Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 29, 1956—5:48 p.m.

2340. For Holmes and principal officers only. Holmes may make following points to HMG re Cyprus in manner he considers most suitable:

1. Secretary has informed Holmes Makins demarche September 26 (Deptel² this subject). He authorizes Holmes carry on discussions this topic in order avoid risks misunderstanding and delay which might result from simultaneous talks in Washington and London.

2. HMG has inquired whether US would again undertake lobby actively against inscription Cyprus by GOG. As HMG aware campaign against Greek inscription would be contrary our policy not opposing our allies when they wish raise subject in UN which they consider important. Last year we reluctantly decided oppose GOG at last moment on grounds quiet diplomacy could be more fruitful than heated public debate. After fourteen months we would probably not be able use this argument effectively unless quiet diplomacy had led to real hope successful steps would be taken on Cyprus towards implementing “basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice.” (Quote from Washington Declaration of February 1, 1956.³)

3. Furthermore if we should nevertheless decide oppose inscription, we do not believe such argument would be as convincing as last year and are not inclined to adopt it without real possibility success. Vote last year 28 against inscription, 22 for, 10 abstentions. As HMG has indicated we may have been able to influence the few votes needed for this majority, but since our argument will have been weakened by time and since composition of General Assembly has been considerably changed, we do not believe we could attain same result if attempted. Our preliminary analysis shows that if vote were as favorable as possible from UK viewpoint it would go against UK by narrow margin. Would appreciate British assessment. More on this later.

4. However unless we decide make such attempt, which would be both contrary to our principles and not likely to succeed, we understand HMG may decide submit item to show GOG violated Article 2(7).⁴ While understanding HMG’s desire avoid what Makins described as “diplomatic defeat” in General Assembly, we must point out that British decision indict Greeks in UNGA might delay still longer solution HMG is seeking in Cyprus question. Whatever else might result, it is our belief that such a move would so harden attitude of GOG and Greek Cypriots that any progress would be impossible for indefinite future.

5. It is US view that there are many possibilities between extremes outlined above. Main factors for success some intermediary course would appear to be time and determination. For present we request understanding HMG will not submit item against Greece until latest moment since it could be inscribed as “important and urgent” question even during session.

6. Delay will provide time for Holmes proceed with mission and determine what possibilities exist for solution acceptable to Greeks, Turks, Cypriots and British. He may find grounds to justify UK-Greek agreement to defer or at least remove sting from UNGA debate.

FYI 1. Department will send comments on your 1692,⁵ but for present consider most urgent problem is to obtain from British more time for your mission.

2. On September 11 Greek UN Rep submitted item re “violations of human rights set forth in the UN Charter.” This likely be Greek move permitting them to attack British re Cyprus indirectly should their motion for inscription Cyprus item be defeated. It adds to importance of seeking obtain some understanding between British and Greeks before UNGA meets. End FYI.⁶

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2956. Top Secret; Priority. Limited distribution. Drafted by Wood and Williams. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN.
2. Telegram 1152 to Athens, September 28, repeated to London as telegram 2321, transmitted the highlights of Dulles’ conversation with Makins on September 26. (Ibid., 747C.00/9–2856)
3. For text of the Declaration of Washington issued by Eden and Eisenhower in Washington, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1956, pp. 231–232.
4. Article 2, subparagraph 7 of the U.N. Charter reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” For text of the Charter, see 59 Stat. 1037.
5. Supra.
6. In telegram 1776, October 1, the Embassy at London reported that Barbour and Holmes met with Nutting to discuss the points raised in this telegram. Nutting noted that the United Kingdom was agreeable to the Holmes mission as long as discussions were confined to self-government on the basis of a liberal constitution with the issue of self-determination “indefinitely postponed” although the principle itself reaffirmed. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–156)