93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 10, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- Admiral Davis
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Sebald
- Mr. Jones
The meeting was held in order to reach State–Defense agreement as to the course of action which should be taken on the NNSC at this time.
Mr. Murphy mentioned that he had spoken with Secretary Gray and asked Admiral Davis whether Secretary Gray had briefed him on the NNSC problem.
Admiral Davis said that he had the impression from Secretary Gray that we should not be too rigid in adhering to the October 15 date. Secretary Gray was willing to agree to a reasonable delay as long as it was not a first step toward doing nothing.
Mr. Murphy and Mr. Robertson assured Admiral Davis that the Department was as interested as Defense in seeing NNSC activities in the ROK terminated as quickly as possible. The Swedes, Mr. Robertson said, were also keen on taking action.
Admiral Davis recalled the conversation between Secretary Gray and Mr. Sebald which seemed to have resulted in a firm agreement that if the Swiss and Swedes had not taken action by October 15 the UN Command would be instructed to terminate NNSC activities in the ROK.2
Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Swiss and Swedes had been the first to propose abolition of the NNSC. They wanted very much to get out of this unpleasant task and failing to get agreement to terminate the Commission they had proposed the recent reduction as a first step. We had been four months in accepting the proposal for a reduction because General Taylor had felt that such a reduction would not settle the problem.
Admiral Davis said that both Defense and the Command had feared that if they accepted the proposed reduction it would be the last step taken.
Mr. Robertson said the Swedes were earnest about getting out of the NNSC and that they did not regard the recent reduction as a last [Page 172] step. The Commission was a drain on them and their problem was to get out as gracefully as possible in view of their neutral position.
Mr. Murphy pointed out that both the Swiss and Swedes had diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists and did not want to jeopardize those relations by too hasty action.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that when we had finally gone along with the proposed reduction we had sent a note to the Swiss and Swedes expressing the hope that an additional step might be taken by October 15.3 The Swiss had taken umbrage at the October 15 date and Swedish Ambassador Boheman had told Mr. Robertson confidentially that the Swiss felt that October 15 smacked too much of an ultimatum. Ambassador Boheman had informed us that the Swedes were engaged right now trying to persuade the Communists at Panmunjom to agree to withdraw the NNSC teams to the Demilitarized Zone. They, of course, did not want to withdraw from the ROK under duress by either the ROK or the U.S. If the Swedes do manage to get the NNSC to agree to withdraw to the Demilitarized Zone it will be the best possible way of accomplishing our objective.
Admiral Davis asked whether the Swiss would go along.
Mr. Robertson said they also wanted out. He had already told them in as strong diplomatic terms as possible of our need to have something done soon. The Swedes feel they can work the matter out with the Swiss and the Communists, given a little time. The Swiss and Swedes are not dragging their feet on the matter; the only question with them is the matter of tactics.
Admiral Davis pointed out that the more time that passed the greater the risk of recurring riots in the ROK. He wondered whether the October 15 date had leaked to the ROK. He pointed out that he had understood the October 15 date was also the position the Secretary regarded as favorable.
Mr. Murphy said the Secretary had not felt the date was that categorical, but rather looked at it as a target date.
Mr. Robertson said there was no question but what the language of the agreement between State and Defense was airtight on the question of the October 15 date. However, Mr. Robertson had talked with the Secretary and the Secretary had stated his intention to write a letter to Secretary Wilson saying that we ought not to regard this date as too firm, but rather give the Swiss and Swedes a little more time to carry out their desired course of action.
Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Australians were worried about the possibility of the UN Command taking unilateral action.
[Page 173]Mr. Robertson stated that this worry was principally fear that such action would place us in a bad public position, one where we might be made to look like violators of the Armistice Agreement.
Admiral Davis said Secretary Gray had agreed that a reasonable delay would be all right and asked how much time the Swiss and Swedes would take to complete their action.
Mr. Robertson said that on the basis of his conversations with Ambassador Boheman it was hard to pick out a particular date. The Swedes had made a proposition to the Communists to withdraw the teams to the Demilitarized Zone. The Communists were finding this proposal difficult to turn down and the Swedes were pressing hard hoping to get a reasonably prompt response. Ambassador Boheman had informed us that if the Swedes were not able to get such a response by October 15 the UN Command could, of course, ask the Swiss and Swedes to get out and they would go. However, this would place the Command in the possible position of violating the Armistice.
Admiral Davis asked if the Swedes might not prefer to be moved out.
Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Swiss would like very much to have us tell them to get out.
Mr. Robertson said the Swedes would not mind being moved out but then we would have to bear the onus of such action.
Mr. Murphy agreed with the point Admiral Davis made that there now was somewhat of a lull in the demonstrations in the ROK and that this was the time to act.
Mr. Sebald said he had appealed to Minister Han very strongly on this matter pointing out that the demonstrations had tied our hands and made it difficult for the UN Command or the Swiss and Swedes to act.4
Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Robertson how the matter had been left with Ambassador Boheman.
Mr. Robertson said that he had told the Ambassador that October 15 was not an ultimatum. However, there had to be a termination of the NNSC at some time and the UN Command had felt that they wanted to know by October 15 what the Swiss and Swedes were going to do if anything so that they could act accordingly.
Admiral Davis asked why the Communists should agree to withdrawal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone.
Mr. Robertson said Ambassador Boheman felt that the Communists were fearful the Swiss and Swedes would walk out altogether; they wanted very much to maintain the facade of inspection. Thus they might settle for something rather than nothing.
[Page 174]Admiral Davis said he thought we should take this occasion to tell the Swiss and Swedes that there was a comparative lull in the demonstrations in the ROK and that there was a certain awareness in the ROK that the NNSC operations there should be wound up shortly, and thus if we do not manage this soon, we will find ourselves in a very difficult position again.
Mr. Robertson said he would tell the Swiss this when they came in to report Bern’s attitude on the problem.
Admiral Davis said that he presumed whatever is done State will simply inform the Sixteen and not ask their permission to take action.
Mr. Murphy and Mr. Robertson agreed that this was so, but pointed out that if we were forced into unilateral UN Command action our position with our Allies would be very bad.
Admiral Davis said Defense could not accept the responsibility of having the demonstrations build up again.
Mr. Murphy said it was hard to tell what the ROK will do, and said that what we should try to do now was to smoke out the Swiss.
Mr. Sebald asked whether the Command should not be notified.
Mr. Robertson said that he understood the Command did not have instructions to take action. He thought, however, it would be well to inform the Command in a joint State–Defense message5 that the Swedes were working on the problem, and that they felt it best to wait the outcome of their negotiations with the Swiss and the Communists because this would incur only a relatively short delay in achieving our objective.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–1055. Secret. Drafted by Jones. The source text indicates the meeting took place in Murphy’s office.↩
- See Document 81.↩
- Summarized in Document 85.↩
- See Document 88.↩
- Sent to CINCUNC as telegram 773 to Tokyo, October 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/10–1055)↩