69. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State 1
152. State pass Defense. Tokyo pass CINCUNC and CAG. Reference Department’s 782 sent Tokyo 217. This is a joint message from Amb Lacy and Gen Lemnitzer. Gen Lemnitzer and I called on President Rhee this afternoon and conveyed to him the substance of our joint instructions as given in reftel.
In response to a direct question concerning his intention to use force in obtaining the return of the areas below the 38th parallel, including Kaesong and the Ongjin Peninsula, the President replied that the Govt’s announcement, which had been cleared by him, made no mention of the use of force and that he did not intend to use force in connection with it.3 He said that the Communists must recognize they had no right to this area which was below the 38th parallel. After describing the circumstances under which they had obtained possession of it, the President said that in all fairness they must give it back. When asked if he believed they would return it as a result of the Govt statement, he muttered rather incoherently that that would depend on whether or not the US and UN Command backed up his request. Gen Lemnitzer asked if he had given any consideration to the possibility of the Communists raising a question concerning the areas the ROK hold above the 38th parallel now that he had asked for the return of areas held by the Communists below the parallel. He replied impatiently that our men had fought, bled, and died for the area held above the parallel and in any event the ROK had a right to all the area north of the parallel.
The President was less categorical about his intention to use force in evicting the Czechs and Poles on the NNIT. However Gen Lemnitzer stated clearly that the protection of the NNIT and the guarantee of the physical safety was an integral part of his mission as CINCUNC and that he could not and would not tolerate any interference [Page 135] with them. The President repeated his familiar complaint against the presence of “Czech and Polish spies” in the territory of the ROK and recalled again the Secretary’s promise to him in Washington last July4 in the presence of American and Korean officials that the problem of the NNSC would be solved to his satisfaction and, he said, “with all possible speed”. Both Gen Lemnitzer and I assured him that tremendous efforts had been made and were being made at the very highest levels in our Govt for the solution of this problem. I stated that it was my conviction that great progress had recently been made in this regard.
The interview this afternoon lasted half an hour. The President was relatively restrained in his statements but left no doubt concerning his impatience with the delay in resolving the problem of the NNSC. It was apparent from our conversation that the statement that was issued by the Govt on Sunday has not been communicated directly to the North Korean Govt. ROK Govt appears to consider its publication of the statement constitutes an official communication on its part to the Govt of North Korea.
It is our opinion that that Govt’s statement stems from the President’s dissatisfaction with progress on the resolution of the problem of the NNSC and from his growing bewilderment and frustration as he sees world tension relaxing and the opportunity to unify his country by the use of force fading away. He may well have had the intention when the announcement was made on Sunday to use force both in recovering the Kaesong area and in ejecting the Czechs and Poles. However, reliable intelligence reports show that in ROK conferences subsequent to the announcement the President’s own military leaders were reluctant or unwilling to follow his leadership in any measures that would involve the use of force in either connection. His statements reviewed above undoubtedly reflect his present attitude on the use of force but do not necessarily reflect his intent at the time the statement was issued.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–455. Secret; Niact. Repeated priority to Tokyo.↩
- Telegram 78 to Seoul, August 2, instructed Ambassador Lacy to join with General Lemnitzer in calling on President Rhee to express astonishment at the announcement that the Republic of Korea had demanded the withdrawal of the NNSC from Korea and ordered the withdrawal of Communist forces from south of the 38th parallel. Lacy and Lemnitzer were instructed to tell Rhee that the Unified Command had an obligation to maintain the Armistice line and to protect the members of the NNSC and intended to carry out those obligations. (Ibid., 795.00/8–255)↩
- On August 2, the Republic of Korea Office of Public Information issued a press release which demanded the withdrawal of the NNSC from Korea and ordered the withdrawal of Communist forces from Kaesong, Ongjin, and the northern portion of the Han River. (Telegram 139 from Seoul, August 2; ibid.)↩
- For documentation on Rhee’s trip to Washington in July 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XV, Part 2, pp. 1839 ff.↩