67. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, July 29, 1955, 11:30 a.m.1
[Here follow a list of 26 persons present and the first two agenda items. Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State officials [Page 129] included Murphy, Robertson, and McClurkin. General Cabell attended the meeting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency.]
3. Future Status of the NNSC
Mr. Murphy mentioned Swedish and Swiss concern over delays in facing up to the problem of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their desire to move toward complete abolition of the Commission by a first step of cutting down on the number of inspection teams in Korea, as had been recommended to the Military Armistice Commission by the NNSC.2 He and Mr. Robertson pointed out that there has as yet been no answer to the April 9 proposal3 to this effect and that the communists in MAC have accepted it. They pointed out that both the Swiss and the Swedes wanted to get rid of the NNSC in toto just as we do, but that they are not unmindful of the fact that their reputation and good name are involved in their participation on the Commission; and they consider it better to handle the problem in stages.
Admiral Radford remarked that the President had approved the decision to bring about the end of the NNSC. He said that he was strongly in favor of moving ahead with vigor to get the job done in one sweep. He expressed the view that the U.S. has not had the cooperation it deserves from the Committee of Sixteen and that it was up to this Government to put additional pressure on the Sixteen to agree now to dismantling the Commission. He and General Taylor pointed out that the danger of action by the ROK against the inspection teams is not removed merely by reducing the number of teams. Admiral Radford stressed that the main problem was with the ROK, and that we must at all costs avoid creating a situation in which we would have to shoot ROK forces in order to protect the NNSC. He pointed out that the U.S. is the only nation which has any real stake in Korea and expressed strong doubts that the Sixteen, having agreed only to reduce the number of inspection teams, would then two months later agree to abolish the teams entirely. Admiral Radford and General Taylor thought that we must bring the problem to a head and that we have already continued too long with the present unsatisfactory basis.
[Page 130]Admiral Radford said he liked the idea of suspension of NNSC operations and suggested that that announcement be made by the U.S. Mr. Murphy pointed out that any such announcement would be a unilateral action on the part of the U.S. and would enable the other side to charge us with violating the armistice. He continued that some of the countries in the United Nations would make a great deal out of such unilateral action on our part. Mr. Murphy asked for JCS views on how to bring more pressures on the Sixteen in the matter and Admiral Radford suggested that they just be told what we intend to do.
General Taylor suggested another tactic: to propose that both the Chinese Communists and the United Nations withdraw entirely their forces from Korea. He said he was prepared to do this but could not speak for the other Chiefs. Admiral Radford appeared skeptical over this idea.
Mr. Murphy suggested that the Sixteen are not as worried as we over the imbalance of forces in South and North Korea, and Mr. Robertson mentioned Secretary Dulles’ view that we should build up openly. Admiral Radford remarked that this plan was unacceptable, since we don’t want the NNSC inspecting our modern equipment.
Admiral Radford remarked that the JCS just do not believe in the two-stage approach and the timing proposed by the Swedes. Mr. Robertson replied that the Swedes do feel the matter could be accomplished in the way they proposed and reiterated the desire of the Swedish Government to be rid of the whole affair.
With respect to violations of the armistice by the North Koreans, Admiral Radford and General Taylor expressed the JCS view that there had been a long line of violations which everyone knew about and that feeling in the Sixteen relative to terminating NNSC was not getting any better but that the Sixteen could be expected rather to grow more complacent from now on. That was another strong reason for taking vigorous action now to terminate the NNSC. Admiral Radford expressed the view that there should be another meeting with the President on the matter to arrive at a decision as to U.S. policy.
Mr. Murphy said that we were left with little alternative but to inform the Swedish Government that its proposal is not acceptable. He thought it would be wiser to go forward with their proposal but would report the JCS objection to the Secretary of State and recommend that the problem be raised again with the President.4
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”↩
- In telegram 83 from Bern, July 21, the Embassy reported that the Swiss Government had inquired “on numerous occasions” concerning the U.S. reply to the urgent Swiss request that the United States not reject the May 3 NNSC proposal. The Embassy in Stockholm reported in telegram 84, July 26, that the Swedish Government was similarly impatient for a U.S. response to the Swedish proposal. (Ibid., 795.00/7–2155 and 795.00/7–2655, respectively)↩
- The Swedish proposal was conveyed to the Department on April 7 by Count Douglas; see Document 34.↩
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On August 3, Robertson sent a memorandum to Dulles in which he summarized the discussion on July 29 with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the problems relating to the Korean Armistice. Robertson noted the strong desire of the military to abolish the NNSC and concluded:
“Our best prospect still seems to be to accept promptly in the MAC the reduction proposed by the NNSC. Then we should go ahead with your suggestion that we report to the United Nations our practical interpretation of the Armistice and proceed openly as necessary to introduce the weapons which we need to introduce. The NNSC can then be allowed to wither on the vine. Defense’s problem that it does not want any opportunity for the NNSC to inspect some of our new weapons can probably be met through the operation of the time factor since, as we understand it, it is not immediately intended to introduce these new weapons and the NNSC may well have died a natural death through Swedish and Swiss action before the necessity arises.”
Robertson therefore recommended that Dulles hold another meeting with Defense representatives to discuss the subject and to urge immediate acceptance in the MAC of the proposed reductions in the NNSC. If agreement could not be reached in such a discussion, Robertson proposed that the matter should be put up to the President for decision. Dulles indicated on the memorandum that he approved of Robertson’s recommendations with the exception of the recommendation to put the matter, if necessary, up to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/8–355)
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