148. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, May 23, 1956, 3:30 p.m.1
[Here follow a list of 23 persons present and discussion of unrelated subjects. Attending for the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Radford, Twining, Burke, and Pate. Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer represented the Army. The Department of State officials included Murphy; Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration; Leo G. Cyr, Director of the Office of African Affairs; and William R. Tyler, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs. Robert Amory, Deputy Director for Intelligence, attended on behalf of the CIA.]
5. NNSC
Mr. Murphy described the current status of discussions with the fifteen powers participating in the UN command. He said that agreement to the withdrawal of the neutral teams from South Korea had been reached but that there had been some difference over the time interval to be permitted between the announcement in the Military Armistice Commission and the actual removal of the teams. At a meeting on May 25 the U.S. believes that it will get general agreement to a seven-day interval. Admiral Radford commented that this seemed to be all right; it would give the neutral teams time to pack their clothes at least. He asked whether General Lemnitzer and the ROK are being kept informed. Mr. Murphy replied that an ROK representative has been attending the meetings in Washington and that General Lemnitzer is being kept informed by telegram.
Admiral Radford inquired about Article 13(d) of the Armistice Agreement, noting that we are taking great risks because we are not able to keep the military efficiency of our forces in Korea at the necessary level. The Admiral suggested that perhaps we could get the Japanese to agree to lengthen runways in Japan if we could tell them that we were in a position to pull our air forces out and send them to Korea. He noted that General Taylor feels July 1 is the target date for favorable action on Article 13(d).
Mr. Murphy said he thought it would be inadvisable to raise this matter with the UN group. Admiral Radford agreed and said that he thought the UN commander in the field should take the necessary action as a military matter and that the subject of 13(d) should not be raised formally with other UN representatives. Mr. Murphy agreed and said we might use the theory that time had overtaken [Page 272] this aspect of the agreement. He added that the possibility exists that the communists might denounce the Korean Armistice Agreement if we should take any formal action on Article 13(d). Admiral Radford said that he did not think this would be the result if we went ahead and brought in military equipment as necessary. Admiral Radford and Mr. Murphy agreed that it would probably not be advisable to make reports of new equipment brought in to Korea.
Mr. Murphy said the Department would look into the problem of Article 13(d).
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
- Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”↩