38. Memorandum of Discussion at the 245th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 21, 19551
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]
3. Presentation by General Hull (NSC Action No. 1352–c)2
Mr. Dillon Anderson introduced General Hull while the Service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff entered the Cabinet Room.
General Hull indicated that he would first discuss briefly the military situation in the Far East generally, and would follow this with a description of the specific military situation in Korea occasioned by the armistice and the activities of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). Using a map indicating military dispositions and a chart indicating the strength of Communist and friendly forces in the Far East, General Hull proceeded to make his presentation.
[Page 69]He dealt first with the opposing forces in the Far East—Soviet, Chinese Communist, and North Korean—by Services. He noted a considerable reduction in total Communist forces in North Korea since the armistice. He estimated that the present total of such forces was in the neighborhood of 780,000, and indications pointed to a defensive rather than an offensive role for these forces at the present time.
General Hull then commented on the ROK and UN forces in South Korea. He listed the total of friendly forces in South Korea at 730,000. General Hull spoke with pride of the development and capabilities of the ROK forces. The chief difficulties were that the highest ranking officers in the ROK armed services were very young and lacked experience in the handling of large forces in the field, especially from the administrative point of view.
General Hull then discussed Japanese military capabilities, which he said he could not rate very high. He described this as our greatest military problem in the Far East at the present time. It was essential to build up Japan’s armed forces. While progress was discernible, it was very slow.
General Hull then analyzed current U.S. strength in the Korean area and in the Far East generally. He described U.S. strength as being approximately at the present time what it was in June 1950, prior to the outbreak of the Korean war. General Hull expressed the belief that the remaining two U.S. divisions in Korea should be redeployed to Japan, leaving only token U.S. forces in Korea.
General Hull then turned to the specific problem occasioned by persistent Communist violations of the armistice. He noted paragraph 13–d of the armistice agreement, which forbade the replacement of old war matériel by new matériel, and indicated that the Soviets constantly violated this provision by avoiding ports of entry where they could be supervised. He said that the United States was dealing with an enemy with a completely different code of ethics than our own. The Communists approved any means which led to the ends they sought. On the contrary, the UN Command had lived up to the armistice faithfully and conscientiously. Accordingly, the longer the armistice continued and paragraph 13–d was in effect, the worse off the U.S. would be. This affected all three of the Services, and General Hull cited illustrations of the effects.
With respect to the personnel on the NNSC inspection teams, General Hull said that the Swiss and the Swedes were truly neutral, while the Poles and the Czechs were completely pro-Communist. Indeed, in private conversations with him General Hull said that the Swiss and Swedish members of these teams invariably described the inspection procedure as a farce. General Hull then indicated serious doubt whether President Rhee could be induced to agree to any [Page 70] future inspections by NNSC teams in South Korea. We must not only anticipate such refusals, but we must even anticipate the possibility of an incident resulting from a South Korean move to seize and imprison the Communist members of an inspection team. U.S. forces in Korea were not now sufficiently numerous to prevent such an incident, which would, of course, be very embarrassing. Accordingly, General Hull reiterated his earlier recommendation that this Government take action at once to put an end to the activities of these inspection teams. General Hull said that he was confident that the Communists would not reopen hostilities if we abrogated this portion of the armistice agreement. He believed that the Communists would reopen the Korean war if and when it suited their plans.
The President inquired of General Hull how he proposed to put an end to the NNSC inspections. Would you, he asked, merely inform the heads of the NNSC that they would no longer be allowed to carry out inspections in South Korea? General Hull replied in the affirmative if no agreement with the Swiss and Swedish Governments was reached to end the operations of the NNSC. In short, said General Hull, the UN Commander should unilaterally abolish the NNSC. General Hull indicated his opinion that the Swiss and the Swedes would be delighted at such unilateral U.S. action, because they do not wish to be put in the position of voluntarily withdrawing. In any case, said General Hull, there were really two possible solutions: First, to abolish the NNSC completely; second, to reduce their numbers drastically and to put an end to further inspections, confining the remaining NNSC personnel within the demilitarized zone.
General Hull further emphasized how essential it was to change paragraph 13–d of the armistice agreement in order that new and modern equipment could be supplied to UN and ROK forces in South Korea. General Hull felt that the United States was “too big” to stoop to imitate the Communist technique of violating the armistice agreement by secretly introducing modern matériel.
The Vice President referred to General Hull’s expression of disappointment as to progress being made in Japan’s rearmament, and asked General Hull if he would elaborate a little. General Hull replied that his degree of disappointment was relative. He explained Japan’s difficulties, both psychological and practical, since her defeat at the end of the war. He indicated that there was no disagreement among Japanese leaders that the nation must rearm. The arguments were occasioned on the matter of the rate of rearmament. This was coming along, though not as rapidly as we would like.
The President then went back to General Hull’s statement that the picture of U.S. forces in the Far East was not very different from what it had been in June 1950. On the other hand, said the President [Page 71] General Hull had high praise for the quality of the ROK forces, and had additionally indicated good capabilities for the Chinese forces on Formosa and the developing strength of Japan’s forces. All in all, said the President, he would therefore conclude that the total picture was actually much brighter than it had been in June 1950. General Hull replied that the President’s point was well taken, and that he had not meant to deny that our general position in the Far East was much stronger than it had been in the spring of 1950. The President then expressed agreement with General Hull’s statement that the United States must keep token forces in South Korea—perhaps in a composite division.
Secretary Humphrey inquired of General Hull whether, if we did away with the the NNSC inspection teams, this wouldn’t mean that each side would be left free to build up its own forces as it liked. General Hull said yes, but both he and the President pointed out that the Communists were already doing precisely this. On the other hand, said the President, in the event the inspection teams were removed, at least the Air Force would not be obliged, as it now is, to keep up maintenance facilities for obsolete aircraft.
Secretary Humphrey then commented that if the abrogation of paragraph 13–d of the armistice agreement would greatly improve the U.S. military position, what possible objection was there to proceeding? The President replied that there was no objection, except, of course, that the State Department had entered into the armistice agreement in good faith, and this would cause them certain difficulties.
Secretary Hoover indicated that the State Department had been putting all possible pressure on the Swiss and the Swedes to get them out of the NNSC. The most recent meeting on the subject had been held on April 20, but he had no report as to the results. The President commented that one would think that self-respect alone would compel the Swiss and the Swedes to get out of the NNSC. After further discussion, the President added that the United States had got to move in on a situation which was really becoming intolerable.
The National Security Council:3
Noted and discussed a presentation by General Hull, pursuant to the reference action, of the military situation of the United Nations Command in Korea relative to the Communist military situation in North Korea.
[Page 72][Here follow agenda items 4 and 5.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 22.↩
- See footnote 8, Document 30.↩
- The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1381. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