Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, November 25, 1957—9:51 p.m.

1727. Forthcoming debate on Cyprus in UNGA, urgent British desire to lessen burdens of Cyprus status quo and expected interest in Cyprus during Paris NATO ministerial meeting, all underline importance of continuing our attempt in quiet diplomacy to assist parties concerned in their efforts to get together and solve controversy.

In frequent discussions during past year, British and Greeks have shown flexibility in respective positions. UK has privately expressed willingness under reasonable conditions to accept even solution which will mean end of UK sovereignty of island outside modest base area (London 1969²). Both GOG Foreign Minister and Cyprus Ethnarch have repeatedly indicated they can accept solution short of enosis (London 3106³ and Athens 1050⁴).

For many reasons including especially Turkish elections, there have been relatively few discussions in recent months with leaders of Turkish Government on Cyprus problem. All public statements reveal Turkey holding rigidly to partition of island between Greece and Turkey as only acceptable alternative (other than Turkish annexation) to status quo.

It is clear to Department that Turkey considers its readiness to accept partition as evidence of its willingness to make concessions. Yet it is equally clear that outright partition as solution presents such difficulties (Deptel 2416⁵) that those who sincerely desire solution must carefully study variants thereof or other possibilities. In light of mutual desire for free world harmony and NATO solidarity, we believe Turkish Government will recognize need for Turkish concessions as well as concessions by all other interested parties to achieve lasting solution to this problem and thus contribute to peace in eastern Mediterranean.

Accordingly Department desires Embassy Ankara to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to impress upon Turkish Government at high level importance which we attach to solution of Cyprus question. With prospects poor for either enosis or outright partition and with need great for some solution, those who wish to solve problem must consider seriously other interim or long-term solutions in spirit that recognizes overriding importance of NATO solidarity. Most careful examination of problem bilaterally and multilaterally is called for and we trust that Turks will welcome opportunity to exchange views with those concerned and those who for sake of common interests are seeking to assist in solutions.

In approach to Turks Embassy should also say US Government particularly welcomes Spaak’s interest in problem and reports of direct Turk-Greek talks. While not necessarily associating ourselves with any specific proposals that Spaak or the Greeks may make, we welcome and encourage any bilateral or multilateral exchange of views of this type that might lead to compromise proposal. NATO summit meeting in Paris⁶ will doubtless offer opportunity for private talks between high level Greeks and Turks.

If you deem it appropriate you may remark that Greek interpretation of British Labor Party resolution⁷ has had profound effect in Greece, where there is growing conviction that GOG may accept nothing short of enosis since Greeks believe Labor Party victory in 1960 or before will mean enosis. Department will appreciate Ankara’s estimate of impact if any of Labor Party’s resolution in Turkey. Specifically may Turks be led to accept compromise (other than outright partition which they consider to be such) in anticipation of eventual change in UK policy favorable to Greece?

FYI. In your discussions with Turks we recognize that any direct attack on Turkish advocacy of partition might not be useful. However, you should bear in mind that Department has grave misgivings regarding both partition and enosis. If you have reason to believe Turks may suspect our approach motivated by Pesmazoglu (Ankara 1444⁸) you should emphasize timing of these instructions determined by other impelling factors, e.g., end of Turkish electoral campaign, Spaak’s activities and NATO Ministerial meeting. End FYI.⁹

London: Inform Foreign Office that we are instructing Embassy Ankara to make this approach to Turkish Government, and express gratification UK resuming Cyprus discussion with Turks (London 3235¹⁰).

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/9–1957. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Williams and approved by Howe. Also sent to London and repeated to Ankara, Paris Topol, and Nicosia.
2. Dated September 19. (Ibid.)
3. Dated November 15. (Ibid.)
4. Dated October 8. (Ibid.)
5. Printed as telegram 7312 to London, Document 241.
6. Reference is to the Heads of Government Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Paris, December 16–19.

7. Reference is to the statement adopted by the Labour Party at its 56th annual conference at Brighton, September 30–October 4. The part of the statement dealing with Cyprus reads:

   “Cyprus should be given the right of self-determination and after a set period may opt for Greece: but it is fully possible that the Cypriots, once the right of self-determination has been conceded, may decide to stay within the Commonwealth.” (Transmitted in telegram 2328 from London, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/10–957)

8. Telegram 1444, November 19, reported the substance of a conversation between the Greek Ambassador to Turkey, Pesmazolu, and Warren during which the Greek Ambassador stressed his determination to find a solution to the Cyprus dispute. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–1957)
9. Throughout October and November, Spaak continued his discussions with the Greeks and the British in an effort to find a framework for a Cyprus settlement that might prove acceptable to the Turks. Among Spaak’s proposals were a formula for a settlement that guaranteed independence for Cyprus; a NATO base on the island occupied by British forces; and an international statute preserving the rights of minorities. (Polto 1333 from Paris, November 18; ibid.,747C.00/11–1857)
10. Telegram 3235, November 21, transmitted a summary of instructions being sent to the British Ambassador in Ankara with respect to exploring the Cyprus situation with the Turks. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–2157)

    On December 2, Warren informed the Department that he had conveyed the substance of this telegram to President Bayar. Commenting on the conversation, the Ambassador noted that it seemed that the Turks were pressing forward with their ideas on partition and could not retreat. (Ibid., 747C.00/12–257)