The joint report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of
Korea, attached as Enclosure No. 1, is submitted in accordance with the
instructions under reference. It was prepared [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
the Embassy, using material also obtained from the Service Attaches,
Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC),
FOA and Assistant Chief of Staff,
G–2, Eighth U.S. Army
(Forward).
Enclosure
1
REPORT ON THE COUNTER-SUBVERSIVE CAPACITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA3
Introduction and Summary
For the purposes of the instructions under reference the Republic of
Korea (ROK) is considered to be the
type of country in which the primary need for U.S. assistance is in
improving the capabilities of police-type forces in order to prevent
Communist subversion from making important headway. Greater U.S.
efforts, therefore, should be
[Page 75]
directed towards improving the overall effectiveness of existing
internal security forces. The National Police is the logical
organization for development as the major internal security force
because of its manpower, its long existence as a police force and
its complete coverage of the country. From a manpower standpoint it
is adequate, but on the basis of actual performance it does not even
approximate an adequate counter-espionage and counter-intelligence
service. Korea suffers from a plethora of internal security
organizations which are not only countenanced but encouraged and
utilized by President Rhee.
The two major forces, in addition to the National Police, are the
ROK Army CIC and the Joint Provost Marshal Command. All these
organizations are used at times by President Rhee for security as well as
political actions, and, in addition, the President has his own
private police and investigating force known as the Kyungmudae4 Police, which is drawn
from the National Police personnel. Such a diversity of security and
investigative units results in vying for the favor of President
Rhee, and generally each
unit spends more time watching the others for indications of
Presidential favor than in doing the spade work necessary to uncover
skillful subversive tactics. Within the ROK, the regular armed forces should continue to have
the primary mission of protecting against external attack.
I. State of Development of Threat
and Subversion
The threat of Communist control of the ROK through subversion is at present a potential,
rather than an actual, danger. North Korean directed Communist
guerrilla elements in the ROK have
been almost totally annihilated. Such subversion as has been
accomplished has resulted from efforts of the Korean Labor Party
(KLP), the Communist Party of
North Korea. Its organized underground assets in South Korea were
destroyed during the war. The KLP
must now, therefore, rely upon propaganda and compartmented and
low-level espionage agents in attempting to create another
underground.
The Korean Government and its people are strongly anti-Communist, and
there are at present relatively few manifestations of internal
Communist activity in South Korea. A potentially dangerous situation
could develop, however, in the event President Rhee dies or becomes incapacitated.
His personal rule, his failure to provide for a successor, his
policy of playing off officials against each other, and the absence
of strongly entrenched traditions of political party
responsibilities are some of the characteristics which could provide
confusion and disorder when the firm hand of Rhee is removed. Such a situation
would be fertile ground for Communist subversive activities.
[Page 76]
In these circumstances certain limited North Korean subversive assets
which already exist in South Korea in a more or less dormant state
could be used to advantage by trained agents to exploit the
confusion and disorder that might well accompany a ROK political crisis. The following
identifiable groups are assets of this type: Remnants of the former
Communist underground in South Korea; other Communists and Communist
sympathizers who survived the Korean war in the ROK; relatives and associates of the
thousands of Leftist intellectuals who fled to North Korea during
the war; approximately two million refugees from North Korea now in
South Korea who, although mostly non-Communists, are exploitable
because of their friends and relatives in North Korea; and prisoners
of war released by the ROK in South
Korea.
The counter-subversive facilities and personnel of the ROK security agencies are almost fully
occupied in carrying out political tasks assigned by President
Rhee and in seeking to
combat the large volume of Communist low-level espionage and
subversive penetration attempts from North Korea. Even so,
subversives apprehended by the ROK
probably represent only a fraction of the total number of agents
dispatched by the KLP.
It can be assumed that there are high caliber individual agents
working at high levels within the ROK whose mission is political subversion. Civil and
military security agents do not have a planned, coordinated program
to combat this type agent who represents a far greater threat of
political subversion than do the low-level type, border crossing
agents.
A dangerous situation results from the fact that through its control
of coastal smuggling channels between North and South Korea the
KLP and its intelligence
organization exert a damaging influence on the ROK intelligence efforts. Fifteen
Communist front trading organizations have been established in North
Korea close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The ROK positive and counter-intelligence
agencies in turn have established cover-type commercial firms in
South Korea to deal with these North Korean organizations on the
naive assumption that the South Koreans will be able to engage in
effective positive intelligence activities against the North. In
practice the KLP is able to send
commercial goods, subversive agents, funds, instructions and radios
through the smuggling channel to the South Korean commercial fronts
and through them to other destinations in South Korea. However, the
agents and couriers dispatched by the South Korean intelligence
services are not permitted to penetrate North Korea beyond the
trading firms immediately above the DMZ where they receive
information which is prepared and intended for them by the KLP. Competition between the several
ROK intelligence
[Page 77]
agencies and the corruptibility of their
officials are damaging byproducts of this trade.
The inadequate salaries of members of the ROK police and military counter-subversive agencies
make them susceptible to bribes to augment their salaries. This
situation is no doubt exploited by the North Koreans, and as a
result some criminals and subversives without proper identification
documents can probably evade the law and go undetected.
There are two organizations in Japan, the Minsen (Korean Minority
Group of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)) and the Third Force movement for Korean
unification, which should be considered as Communist assets and of
potential usefulness in South Korea for Communist purposes.
Indicative of Minsen activity is the fact one such political-type
agent has been detected and apprehended in Korea in the last five
months. The ROK has outlawed the
Third Force movement and fought it. The Communists both in North
Korea and in Japan engage in extensive smuggling by sea between
Japan and South Korea. Profits help finance their operations and the
channels are used for courier purposes.
