271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1
1891. Your 1600,2 Athens 16613 and Nicosia 142.4 US policy on Cyprus has not changed and you should go ahead with representation to GOT as set forth Deptel 1727.5 As stated in these instructions we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views that might lead to compromise proposal. We trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in finding solution.
Re paras A, B and C reftel,6 US is not supporting any of various compromise solutions which have been put forward. We are carefully preserving our freedom of action in manner which will [Page 520] permit us to exert our influence most effectively on all interested parties of Cyprus dispute.
In event Zorlu asserts “USG too active in Cyprus matter” you should say that as member NATO and close friend of parties involved, US is deeply concerned over continued failure parties to recognize larger issues at stake and to make compromises essential to solution of Cyprus controversy. US has been urging and will continue to urge interested parties to get together and arrive at compromise solution. There is too much at stake for us to do otherwise.
We generally agree with various points made by Embassy in reftel except following:
- A.
- Now that elections are over we fail to see why GOT feels it must go “full steam ahead on partition.” If Greece does likewise in pursuit its aims we see only gravest consequences ahead. Only hope lies in gradual retreat by both Greek and Turks from intransigent positions they have taken.
- B.
- We do not agree “that status Cyprus can remain unchanged if no solution found.” If we are to avoid further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations and in NATO defenses in area it is imperative that some early interim or permanent arrangements be found that will take us out of present impasse. Events of last 18 months clearly indicate how untenable is status quo. British themselves recognize this.
We trust you will be able to make representations to Menderes and Zorlu along lines Deptel 1727 before their departure for Paris.7
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–1057. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams, Laingen, and Jones. Repeated to London, Paris, Athens, and Nicosia.↩
- In telegram 1600, December 6, the Embassy informed the Department that it was concerned that the United States position on the Cyprus question was shifting. The Embassy was particularly disturbed by the possibility that the United States was becoming too closely involved in the problem and too closely identified with a particular position. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–657)↩
- In telegram 1661, December 7, Penfield noted that a solution to the Cyprus problem had to be found as soon as possible. He concluded: “Should excessive demonstrations of these three dangerous national characteristics happen to occur simultaneously or as chain reaction it is hard to see how we could avoid disastrous results to NATO and our ME position.” (Ibid., 747C.00/12–757)↩
- In telegram 142, December 9, the U.S. Consul at Nicosia, commenting on the telegrams cited in footnotes 2 and 3 above, noted: “... I have tended disregard more extreme statements Greek Cypriot politicians and others who claim they have nothing lose but chains in bringing on ‘heroic holocaust’ heralded by recent EOKA leaflets and private statements that 10,000 lives not too high price for freedom. But it seems perilous ignore statements ethnarchy and EOKA indicating unwillingness accept further delay.” (ibid., 747C.00/12–957)↩
- Document 267.↩
- Reference is to three paragraphs of telegram 1600, which contained references to three telegrams that included various proposals for resolving the Cyprus problem. One of these was telegram 1727, ibid.↩
- Presumably a reference, to the NATO Heads of Government meeting in Paris, December 16–18.↩