70. Memorandum of Discussion at the 330th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, July 11, 19571
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants and items 1 and 2.]
[Page 147]3. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
Mr. Cutler indicated that the Director of Central Intelligence would confine his briefing to the recent changes in leadership of the Soviet Union, a subject which the Council would doubtless find of absorbing interest.
Mr. Allen Dulles displayed a chart entitled “USSR Party and Government Organization”. With this chart as background information, he went on to describe the recent developments in the USSR as the most dramatic which had occurred in recent years, not even excepting the death of Stalin. He described the collective dictatorship in the Soviet Union as finished. Khrushchev had achieved clear-cut control of the Party apparatus. His only potential rival might be Marshal Zhukov. The Central Committee of the Communist Party had exercised real power against the Presidium, the old Politburo, for the first time in years. Mr. Dulles followed this with the listing of the major policy issues which had been the subject of debate.
Mr. Dulles then pointed out that the majority of the new Presidium were second-level figures, and that five very well-known members had been eliminated. This left Zhukov and Mikoyan as the only two personalities of real note who remained on as members of the new Presidium. Mikoyan appeared from the record not to be a genuine seeker after power.
Mr. Dulles followed these comments with a brief narrative and analysis of the events which had occurred in the Soviet Union, from the departure of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Finland,2 up to the present time. This was followed by a recital of the official charges against “the rebels”. Mr. Dulles stated his inclination to believe that in this extended contest Zhukov’s intervention on the side of Khrushchev had been decisive. Bulganin’s role, on the other hand, appeared uncertain. Perhaps in the early stages of the debate he had voted with the rebels against Khrushchev. In any event, Khrushchev would probably deem it advisable to keep Bulganin around for a while. This would tend to soften the blow that a disgrace of Bulganin would cause in countries like India, which Bulganin and Khrushchev had recently visited.3 After a while, however, Bulganin might be allowed to retire quietly and be replaced by Zhukov. If this happened, Marshal Konev would be the logical candidate to succeed Zhukov in the Ministry of Defense.
Mr. Dulles indicated his doubts that show trials of the rebels were likely to be staged. Banishment or some kind of house arrest was more likely than show trials.
[Page 148]Mr. Dulles followed with what he described as the tentative conclusions of the CIA as to the meaning of these events, pointing out that as yet these conclusions had not been coordinated within the intelligence community as a whole. Firstly, Khrushchev as a dictator would be dangerous and impulsive, though he may be restrained by Zhukov. Throughout his career, Khrushchev had shown himself to be a shrewd opportunist. He favors co-existence, different roads to socialism, reconciliation with Yugoslavia, and increased contacts with other countries. Khrushchev was likely to continue to follow these policies in the future if not prevented by events beyond his control.
Secondly, the future policy of Khrushchev and Zhukov with regard to the Soviet satellites was hard to analyze. Mr. Dulles stated the belief of CIA that these two individuals had primarily been responsible for the job that had been done in Hungary. On the other hand, Khrushchev’s recent statements would raise hopes in the satellites for a softer Moscow line. This might raise such serious problems in the satellites that Khrushchev will not dare to relax Moscow’s strict control.
Thirdly, Mr. Dulles thought it unlikely that these recent events would produce much of a change in the Soviet position on disarmament at London. It was conceivable, however, that Khrushchev might make some concessions in order to exhibit a victory for himself.
Finally, Mr. Dulles indicated that Khrushchev would be facing very severe internal problems, particularly with respect to industrial decentralization and agriculture. If these problems were not solved, the consequences for Khrushchev could be very serious. De-Stalinization is going on apace. The steam has gone out of the fanatic ideological Communism of the past.
In conclusion, Mr. Dulles said that he would like to emphasize three vitally important questions: First, can Party careerists really make the new industrial system work? Second, if the Party careerists fail, can Khrushchev save himself by adopting wholly new policies? Third, is the next great step military dictatorship?
(A copy of Mr. Dulles’ briefing is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the recent changes in the top levels of the Communist Party and the government organization of the USSR.
[Here follows the remainder of the memorandum.]