Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

270. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Field Marshal Montgomery’s Letter to the President About Cyprus

Field Marshal Montgomery has written a personal letter (Tab A²) to the President expressing concern over the danger to the Free World of a continuation of the Cyprus dispute and urging the President to “bang together the heads of Karamanlis and Menderes” in order to effect a compromise solution.

Discussion:

There is a striking similarity between Field Marshal Montgomery’s letter and Field Marshal Sir John Harding’s final assessment of the problem in Cyprus. The British Embassy has informed us that Harding has concluded that someone must turn to the Greeks and Turks and “bang their heads together.” Harding, like Montgomery, stated that the United States must do this. (Tab B³)

Field Marshal Montgomery speaks of the need for concessions on both sides, including Greek recognition of Turkish interests and Turkish recognition of the principle that Cyprus must be a “single state” with majority rule subject to safeguards. Montgomery thus apparently shares Harding’s views that Cyprus must not be partitioned. Our own view has also been to discourage partition. We have also discouraged the Greek desire for enosis. We have not espoused any of the various compromise solutions that have been put forward.

We believe that the best way to bring Greece and Turkey closer together on the Cyprus problem is through the efforts of Mr. Spaak. The December NATO Meeting in Paris provides an excellent opportunity to urge Karamanlis and Menderes to undertake a frank exchange of views. Spaak will seek to do this. We should also do all we can to help effect bilateral exchanges on the Cyprus dispute at Paris, between the parties concerned and between each of them and ourselves.

The British are unlikely to undertake any new departure in Cyprus until after Sir Hugh Foot, the new Governor, has had a chance to review the problem in Cyprus and make recommendations. This will probably take at least six weeks. As soon as this is done, we would hope that we may resume the secret informal talks with the British which Mr. Barbour conducted in London in September and try to agree on possible lines of action by which we could further assist Mr. Spaak in his efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make necessary concessions.

Recommendations:

That you suggest to the President that he tell Field Marshal Montgomery:

1. That we have already, as Montgomery suggests, urged the Greek Government to use all its influence to keep EOKA from further violence at this time. We have also made representations to Averoff on the need for moderation in the UNGA debate on Cyprus.

2. That we are now concentrating our efforts regarding the Cyprus problem on appropriate support to Mr. Spaak’s activities.

3. That at the NATO Meeting in Paris we will encourage Greeks and Turks to begin to talk to each other to try to narrow their differences. When the President sees Menderes and Karamanlis in Paris individually, he may wish to encourage such talks.

4. That after the new British Governor has made his report, we would like to go over with the British possible lines of action with a view to seeing in what ways we can further support Mr. Spaak’s efforts and encourage the Greeks and Turks to make concessions.

We are prepared to draft a suggested reply to Montgomery along the above lines.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/12–957. Secret. Drafted by Williams, Jones, and Laingen.
2. Not found attached. A copy of Montgomery’s letter to Eisenhower, dated November 1957, is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memos.
3. Tab B, which according to a notation on the source text was an extract from Williams’ memorandum of conversation with Wiggin, dated November 27, was not found attached. A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central File 747C.00/11–2757.
4. There is no indication on the source text that Dulles approved the memorandum.