71. Memorandum From the Secretary of States Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Arneson) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Possible Impact on Soviet Military Posture of the Kremlin Shake-up
While the Soviet leadership changes could portend the emergence of Khrushchev as a dictator in the image of Stalin, there is no present evidence that the secret police or the military are subordinate to him personally; or that Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are ciphers within the Party. Counterbalancing forces to one-man rule will probably be operative into the foreseeable future despite the greater freedom which Khrushchev may enjoy in executing policy. The dangers inherent in such rule of a miscalculation leading to hostilities thus do not appear more pressing than heretofore.
The changes could also mean considerable enhancement of the power of the military. In the absence of evidence that the military in fact seek an independent power position, we interpret Zhukov’s elevation to the Party Presidium as a recognition of influence he has exerted for some time over policy formation rather than as a harbinger of vastly increased powers. The military are nevertheless likely to serve as an important deterrent to a resurgence of Stalinist-type rule; professionally they are also likely to press for a continued preferential allocation of resources to military and related industrial investment.
The changes could likewise affect internal stability and bloc solidarity, both central to Soviet readiness and capability to initiate hostilities. They now appear unlikely, however, to produce a decisive impact in either respect. In the USSR the regime has not felt obliged to take unusual security precautions, and any discontent in Party circles has been muted by a massive propaganda campaign. [Page 150] Much will depend on whether Khrushchev ultimately abstains from the temptation to widen the purge and whether he successfully implements the apparently popular agricultural and housing policies with which he is identified. As regards Soviet policy toward the bloc, the optimistic Polish interpretation of events2 must yet be proved accurate. We believe that the USSR will continue to find it virtually impossible to achieve a stable satellite policy through a mixture of liberal and repressive measures. As a corollary, Eastern Europe seems likely to remain a dubious Soviet asset in the event of widespread hostilities.
In light of these considerations and Moscow’s current stress on continuity of policy rather than dramatic change, Khrushchev’s elevation is unlikely to entail any substantial modification of existing estimates as to the likelihood of a Soviet resort to force.