Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

219. Memorandum From the NSC Planning Board Assistant on the Policy Planning Staff (Leonhart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Washington, June 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Obsolescent Modernization for Korea

1. It might be well to have in mind just what sort of weapons Defense is talking about when it uses the diminutives of “eight-inch”, “762 mm” rocket, “280 mm” cannon. An article in today’s NY Times (attached) by Hanson Baldwin² describes the first two, and I’ve looked into the third:

a) the eight-inch howitzer: weight 16 tons; range 10 1/2 miles; impedimenta—trucks, tractors, ammunition, crews.

b) the Honest John 762 mm rocket: weight 16 tons; [range about 15 miles—WL];³ impedimenta, trucks, tractors, launching vehicles, ammunition, crews.

c) the 280 mm [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] cannon: this little beauty must not only be towed by one heavy tractor, but pushed by another: total weight 86 tons; length about a city block; range about 20 miles.

2. The question arises whether it is now possible to move the 86-ton [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cannon north from Inchon to within 10 miles of the 38th parallel (presumably at least half its range should be directed at North Korea). If the road beds can be suitably strengthened, I am informed a Class C Pontoon Bridge, rated at 60 ton capacity, can be especially augmented for the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cannon. It would naturally be of interest to know what sort of road and bridge program we are buying to emplace these weapons in fixed positions on the Armistice Line. And how long the construction period will take.

3. These difficulties can be [no?] doubt solved, at some delay and expense. There is more uncertainty about the Defense–JCS claim that the Honest John and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cannon are needed in Korea because we cannot maintain two different kinds of divisions: one obsoletely conventional, the other modernly [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. “We must standardize, or we can’t rotate the troops.” If, as Baldwin suggests, these weapons are already acknowledged unsuccessful and are now being replaced, the standardization claim seems specious.

4. The real reason for the Defense–JCS insistence on these weapons may reside in their characteristics. They are too limited in range for use in continental defense. They are too bulky and cumbersome for maneuver in Europe, and we do not have a NATO border fronting on the Soviet Union within the range of these weapons. Korea may, in fact, be the only place in the world where these two developmental prototypes can be buried without public admission of a wasteful and futile effort to make the Army competitive with the Air Force in atomic delivery.

5. In sum, these two bulky, cumbersome, obsolescent weapons have little significance for “modernization” of our forces. They have even less for “standardization” of our defenses. Modernization of our forces in Korea should and can be sought in improving air-atomic capabilities. The introduction of the 280 and the Honest John seem justified only as an attempt to facilitate or to finance their replacement by more efficient models at home. The political costs in such an attempt seem wholly exorbitant.

WL

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 62 D 1, Korea, US Policy Toward (NSC 5702, 5702/1, 5702/2). Secret.
2. Not printed. The article, entitled “An Army in Transition,” was printed in the New York Times on June 7.
3. Brackets in the source text.