6. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1


  • U.S. Courses of Action in Case Present U.S.-ROK Problems Remain Unresolved
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the recent proposals made by Ambassador Briggs, General Hull, and Mr. Tyler Wood concerning an integrated plan embracing political, economic, and military measures to cope with President Rhee’s continued unwillingness to cooperate with U.S. policy in Korea, such as his delay in [Page 9] signing the “Agreed Minute” and his obstructionism in the dollar-Hwan controversy.2
The integrated plan contains four series of actions of increasing severity designed to develop mounting pressures on the ROK Government. Each of the actions contains economic, military and political measures which would be implemented to the extent and at the rate necessary to induce ROK cooperation with U.S. policy.
The specific military measures recommended in order of increasing severity are as follows:
Slow-down of military program, including cessation of any further expansion.
Announce consideration of redeployment of the remaining U.S. forces from Korea and discussion of withdrawal of other UN units with their respective governments, and continuation of military aid on minimum basis consistent with the United States interests.
Withdrawal of all U.S. and UN forces from Korea except KMAG.
Withdrawal of KMAG as a last resort.
As a result of the signing of the “Agreed Minute” on 17 November 1954 and the successful dollar auctions on 13 December 1954 and 10 January 1955,3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the situation in Korea has altered to the extent that it would be inappropriate to approve a series of measures for future action which, should the need arise, in all probability would have to be reconsidered in detail in the light of the conditions then existing.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration in the attached draft message to CINCUNC,4 Ambassador Briggs and Mr. Wood jointly, and that it be dispatched as a joint State–Defense–FOA message.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford5
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 60 B 1025, 092 Korea. Top Secret.
  2. These proposals were conveyed to the Army Chief of Staff in telegram C–70208 from CINCUNC, November 8, 1954; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XV, Part 2, pp. 19111914.
  3. See footnote 3, Document 3.
  4. Attached but not printed. It is a joint State–Defense–FOA message which indicated that there was no current need to adopt the measures which had been proposed in telegram C 70208 cited in footnote 2 above. The draft message was approved by the Department of State and the Foreign Operations Administration and sent to CINCUNC.
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.