40. Despatch From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1
- Department of State Circular Telegrams Nos. 559 and 560, dated March 24 , 19552
- Report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea
The joint report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea, attached as Enclosure No. 1, is submitted in accordance with the instructions under reference. It was prepared [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Embassy, using material also obtained from the Service Attaches, Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), FOA and Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward).
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Eighth U.S. Army (Forward) does not agree that an increased level of U.S. assistance is necessary to improve the capacity of the ROK police-type forces for combating Communist subversion. His conclusions and views are summarized in Enclosure No. 2, attached.
Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/4–3055. Top Secret.↩
Circular telegram 559 instructed Chiefs of Mission “to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG (or service attachés), [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with communist subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrections.” (Ibid., 700.5/3–2355) The purpose of the exercise was to provide the OCB with information necessary to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.
Circular telegram 560 pointed out that the problem of combating Communist attempts to subvert friendly governments had already received preliminary study by the OCB. Since country team assessments would weigh heavily in the formulation of an NSC decision which could affect future U.S. foreign and defense policy, the 20 Missions addressed were instructed to assign their best officers to prepare the reply, which was to include points of disagreement as well as agreement. (Ibid.)
The country study on the internal security situation in the Republic of Korea, produced by an interagency working group for the OCB on November 16, is printed as Document 99.↩
- Top Secret.↩
- The Kyungmudae is the Executive Mansion. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Top Secret.↩