Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

72. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 15, 1957—7 p.m.

107. Department repeat as desired. Following are Embassy’s further comments (Embtel 23)² on impact of June plenum on collective leadership as institution.

1. Collective leadership established after Stalin’s death (more accurately after Beria expulsion in June 1953) was ad hoc working relationship among members of Presidium based on agreement that policy decisions would be reached by majority vote within Presidium, disagreements among Presidium members were permitted and expected, disagreements would be resolved within Presidium and above all not by means of arrest, and “chairman of board” of Presidium would have authority to lead but not to dictate and would not have power of life and death over his colleagues. Under this arrangement, Presidium has been center of political power and Party Central Committee basically rubber stamp of authority for Presidium decisions, neither initiating policies nor vetoing Presidium decisions.

2. This working relationship (but not necessarily the institution of collective leadership) has now broken down with expulsion of five of original nine members of Presidium (excluding Beria). This creates fluid political situation in Soviet Union with three likely possibilities: (1) Establishment of absolute one-man rule by Khrushchev, (2) Continuance of previous collective rule by Presidium with Khrushchev pre-eminence as “first among equals” strengthened, (3) Solution along lines of (2) but with Central Committee achieving greater political power, particularly as court of last resort in case of major policy disputes in Presidium. If Khrushchev were to seek one-man rule, presence of following three factors would be important for his success: breakdown of practice in Presidium of reaching decisions by majority vote, establishment of personal control over secret police, and ambition and will to become personal dictator.

3. June plenum had some results which point in direction of establishment of one-man rule, and some signs have appeared since plenum of build-up Khrushchev for this position:

a) Plenum was triumph for Khrushchev over opposition attempting to unseat him from leading position in Presidium. It was public reaffirmation of and strengthened commitment to policies carried out under Khrushchev’s leadership, in particular certain policies which were apparently introduced on his own initiative. These circumstances undoubtedly greatly increase Khrushchev’s authority.

b) Khrushchev’s most persistent opponents have been expelled from party leadership, including his most influential and dangerous rivals, Malenkov and Molotov. Presidium staffed with nine new members and presumably many of them have been thus rewarded for their personal loyalty to Khrushchev. Although entire question of personal loyalty among Soviet leaders is very obscure and frequently misleading (Shepilov good example), this factor cannot be dismissed as being without significance for immediate future at least. For example, six members of Presidium (four of them new members) are Central Committee Secretaries and directly subordinate to Khrushchev in his capacity as First Secretary. Thus, Khrushchev undoubtedly enjoys freer hand than ever before within Presidium.

c) Khrushchev has received extraordinary praise and honorifics on number of occasions since June plenum. Bulganin has twice singled him out for praise. In Leningrad he credited Khrushchev with “initiative” in proposing meat and dairy products program and in Prague³ asserted that Khrushchev “deserves great credit in unmasking and crushing anti-party group.” Soviet press coverage of Khrushchev–Bulganin visit has been almost exclusively devoted to Khrushchev’s activities and Bulganin has been placed very much in background. (New York Times correspondent reports Moscow censor passed story asserting Khrushchev receiving “top billing” on Prague visit. In past any such comment has always been deleted by censor.) Several provincial party organizations have singled Khrushchev out for particular praise. New height reached at July 3 meeting Uzbek party Aktiv which credited Khrushchev with rendering “great aid” in development Uzbek cotton and livestock industry, noted “great attention which Khrushchev has given to creative activities Soviet writers,” and adopted resolution expressing confidence in new party Presidium “headed by First Secretary Khrushchev.”

On other hand, certain build-up of Khrushchev is understandable in view of events and outcome of June plenum. Fact that Khrushchev singled out in Soviet press for particular attention and praise is only significant if it is part of concerted campaign inspired by him to build self up as one-man ruler. Neither quality nor volume of public praise so far indicates that a campaign with this objective has been launched.

