Office of the Historian

258. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of Defense1

Seoul, December 18, 1957—12:15 p.m.

UK 977635CC. Joint Embassy–CINCUNC message. References: A. DEF 933850.2 B. UK 977475.3

1.
MND ROK furnished memo 16 December4 embodying info contained reference A. He was disappointed that ROK proposal as set forth in reference B was unacceptable. He questioned figure 676,995 used as base for reduction when actual strength at time negotiations began was considerably higher. He also pointed out that soon after negotiations began he purposely allowed strength to decline to avoid large scale reduction at a later date.
2.
The following tabulation reflects actual ROK strengths as of dates indicated: read in 6 columns: colm 1, Branch of Service colm 2, 30 Nov 56; colm 3, 28 Feb 57; colm 4, 31 May 57; colm 5, 31 Aug 57; colm 6, 30 Nov 57. Army asterisk 618,369 641,983 624,908 635,306 608,707; Navy 14,810 14,720 14,774 14,971 14,806; Marines 27,456 26,707 26,337 25,773 26,039; Air Force 16,355 16,291 16,295 17,103 [Page 528] 17,990; Total 676,990 699,701 682,314 693,153 667,542; Asterisk incl reserves on AD 31,687 33,044 16,763 98 20,440.
3.
The 676,995 strength used in reference A as base against which reduction is to be made is reconciled here as reported ROK strength as of 30 Nov 1956.
4.
MND has requested that the strength as of 31 Aug 57 (693,153) the end of the quarter during which negotiations began can be used as base figure against which reduction of 60 thous will be made. He was informed that the matter would be referred to you for consideration, but that in the meantime he should proceed on basis info contained reference A.
5.
The magnitude of the desired reduction in ROK force as expressed in (Seoul msg 892)5 TOO 181500Z June 57 was minimum four divisions; State 229, 16 Sep 57,6 indicated the desired reduction to be four divisions including supporting units (or the equivalent personnel reduction); reference A indicates minimum acceptable plan is reduction of 60 thous against 30 Nov 1956 reported actual strength of 676,995. To avoid confusion as to the objective to be attained and the difficulty of explaining to ROK why the strength as of a certain date rather than another was used as the base for reduction, it is suggested that the magnitude of the desired reduction could best be expressed in relation to the overall authorized strength of ROK forces which is recognized by ROK as 720,000.
6.
In the absence of any subsequent agreement, the terms of reference contained in the Agreed Minute of 1954 are used as guidance. It is considered, therefore, that the figures set forth in para 2, reference A do not abrogate CINCUNC’s authority under para 1, Appendix B to Agreed Minute of 1954 to authorize adjustments in ROK components within the overall strength ceiling. Such adjustments are essential, for example in connection with Air Force augmentation to provide strength necessary to man the additional fighter bomber wing which will be authorized ROK by State 229. The Air Force strength as indicated in reference A is inadequate to meet this additional requirement.
7.
In view of the above it is requested that an overall authorized ceiling strength figure be established to express the magnitude of the desired reduction taking into account the request of the ROK MND in para 4 above.
8.
Would appreciate early reply.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/12–1857. Secret; Priority. Sent to the Department of Defense for OSD/ISA and to the Department of State and repeated to the Department of the Army, CINCPAC, USARPAC, and the Embassy in Seoul. The source text is the Department of State copy.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Document 253.↩
  4. A copy of the December 16 memorandum on “Reorganization of Forces (Korean)” from General Decker and Weil to the Minister of Defense is in Department of State, NA Files: Lot 60 D 680, Reduction of Forces (Korean).↩
  5. Document 223.↩
  6. Document 247.↩