Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

36. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, April 13, 1955.

Dear Secretary Wilson: In your letter of March 30, 1955² you expressed opposition to the Commonwealth proposal of March 23³ calling for a reduction of the Commonwealth troops in Korea to a battalion group. You enclosed a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 25 and have proposed a reply through military channels opposing a reduction at this time and asking the Commonwealth countries to reconsider.

I fully share your concern over the continuing reduction in the contributions of our Allies to the United Nations Command in Korea, and the Department of State has made every effort to persuade other countries to keep contingents in Korea. While I doubt that we can do more than forestall the proposed reduction in Commonwealth forces for the immediate future—and perhaps will be unsuccessful even in this effort—I agree with you that we should transmit a note to the Commonwealth opposing further reduction at this time.⁴

Since I believe that the motivation behind the position of the Commonwealth countries is primarily political, I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note be expanded somewhat to point up the psychological and political effects of such a withdrawal at this time. I have in mind the effect it will have on the Free World position in Asia, the increased difficulty in persuading the Republic of Korea that the issue of unification should be dealt with by the United Nations, and a possible reaction of the American public toward the Commonwealth which will be interpreted as wanting a voice in northeast Asia without accepting commensurate responsibilities. In view of our action on the issue of the Canadian battalion,⁵ it would seem advisable to answer the Commonwealth request as a matter of urgency.

I have asked Mr. Robertson to have his staff discuss this matter with appropriate officers in Defense who might then work out a somewhat expanded communication indicating our inability to concur at this time in the Commonwealth proposal for both political and military reasons. In working this matter out it may prove desirable that the reply to the Commonwealth come from the United States Government rather than the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3–3055. Secret. Drafted by Norred and cleared with IO, FE, and Murphy.
2. Document 31.
3. This proposal and the JCS memorandum of March 25 are summarized in footnote 2, Document 31.
4. See Document 39.
5. On March 23, the Canadian military representative who participated in the transmittal to the JCS of the joint Commonwealth proposal to withdraw Commonwealth forces from Korea orally asked the JCS for concurrence and instructions to CINCUNC to allow the departure by April 3 of the Canadian battalion in Korea. The Canadian Embassy supported this request on March 28 in view of the adverse political repercussions which they felt would follow in Canada if Canadians were not permitted to leave Korea at the end of their normal tours of duty. (Telegram 280 to Ottawa, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/3–2955) On March 31, the Department informed the Canadian Embassy that, pending a review of U.N. strength in Korea and a corresponding review of the Commonwealth proposal, the United States was not in a position to concur in the withdrawal of the Canadian battalion from Korea. If, however, the Canadian Government still wished to proceed with the withdrawal, the United States would make the necessary transport available. (Telegram 285 to Ottawa, March 31; ibid., 795B.5/3–3055)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.