[Here follows a six-page analysis of the adequacy of the
countermeasures taken by the Republic of Korea to meet the threat of
Communist subversion. The analysis includes a detailed discussion of
the strength and mission of the National Police, the Joint Provost
Marshal General Command, and the Counter-intelligence Corps of the
South Korean Army.]
III. Analysis of Local U.S.
Programs
U.S. programs of assistance and support of the NP or the several intelligence agencies of the ROK Armed Services are presently being
carried out by [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] KCAC,
FOA and Army CIC. [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] the programs are
narrow and specific in scope and are not coordinated by any central
U.S. agency in Korea. The programs vary in nature but are limited to
theoretical and practical training. U.S. is not rendering logistical
support to the ROK intelligence
agencies, except for that programed by FOA, as noted below.
- a.
- [1 paragraph (25 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- b.
-
Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC)
During the military government phases in South Korea
following World War II the U.S. directed the NP and rendered limited
logistical support. Remnants of that program exist today
within the public safety branch of KCAC in the form of a U.S. Advisory Group to
the NP, soon to be reduced to
only nine U.S. Army officers, with the function of advising
the NP in all phases of its
operations. No logistical support is included. The U.S.
Advisory Group has sponsored the
[Page 78]
training of twenty ROK police officials in the
U.S. Funds were supplied by the U.S. Department of State.
Ten more will probably go to the U.S. during the balance of
1955 on funds furnished by the Department of State and
FOA. (In addition, the
ROK Government has
financed ineffective short-time training in the U.S. for
approximately ten more during the last three
years.)
- c.
-
FOA
Program
FOA has extended assistance
to the NP in the fiscal year
1954. Six hundred and forty thousand dollars of FOA funds were made available
as a grant to purchase cloth for police uniforms. The
purchase has not materialized, however, for the ROK has not been willing to buy
from Japanese sources, which offered the lowest bids. In
addition, a $1,000,000 grant was made the ROK for purchase of
communications equipment: $471,000 for radio equipment,
which will be delivered in September 1955, and $529,000 for
communications wire, now being procured.
Under the Fiscal Year 1955 program, funds made available by
FOA through the Bank of
Korea are being used by a Korean importer to finance the
purchase of a 300-line $25,000 switchboard for the NP.
Two of the ten trainees to go to the U.S. this year from the
NP, as noted above, will
be financed by FOA.
FOA recently offered to
establish and finance a legal center in Seoul with a law
library and staff from the American Bar Association. It is
understood, however, that President Rhee has declined the
offer.
- d.
-
Army CIC
[1 paragraph (1-1/2 lines of source text)
not declassified]
IV. Recommendations
This is a joint report prepared by the Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which
also incorporates material obtained from the Service Attachés,
KCAC, FOA and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward).
The conclusions presented and the following recommendations are
concurred in by the Embassy, the Service Attachés [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. AC/S, G–2 of Eighth Army (Forward), has taken exception to
the report in the manner indicated in Enclosure 2.
It is the joint conclusion of the Embassy, the Service Attachés [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] that conditions in the ROK would not justify the diversion of
military assistance funds to the internal security forces. The
following specific recommendations which may involve the
establishment of new programs are based on the assumption that
improvement of the ROK internal
security forces to meet Communist subversion can be accomplished
through carefully
[Page 79]
defined
projects directed at specific deficiencies. Such an approach might
be more acceptable politically to President Rhee than a general overall program.
The timing of each suggested recommendation should be subjected to
further detailed consideration. The practical implementation of
these recommendations should be the subject of further coordinated
study by the interested agencies.
It is recommended that:
- a.
- The several interested agencies of the U.S. Government
coordinate and adopt a program of assistance for the ROK internal security forces
which would consist both of specialized training and limited
logistical support.
- b.
- A U.S. training program in counter-subversion and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] techniques be established for the
ROK National Police. All
training should be on-the-ground and techniques applicable
in the United States must be adapted to conditions peculiar
to South Korea and to Asia in general.
- c.
- The American military services (Army, Navy Air Force) in
Korea train their counterparts in the ROK armed services through
on-the-ground training courses devoted to the techniques of
counterintelligence and that members of these ROK services participate, as
appropriate, in the NP
training program.
- d.
- The ROK security agencies
be encouraged and assisted in developing procedures for the
exchange of all information and in establishing a central
information and research center.
- e.
- In addition to extending training to the ROK agencies, American
intelligence agencies work, to the extent feasible, with the
ROKs in joint
counter-subversive activities thus teaching techniques and
offering guidance at the same time.
- f.
- Training in the United States be offered to selected
members of ROK security
agencies.
- g.
- USIA aid effectively in a
counter-subversion propaganda program by supplying ROK agencies with a flow of
usable [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] information for their use in
addressing the people of South Korea. This
education-propaganda should include material with respect to
overall Communist intents, techniques, propaganda lines and
methods, overall strategy and techniques and especially
information as to specific Communist targets in the ROK.
- h.
- FOA, or its successor
agency, consider the advisability of taking over supervision
of the U.S. Advisory Group to the National Police (in order
that the group will not be disbanded should KCAC be abolished) and
augmenting that program by providing logistical support
either through grants in aid or on a reimbursable
basis.
- i.
- President Rhee be
apprized by the highest ranking U.S. military and civilian
officials of the purposes of the proffered training programs
and United States limited logistical support. Unless the
President’s concurrence is obtained and implemented by his
directing ROK agencies to
cooperate jointly with the United States, any U.S. program
will fail to achieve its objectives. President Rhee’s full cooperation is
considered to be essential for the success of any effort to
improve internal security in the ROK.
