Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 21, 1955¹

Washington, May 21, 1955

SUBJECT

• Korean Armistice

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy
• M. G. L. Joy, British Embassy
• Robert G. Murphy, Under Secretary
• Noel Hemmendinger, Deputy Director, NA

Sir Robert came in to give the comments of the British Government on the proposals which had been communicated to him by Mr. Murphy on May 13 with respect to suspension of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).²

He spoke from the attached memorandum,³ which he thereupon handed to Mr. Murphy. Sir Robert indicated that the matter had been carefully considered in London after the Foreign Minister returned from Paris, on the basis of his conversation with the Secretary. They had concluded that the heart of the problem appeared to be military reinforcement, which would not be directly assisted by the present U.S. proposal, and they thought there were most important political objections to any action at this time which tended to weaken the Armistice.

Mr. Murphy said that both the Department of State and our military have felt it would be unwise to take action which would amount to barefaced violation of the Armistice. Sir Robert suggested that the language of the Armistice Agreement was not so explicit that it would not be possible to give a somewhat liberal interpretation, to the word “types”, for instance. Mr. Murphy said we thought the language was pretty tight and that the Neutral Nations had given it a tight interpretation which would be difficult now to escape from. Sir Robert suggested that it would be possible for the UN Command to give fewer details from now on to the NNSC on the ground that the other side was not giving details.

Sir Robert also emphasized that the British would not suggest that any action to be taken with respect to introducing more modern equipment be discussed with the other participating nations. He thought that we should discuss at the most with them the proposal made by the NNSC and now pending in the Military Administering Commission.

There was a discussion of whether a public suspension of the operations of the NNSC would cause any serious public reactions in view of the public case we could make. Sir Robert agreed that we could undoubtedly make a case but his Government felt that it would still be unwise to stir up the issue, especially since the proposed action did not meet the military problem.

Mr. Murphy indicated that our military were now considering the public release of further information on violations by the Communists. It was agreed that this was a good thing to do no matter what course of action is decided upon.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–2155. Confidential. Drafted by Hemmendinger.
2. See Document 49.
3. Not printed. The memorandum lays out in greater detail the argument advanced by Scott that it would be politically unwise for the U.N. Command to take unilateral action to remove the NNSC from South Korea and run the risk of international censure for violation of the Armistice Agreement. [1 line of text not declassified]