200. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
1158. Paris for Dillon and Perkins; London, Ankara and Nicosia for principal officers only. Holmes and I spent 3½ hours with Karamanlis today going over Cyprus question. In morning session, which had to be broken off so that Prime Minister could attend memorial services marking first anniversary of death Papagos, Karamanlis gave strongly subjective and sometimes vehement account Greek side of question. Though he made clear his distrust of British, he readily recognized their vital interests deeply involved and expressed [Page 413] opinion that important to West in general and Greece in particular that they remain strong in this part of world. He was most appreciative of US interest and efforts and fully understood significance Holmes mission and need for his viewpoint as well as other parties to maintain strictest secrecy. In more relaxed evening session he indicated increased confidence his own political position.
Though atmosphere and substance of Karamanlis’ conversations somewhat different from talk with Averoff yesterday (latter engaged in no histrionics, took softer line on implementation self-determination principle, felt amnesty could be worked out along lines recent Harding proposals, and stressed efforts he making to influence Cypriot opinion in order prepare it for settlement short of self-determination), discrepancies not important as obviously deep desire of both for settlement of Cypriot issue.
From conversations to date Greek position on Cyprus problem emerges as follows:
1. Immediate introduction of self-government based on majority principle.
Greeks appear to have intimation that Radcliffe constitution will be liberal and are principally concerned with need that they be shown document in advance of publication in order make use this fact to strengthen their position with Greek public opinion, with Makarios, and with the Cypriots. They flatly state they will be willing to agree to any safeguards for Turkish minority. They accept without question reservation Defense and Foreign Affairs powers to British and recognize necessity for British continue have jurisdiction over internal security but would like understanding that after a stated period (three years was suggested) discussions take place between HMG and Cypriot Government for gradual turn-over of police power to Cypriots with British to retain indefinitely right to intervene in event emergency.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Amnesty
Though Averoff critical of Harding’s recent “surrender terms” he agreed that in connection broad political settlement similar arrangement might be acceptable if stated in somewhat different terms. He felt those affected would rather come to Greece as national heroes than remain in Cyprus and be tried for murder. He insisted that apart from Grivas very few Greeks were involved EOKA. Karamanlis’ attitude on amnesty was to emphasize that along with inauguration full self-government amnesty essential to stop fighting. Asked about Harding terms, he replied that best solution would be simple blanket amnesty for all concerned. He indicated willingness, however, give further consideration matter which he [Page 414] recognized not as simple as he put it and expressed confidence amnesty solution could be reached if British really well disposed and anxious for settlement.
4. Makarios
Karamanlis and Averoff both believed it virtually impossible bring Cypriots to accept settlement without some form of blessing by Makarios…. Karamanlis quite clear, however, on readiness (even eagerness) Greek Government send emissary to Seychelles posthaste if grounds of agreement found between British and Greeks and to authorize emissary to pursue strong pressure tactics on Makarios….
In conversations Greeks showed no apparent awareness of British intention to inscribe complaint against them in UNGA. They fully cognizant, however, that in UNGA debate British will attack them vigorously and would like to avoid it if at all possible. Unless solution can be found within next two or three weeks, however, Greek Government feels impelled press for inscription on final UNGA agenda.
While not admitting Turkish right to have determining voice in Cyprus matter, Karamanlis fully understood Turks have to be taken into account and expressed desire improve Greek-Turkish relations. He felt that if substantial Anglo-Greek agreement achieved, Turks would make necessary adjustments in their position.
At end second session with Karamanlis, Averoff joined us and there was brief discussion of tactics and procedures. Greeks stressed need to avoid unilateral announcement by British of any settlement and strongly advocated simultaneous announcements in both capitals. They again placed great weight on need for consultation concerning Radcliffe constitution.
Just prior Averoff’s entry on scene, Holmes, bearing in mind need bring Averoff’s helpful influence to bear, had obtained Prime Minister’s consent to procedure under which we would draw up brief summary of Greek Government position (with view of showing it to British) and to going over this paper first with Foreign Minister. Objective this procedure to reconcile differences between positions of two Ministers and to obtain a clear and agreed statement of Greek position without asking for formal commitments this time. Text paper will be cabled Washington when it takes final form after it has been reviewed by Averoff and a probable last going over with Karamanlis.
Holmes believes that in light discussions here it would now be more productive to return to London before proceeding Ankara unless Department has contrary view. Should be able complete work here today and to fly London this weekend.
[Page 415]Reference: Department’s 751 to Ankara,2 Holmes recommends that Embassy Ankara start preparing Turks along lines suggested therein without, of course, making reference Dr. Holmes visit. Both Holmes and this Embassy appreciate need avoid appearance presenting Turks with fait accompli although if it is found possible to achieve broad agreement between London and Athens, this should strengthen Holmes hand with Turks.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/10–556. Top Secret; Priority. Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, and Nicosia. Holmes arrived in Athens on October 2.↩
- Telegram 751, October 3, noted that the Department was concerned over the “increasing vociferousness of the Turkish attitude on Cyprus” and indicated that it was still the U.S. view that Turkey must be prepared to modify gradually its position. (Ibid., 747C.00/10–156)↩
- In telegram 1271, October 6, the Department concurred that, Holmes should return to London before proceeding to Ankara. (Ibid., 120.1540/10–556)↩