198. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

1692. Paris for Dillon and Perkins only. Athens and Ankara principal officers only. Barbour and Holmes met yesterday evening with Lloyd, Lennox-Boyd, Nutting, Kirkpatrick, Peake (British Ambassador to Greece) and Young (Head Southern Department). Agreed cover was call on Nutting to discuss NATO affairs.

Holmes briefly explained mission and then raised question of whether in light of Suez situation, Her Majesty’s Government anxious for early solution of Cyprus or whether it was considered in British interest to hold line on island and proceed in unhurried [Page 409] manner with Radcliffe constitution. There was no direct answer to this question, which probably indicates that relation Cyprus and Suez had not been thought through.

Lloyd mentioned British query to Department concerning our attitude inscription of Cyprus item by Greece on provisional agenda General Assembly. It was explained that one objective our suggested informal examination of situation was to determine U.S. position in U.N. Speaking direct to Lloyd, Nutting said he thought it essential that British complaint against Greece should be inscribed before final date of provisional agenda October 12. Lloyd and Lennox-Boyd seemed to agree and although British may delay until near deadline, there seems no doubt they will submit their complaint. They feel their case against Greece is a strong one and that there is a possibility that its inscription may result in a negotiated removal of it and the Greek item or the postponement of both to the tail end of the agenda.

Lennox-Boyd reported that Radcliffe had departed for Cyprus and would return in about a week. He expected that within 4 or 5 weeks from now Radcliffe would submit his draft constitution to Her Majesty’s Government. If the government approved the draft, he was willing to show it to the Greek Government before promulgation. In response to questions, he stated that personally he would be willing to accept Greek comments, and if there was real evidence of good faith by Greece, he would be willing to allow non-substantive changes if by so doing Greece’s ability to influence the Ethnarchy would be strengthened. Although he could not predict what Radcliffe’s recommendations would be, he felt certain that his draft constitution would be a truly liberal one.

Lennox-Boyd then volunteered his position with respect to Makarios: it was never intended that the exile would be permanent; if the Archbishop would denounce terrorism now and for the future, he would be allowed to return to Cyprus, but only after the new constitution was in force and working; if even after constitution in force and working, he still failed to denounce terrorism he would nevertheless be released, free to go where he chose, except he would be barred from Cyprus.

The Colonial Secretary then said he saw some possibility of a settlement if Greece would completely separate self-government and self-determination, settling now for the former, and if Turks could be convinced that self-government was not an open door to self-determination and that minority really protected.

Holmes pointed out that from what Karamanlis and Averoff have told our representatives in Athens, the appeal to the U.S. to mediate remarks by Averoff to Committee of 3 in Paris and to Senator George and him, it was our opinion that Greek Government [Page 410] is very anxious for settlement, fears its political position and feels that when circumstances right it can influence Cypriots. Peake opinioned that Karamanlis is in no great danger of being ousted and that talk of losing power and painting black picture of what might succeed him was designed to “make our flesh creep”. No one expressed agreement with this view.

There then followed general discussion of how Greek sincerity and influence with Cypriots might be tested. Kirkpatrick suggested that they might be asked to send word secretly to Bishop of Kitium that leading Cypriots respond to Radcliffe’s invitation to consult on constitution.

The meeting lasted an hour and of course there was much more general conversation of the complex subject under discussion. It ended with Lloyd saying that they would discuss the matter, think it over and communicate with us as soon as possible.

The meeting was cordial, serious and our desire to be helpful was clearly appreciated.2

Aldrich
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.154/9–2656. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Athens, and Ankara.
  2. In telegram 1254, October 5, for Holmes and principal officers only, the Department made a number of comments on telegram 1692 that were intended for possible use in discussions with the British. Among its comments, the Department noted that if the United Kingdom was determined to inscribe the item regarding Greece’s intervention in the Cyprus problem, it might be best to make the item of a general character without naming Greece. With respect to Makarios, the Department added, any proposals must be ultimately acceptable to the Greek Cypriots whose representatives insist that there can be no progress without the Archbishop. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1540/9–2656)