Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

242. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of the Army¹

Seoul, August 10, 1957—1:40 p.m.

UK 977142CC, 100440Z (Army Message). Joint Embassy— CINCUNC message.

Part one.

This progress report reduction ROK forces.

The following met on 9 August to discuss reduction ROK forces: Ambassador Dowling; General Decker, Chief, PROV/MAAG–K (Generals Gard and Griffing); ROK Defense Minister Kim; Lieutenant General Yu, Chairman, ROK JCS; General Paik, C/S, ROKA.

Part two.

Minister Kim opened meeting stating that the three ROK officials present were instructed by President Rhee to prepare a study on requirements of ROK forces. In the course of this study, questions developed and the meeting had been requested to clarify these questions.

Part three.

Minister primarily concerned with:

a. What direct support and defense support will be available from US for ROK in FY 1958?

b. What additional equipment can ROK forces expect to receive?

c. If reduction is accomplished, how much of a reduction must it be and can these savings be utilized for increased pay and allowances of ROK forces?

d. Will reduction in force lead to reduction in financial support from US?

Part four.

Reference paragraph 3a., Minister advised that total US support appropriated for ROK would not be known here for some time, possibly not before December. Further advised that present indications are that appropriations will be less than FY 1957.

Part five.

Reference paragraph 3b., Minister informed additional equipment for ROK forces including additional fighter bomber wing and improved communication and transportation equipment contingent upon reduction of present ROK forces. Minister asked specifically about more modern tanks, additional 105 and 155 howitzers to provide six gun batteries and additional AAA (sky-sweeper and radar). He was informed these not presently programmed but would be considered in development of future programs.

Part six.

Reference paragraph 3c, Minister advised minimum reduction must be four active divisions by end of US FY 1958; that reduction should start promptly; that US not thinking in terms of specific cost or numbers of personnel, but in terms of units. Minister stated that politically he did not feel country or President would accept reduction of four divisions as such. He stated his current thinking was the elimination of battalions and batteries from regimental and battalion size units to effect reduction equivalent to four divisions. He feels that psychologically this would be best approach and would facilitate more rapid reattainment of combat effectiveness. Minister was advised that such a reduction would entail greater reduction in personnel than would outright reduction of four divisions and would require storage of individual and unit equipment so as to be immediately available to reserve unit earmarked to replace eliminated unit on M-day. With reference to increased pay and allowances for ROK forces, Minister was informed that the need for more adequate pay for ROK military was recognized but could not possibly be provided for present strength. Further, that the overall cost of support to ROK forces and ROK economy was constantly rising, therefore, budget for FY 1957 could not necessarily be used as basis upon which he could assume an actual saving would result in FY 1958. Minister advised that present ROK economy cannot support current ROK forces on a sound financial basis and that it is important that more funds be directed to capital investment in the national economy to provide a sound structure for support of military forces.

Part seven.

Reference 3d., Minister concerned that reduction of forces might be construed to mean decreased effort by ROK and would result in reduction of US financial support. Minister advised this was not the case, that reductions in financial support must be expected but these are worldwide, that US fully aware importance Korea.

Part eight.

Minister also expressed concern that in event of general war, US might withdraw forces from Korea leaving ROK alone; this would leave ROK incapable of defense if forces were reduced.

Part nine.

The matter of equipping ROK forces with atomic capable weapons was not mentioned.

Part ten.

Upon conclusion, Minister Kim suggested subsequent meeting. This was concurred in and it was recommended to the Minister that at that time he be prepared to submit specific proposals of ROK courses of action. Minister Kim agreed to this and stated he would advise when he was prepared for the next meeting. Since it is believed Minister’s proposal will be along line indicated in paragraph 6, would appreciate advice of acceptability of this approach. Ambassador and CINCUNC believe it has greater chance of acceptance by President Rhee. CINCUNC considers it desirable from military considerations.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.5/8–1057. Secret. Sent to the Department of State through the Department of the Army as the executive agent and repeated to Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague, CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CG USARJ/UNCEA Japan, and the Embassy in Seoul. The source text is the Department of State copy.