Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

244. Letter From the Ambassador in Korea (Dowling) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons)¹

Seoul, September 5, 1957.

Dear Howard: President and Mrs. Rhee returned from Chinhae on Monday and I had a long talk with him on Tuesday. He had obviously benefited from his unusually long holiday and was more alert and less nervous than when he left Seoul a few weeks ago. I was sorry to see, however, that the rest this time had not done him as much good as had previous vacations at Chinhae; he is beginning to look and act like a very old man.

The talk covered a variety of subjects and as we were leaving President Rhee asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also present, if he could make some notes on the conversation since there were a number of things he would like to keep in mind. The Minister, appearing undecided as to whether to faint or run from the room, promised that he would. In the entry, as we were leaving the Kyung Mu Dai,² he told me he would be unable to make a summary, and asked me to do it.³ I said I would try my hand and the enclosed⁴ is the result.

The two significant points of the conversation concern the reduction in forces, about which I reported in my telegram 204,⁵ and the question of Korean-Japanese relations. I have had a subsequent conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on this latter subject and am endeavoring to try to straighten things out. It seems to me that the problem is composed of about equal parts of suspicion of Japanese motives and of ineptitude on the part of the Minister. The solution, I think, is to find some new wording which will enable him to save face and at the same time not give away the fundamental position of the Koreans, i.e., that they shall have an opportunity to raise their claims at the proposed formal conference with hopes of some success. The question remains whether, as the Berliners say, “the situation is desperate, but not hopeless,” or “hopeless but not desperate,” as the Viennese used to put it.

I shall write you further about this when I have had a chance to talk to the Minister again.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

RED

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95b/9–557. Confidential; Official–Informal.
2. The Presidential Residence in Seoul.
3. A note on the source text in Dowling’s hand reads: “It will go to the Kyung Mu Dai as the Minister’s report—probably heavily edited.”
4. The enclosed notes by Dowling on his conversation with Rhee, not printed, indicated that the conversation dealt with impending visits to Korea by prominent Americans, the question of Korean unification, Korean-Japanese relations, the forthcoming visit to Korea by President Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam, and the question of a reduction of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea. On the question of the reduction of Korean force levels, Dowling’s notes indicated that he delivered Eisenhower’s August 24 letter to Rhee (Supra), and pointed out that the United States was prepared to supply an additional jet fighter-bomber wing to the Republic of Korea, plus transport and communications equipment, if an agreement could be reached on a reduction in manpower. Rhee responded by asking for more precise information regarding this offer. Dowling indicated that he would consult with General Decker to determine what data was available.
5. In telegram 204 from Seoul, September 3, Ambassador Dowling reported on the delivery of President Eisenhower’s August 24 letter to President Rhee. His report was very similar to, and apparently based on, the notes outlined in footnote 4 above. An additional observation made by Dowling in telegram 204 was that he felt that Rhee now realized, for the first time, the nature of the steps which the United States was prepared to take to modernize the South Korean armed forces if an agreement could be reached on manpower reduction. (Department of State, Central Files, 111.11–EI/9– 357)