59. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 18, 19551

SUBJECT

  • Security of the Republic of Korea

PARTICIPANTS

  • General Chung II Kwon, Republic of Korea Army Chief of Staff
  • Brigadier General Hu Rak Lee, Republic of Korea Military Attaché
  • Mr. Robert J.G. McClurkin, Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
  • Mr. William G. Jones, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
  • Lt. Colonel Helmuth O. Froeschle, U.S. Army, Escort Officer
  • Mr. Christopher A. Norred, Jr., NA

Mr. McClurkin asked about progress in the activation of the reserve divisions, and General Chung replied that eight of the ten had been activated. The only problem remaining in the reserve program is weapons and equipment, which thus far have been supplied by drawing them from the active divisions.

General Chung said that Communist military power in North Korea has increased in five respects: (1) jet planes, (2) airfields, (3) number of tanks, (4) firepower, particularly in mortars and artillery, and (5) movement of Chinese Communist forces into reserve positions, with the North Koreans assuming responsibility for the frontline areas. He said ROK estimates of North Korean strength differ slightly from ours, in that they include service troops in their estimate of about 400,000, of which 330,000 are combat units. Combat units of the ROK Army, he said, number about 300,000. The ROK is not concerned about the North Korean forces, which they believe they could easily handle, and which are inordinately large relative to the population, but it is troubled by Communist China.

Mr. McClurkin commented that ROK security in the final analysis, as has often been pointed out, is based on the Joint Policy Declaration of 1953 and subsequent policy statements indicating that the United States and its Allies would react vigorously to renewed aggression in Korea and would not confine their counter-action to the Korean area. General Chung agreed, but said that as a military commander of forces directly confronting the Communists he is troubled by evidences of Western disunity and reduction of forces as a result of the Communist peace or co-existence offensive. He believes the Communists are steadily increasing their strength, and that their leaders, unlike those of the West, can launch an aggression at any time without regard for public opinion. He urged that ROK forces be kept at their present strength as a front-line for United States defense [Page 115] and in order to buy time in the event of Communist atomic attack. He said that he learned while he was an officer in the Japanese forces fighting the Russians in Manchuria that the Russians do not spend much of their military budget on such things as food. He expressed fear that the Communists may be closing the gap in atomic weapons, citing in particular a Japanese magazine article on atomic activity in western China. Mr. McClurkin said that those in a position to know say that contrary to sensational stories in the newspapers we still are maintaining preponderance in the atomic field.

General Chung said that his experience in China and Manchuria in World War II impressed him greatly with the effectiveness of Communist techniques of control. For propaganda purposes he says much to his troops about the implications of the refusal of the great majority of the Chinese Communist prisoners in Korea to be repatriated, but he must say candidly to us that he believes that Communist China is steadily increasing its internal controls and military power. During his recent visit to Taipei, he talked with many high-ranking officers in the Chinese Nationalist Army whom he has known for many years, and believes that Nationalist China already has a serious morale problem in its military forces.

General Chung expressed concern about Japanese policies toward the ROK and toward trade with the Communists. He said that the ROK is too often blamed for the lack of progress in ROK-Japanese negotiations, inasmuch as the Japanese negotiate in tricky fashion and apparently want to build up Japan’s strength before bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. He strongly criticized Japan’s trade with the Communists, and urged that the United States press Japan not to form ties with Communist China and North Korea. Mr. McClurkin pointed out that Japan’s trade interests are heavily in the free world, and that this will inevitably influence Japan’s policies. General Chung said that he came to know much about Japanese psychology as one of the two Korean cadets in the Japanese military academy, and he feels that there is danger for the West in Japan’s current trend toward independent policies. He mentioned the possibility that the Hatoyama2 government might be succeeded by a leftist government strongly inclined toward relations with the Communists, and urged the United States to exert pressures now so that the new generation of leaders would not drift in that direction. Mr. McClurkin assured him that the United States has seen some dangers in trends in Japan and is working on them in its own fashion; only time will tell if we will succeed.

General Chung urged that ROK forces not be reduced, estimating that reductions would have an irreparable effect on public [Page 116] morale. In closing, he said that the ROK is “putting everything in one boat,” piloted by the United States, and must and will follow after United States leadership. Mr. McClurkin said that the United States is constantly aware that the United States and ROK have identical aims in the struggle against Communism and that we can rely on them fully.

Mr. McClurkin gave General Chung an autographed picture of President Eisenhower, which General Chung had requested in correspondence addressed to the President’s military aide.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/6–1855. Secret. Drafted by Norred.
  2. Ichiro Hatoyama, Japanese Prime Minister.