Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

151. Draft Statement of Policy by the Planning Board of the National Security Council¹

NSC 5616

Washington, October 31, 1956.

U.S. POLICY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

General Considerations

1. Events of great magnitude in Poland and Hungary necessitate an appraisal of the situation and consideration of current U.S. policies, objectives, and courses of action toward those countries. Our initial objective toward the Eastern European satellite area has been to encourage, as a first step toward eventual full national independence and freedom, the emergence of “national” communist governments. While these governments might continue to be in close political and military alliance with the Soviet Union, they would be able to exercise to a much greater degree than in the past independent authority and control in the direction of their own affairs, primarily confined in the first stage to their internal affairs.

Poland

2. Developments in Poland appear favorable to the early attainment of this objective. The Gomulka Government has proclaimed its “national independence and equality” and has asserted its right to pursue its own internal road to “socialism”. At the same time it has declared continued loyalty to its alliance with the USSR and, though requesting the retirement of Soviet armed forces to their usual stations, has declared Soviet troops must remain in Poland and East Germany.

3. In Poland, as in Hungary, recent developments have revealed the strong anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments of the population. Unlike Hungary, the existence of strong leadership in Poland at a critical moment, fear of a reunified Germany with irredentist claims, and the timely promise of reforms, together with an assertion of “national independence” linked with a closely calculated defiance of Russian pressure, evidently has served to enable a reconstituted Polish communist government to set forth on its new course with the acquiescence, if not support, of the majority of Poles.

4. The United States has already indicated directly to the new Government that a Polish request for economic assistance, particularly for wheat or other surplus commodities, would be given sympathetic study. Severe legal and administrative limits are imposed on such assistance.² On the other hand, opportunities exist for materially aiding Poland (and possibly Hungary) in the general area of trade with the free world.

Hungary

5. Developments in Hungary have differed significantly from those in Poland. In Hungary, a nationalist movement, similar to that in Poland, was triggered into national revolt by the intervention of Soviet troops called in by the Hungarian Government in the first hours of its difficulty. The demands of the people on the government have since gone far beyond those originally sought and are now anti-communist as well as anti-Soviet.

6. The situation in Hungary is still fluid and the outcome is difficult to foresee. The Nagy Government, already compromised by the fact of Soviet intervention, is seeking to restore its authority over the country by appearing to accede to many of the demands made upon it. Soviet forces are still in Hungary and the Soviet press has asserted that they are legally there under the terms of the Warsaw Pact. At the request of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Hungarian situation has been brought before the UN Security Council under Article 34.

Policy Conclusions

8. In the present situation, the Basic Objectives of NSC 5608/1 of July 18, 1956³ remain valid. However, in the light of developments in Poland and Hungary, certain tentative conclusions may now be drawn and certain courses of action can be taken to advance U.S. policies and objectives toward the satellite area.

9. The participation of Soviet troops at the “invitation” of the Hungarian Government in fighting the Hungarian population, and the near intervention of Soviet forces in Poland, illustrate that, at least in those countries where Soviet troops are stationed, the Soviet Union is willing to use its armed forces to prevent the coming into power of a non-communist government, or to prevent a communist government from altering a policy of close military and political alliance with the USSR.

10. Moscow is apparently willing to accept, however reluctantly, a communist government, which, while remaining loyal to its military and political alliance with the USSR, asserts its “national independence” and its right to pursue its own internal road to communism.

11. It seems unlikely that U.S. action short of overt military intervention or obvious preparation for such intervention would lead the USSR deliberately to take steps which it believed would materially increase the risk of general war. Soviet suspicions of U.S. policy and present circumstances which involve Soviet troop movements and alerts probably increase the likelihood of a series of actions and counter-actions leading inadvertently to war.

Courses of Action

Poland

14. Provided that the outcome of the forthcoming Soviet-Polish talks does not fundamentally alter the situation:

a. Make an early approach to the Polish Government in response to its note of October 8 indicating our willingness to discuss with it all problems affecting U.S.-Polish relations.

15. In the development of economic relations with Poland encourage the Poles to devote their energies to the satisfaction of consumer demands and peaceful trade.

16. While avoiding specific endorsement of the Gomulka Government, use whatever capabilities we may possess to influence the new Polish leaders to adhere to and fulfill its commitments for reform made to the Polish people which will advance U.S. objectives.⁴

17. Increase contacts and exchanges between Poland and the United States on economic, scientific and cultural bases in the context of NSC 5607.

Hungary

18. In pursuing our immediate objectives of discouraging and, if possible, preventing further Soviet armed intervention in Hungary as well as harsh measures of repression or retaliation, mobilize all appropriate pressures, including UN action, on the USSR against such measures [, while reassuring the USSR we do not look upon Hungary or the other Satellites as potential military allies].⁵

19. In line with this approach, consider whether it is advisable to make in the UN or elsewhere a proposal of Hungarian neutrality on the Austrian model.

25. Encourage the Austrians to maintain their announced policy of granting asylum to Hungarians who may seek it. Aid the Austrians to meet the problem of an increased number of Hungarian refugees by financial and other material assistance from U.S. resources; and encourage other friendly governments to assist. Should a considerable number of Hungarians seek refuge in Austria, urgent consideration will have to be given by the United States and other friendly governments to their immediate care and swift resettlement.

General

26. As a matter of high priority, exploit fully throughout the world propaganda opportunities afforded by recent events in Poland and Hungary.

27. The Planning Board should urgently undertake a study of policies and actions which will encourage or bring about withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe.

28. As soon as developments in the area can be adequately assessed, review “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe” (NSC 5608/1).

29. As a matter of urgency, under currently organized governmental mechanisms, undertake a study of the situation in other European satellites to determine U.S. courses of action in the event of future revolutionary actions or uprisings in those countries which indicate a movement away from control by the USSR.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5616 Series. Secret. Enclosed with a memorandum from Lay to the NSC dated October 31. Prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1623–b, October 26, and transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its November 1 meeting; see infra. An initial draft by the Department of State prepared on October 29 was revised by the Board Assistants on October 30, and then further revised by the Planning Board. Annex A containing public statements by the President and the Secretary of State on this subject has not been printed. Also excluded was Annex B, which was prepared by the International Cooperation Administration to summarize the limitations on assistance to Hungary and Poland. (Ibid.)
2. See Annex B. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Document 80.
4. See SNIE 12–2–56. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Defense–JCS propose deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text. The JCS contended that the “assurances as proposed would tend to undermine such influence as the United States may have on the government which is established in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military disadvantage.” Bowie, however, advised the Secretary that this objection “opposes a sound diplomatic move already made by the President.” (Memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson, October 31, transmitted to the NSC by Lay on November 6, and memorandum from Bowie to Dulles, November 6; both in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5616 Series)]