Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

73. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Claim of Successful Testing of an ICBM²

The Soviet announcement is clearly made in a political context: The statement refers to the many years’ discussion in the United Nations without result of the problem of disarmament, including a ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and on the other hand reiterates the Soviet claim that they have more than once submitted concrete proposals for reductions in armed forces and armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons as well as cessation of tests. The West is charged not only with not taking any practical steps in the field of disarmament, but also the creation of all kinds of obstacles.

The TASS statement categorically asserts that the United States and its partners not only reject the prohibition of nuclear weapons, “but in fact do not want agreement on the unconditional and immediate cessation of tests of nuclear weapons while staging large series of tests with these weapons.” The statement continues that because of this negative attitude on the part of the Western powers, “primarily the USA,” the Soviet Government has been compelled to take all necessary measures with the object of safeguarding the security of the Soviet state. The statement concludes by asserting that the Soviet Government will nevertheless continue persistently to press for agreement on cessation of tests, prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the problem of disarmament as a whole.

We believe that the TASS statement was apparently aimed at heightening the effect of the Soviet demand for immediate cessation of or suspension of nuclear tests. It probably was timed to set the stage for a major Soviet propaganda offensive on the test issue in the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly, where Moscow hopes to score major propaganda gains. A Soviet move for an early recess in the London disarmament talks and a transfer of discussions of the disarmament problems to the General Assembly is therefore not to be excluded.

In your Press Conference we suggest that you may wish to emphasize the political context of the Soviet announcement, perhaps against the following background:

Speaking at Bangalore on November 27, 1955, Khrushchev said that because the West does not want to ban nuclear weapons the Soviets found themselves obliged to manufacture atomic weapons as well as ballistic missiles.

On December 9, 1955, Bulganin in addressing the Supreme Soviet said the Soviet Union desired an agreement outlawing nuclear weapons, including rocket missiles which had been developed over the previous few years and which “we can say are becoming intercontinental weapons” (the clear implication is that the Soviet Union was then developing intercontinental missiles).

In the November 5, 1956, message to Prime Minister Eden Bulganin posed the question: Suppose England were attacked by a more powerful state possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction?—“Such countries instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain could use other means as for instance rocket equipment” (quotation not precise).

January 23, 1957, Pravda in an article suggested that probably the United States was lacking in missile development. There was an implication in the article that by contrast the Soviet Union was ahead in such development.

In an article in the Soviet Army newspaper Red Star dated 16 August 1957, Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Vasilevski attacked an article which had recently been published by Admiral Burke on the subject of naval power. Marshal Vasilevski stressed developments in the field of ultra long-range missiles and said that Navies were not now as important as Admiral Burke thought.

Confidential: I agree with General Cabell that you may very well get a question at the Press Conference regarding the US intelligence estimate of the Soviet Statement and also some question asking what American intelligence has been up to. We suggest that you make no specific reply on the point of a US estimate of the accuracy of the Soviet claim but say something along the lines that regular intelligence reports and estimates of Soviet military preparations and developments are constantly being made. We have known for a long time about the Soviet activity in missile development.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.5612/8–2757.
2. In telegram 407 from Moscow, August 27, Thompson reported that all Soviet papers carried an announcement that the Soviet Union had successfully launched an ICBM and claimed that alleged Western resistance to disarmament had justified Soviet concentration on weapons development. (Ibid., 330.13/8–2757)
3. For the Secretary’s comments about the Soviet ICBM launching at his press conference on August 27, see Department of State Bulletin, September 16, 1957, pp. 457–462.