4. Following is case against establishment of one-man rule.

a) If Embassy analysis of June plenum is correct (Embtel 61⁴), Khrushchev did not take initiative in Stalinist tradition to eliminate his opponents but instead it was latter who were trying to depose him.

b) Present party leadership based its whole position at plenum on 20th Congress decisions, on “correction of mistakes and shortcomings caused by personality cult.” It has strongly pledged itself to continue these policies and accuses opposition of trying to reverse them and “return party to incorrect methods of leadership condemned by 20th Party Congress.” There is undoubtedly some truth to these accusations. According to Mukhitdinov (Pravda Vostoka July 5), opposition charged that industrial reorganization and decentralization measures in field of government meant “weakening of dictatorship of proletariat,” that is, would mean in final analysis weakening of party’s political controls. Their stand was apparently in favor of greater centralization political control, whereas Khrushchev group has rejected these “outdated forms of leadership” in favor of less centralization and rule based more on persuasion than whip. Establishment one-man rule with its consequences would run entirely counter to current general line.

June plenum decree contained no specific reaffirmation of principle of collective leadership but referred only to “restoration of Leninist norms of party life.” However, several editorials and articles have appeared since plenum on subject “collectivity highest principle of party leadership” which “condemn violations of collective leadership” under Stalin and praise Central Committee’s “undeviating realization of principle of collective leadership.”

c) Khrushchev would have to gain direct control of secret police in order to become absolute dictator. There is little doubt that elements in party, intellectuals as a whole and army above all would be opposed to acquisition of this power by one man; in particular to attempts by Khrushchev to use police measures against party members in order to eliminate opposition to him. All of these groups suffered heavily from Stalin’s form of rule based on control of police and could be expected to be against any return to this.

That is why fate of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov is of considerable importance. Any police measures against them would probably symbolize to many in top party and army circles return to Stalinism. There must be powerful opposition to such action on this ground alone. Present events (decrease in press treatment of subject since July 10 and Radio Moscow’s July 10 foreign broadcast that the three will be given jobs and not brought to trial) indicate that Khrushchev will not seek this solution at least in immediate future.

d) Role of Zhukov in Presidium struggle and at CC plenum not clarified by subsequent information and hence remains subject of speculation. We agree with remark (Manila’s 99⁵) that Zhukov would be unlikely support return to Stalinist one-man rule. But there is no evidence as yet pointing to active and early intervention of Zhukov in political struggle or ambition or determination to enhance his own or army’s power outside military field.

e) Objective economic conditions, social forces in Soviet Union today and Khrushchev’s present policies are not those which call for return to autocratic one-man dictatorship but gradual relaxation of Stalin heritage. Circumstances of Soviet Union in 1930’s and Stalin’s policies probably required Stalin’s iron fist to keep Communists in power. Return to these methods today would not only arouse strong opposition among certain influential Soviet groups but also run contrary to entire trend of Soviet social and economic development. These social conditions do not have immediate political impact but in long-run would operate against Stalinist-type dictatorship.

f) Finally, all evidence indicates that it was Central Committee which decided issue and brought about expulsion of opposition group. Thus Central Committee by reversing Presidium decision exercised its formal authority as highest executive organ of party for first time since 1920’s.

5. Above is summary of pros and cons regarding continuance collective leadership. To draw firm and final conclusion on this complex question is not possible at present: Information is fragmentary and not all pieces of political structure have fallen into place since disruption at plenum. Following should be regarded as tentative conclusions:

a) It is unlikely that Khrushchev has become or will emerge in near future at least as one-man dictator, especially on Stalin model.

b) It is likely that collective leadership by party Presidium will continue, but with Khrushchev having much freer hand within Presidium.

c) It is possible that Central Committee will in time tend to become more effective seat of power, with Presidium accountable to it at least on major policy issues. One act of will is not sufficient to bring this about, but expression of power is habit forming. This development is at best still great distance away and such development would be far cry from inner-party “democracy” to say nothing of state democracy. But it would nonetheless be important development, as it would permit freer expression of competitive social and political forces.

6. Given Khrushchev’s personality it appears likely that he will be conspicuously in driver’s seat, with Central Committee in immediate future closely watching outcome of his policies. Failure of any of his major policies (particularly if failure should come before major successes in other fields evident) or premature greed for sole power might result in action by Central Committee to remove him from party leadership.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–1557. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. See Document 66.
3. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Czechoslovakia July 9–16.
4. Dated July 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–957)
5. Dated July 9 and addressed from Bohlen to Under Secretary Herter, it contained Bohlen’s preliminary analysis of the changes in the party. (Ibid.)