany as a focal point and example of disaffection for
the rest of the Soviet satellites, and to make difficult full
utilization by the Soviet Union of East Germany’s economic
resources.
- 9.
- The denigration of Stalin and Moscow’s acceptance of Titoism
have created difficulties in Soviet relations with the
satellites; they have raised questions as to the infallibility
of Soviet leadership among important elements of the satellite
Communist parties; they have aroused to varying degrees latent
popular aspirations for relaxation of oppression, restoration of
national independence, and the establishment of governments
responsive to popular will. This fluid situation in
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the satellites has
increased the previously limited U.S. capabilities to influence
a basic change in Soviet domination of the satellites. Although
the Eastern European peoples continue to feel that liberation is
remote, they remain responsive to our interest in their
independence, provided it is expressed persistently and in terms
which make it clear that this is our basic objective. There is a
possibility that an internal relaxation might result in the long
run in the development of forces and pressures leading to
fundamental changes of the satellite system in the direction of
national independence and individual freedom and
security.
