Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

141. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 4, 1956¹

Washington, May 4, 1956

SUBJECT

• Korean Briefing Meeting, May 4, 1956

PARTICIPANTS

Australia—	Mr. Blakeney, Counselor
	Mr. Rowland, First Secretary
Belgium—	Mr. Muller, Second Secretary
Canada—	Mr. Glazebrook, Minister
	Mr. McCardle, First Secretary
Colombia—	Dr. Anaya, Minister Counselor
Ethiopia—	Mr. Dinke, Counselor
France—	Mr. Millet, Minister
Greece—	Mr. Cavalierato, Counselor
Republic of Korea—	Mr. P.W. Han, Minister
	Mr. Y.D. Han, First Secretary
Netherlands—	Baron van Voorst tot Voorst, Minister
	Mr. Ketel, First Secretary
New Zealand—	Mr. White, Counselor
	Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines—	Mr. Calingo, Minister Counselor
	Capt. Pargas, P.N., Armed Forces Attaché
Thailand—	Mr. Devakul, Minister
Turkey—	Mr. Baydur, Counselor
	Mr. Acet, First Secretary
Union of South Africa—	Mr. Hamilton, Counselor
United Kingdom—	Sir Hubert Graves, Minister
	Mr. Youde, Second Secretary
United States—	Mr. Murphy, G
	Mr. Wainhouse, IO
	Mr. Sebald, FE
	Mr. McConaughy, CA
	Mr. Hemmendinger, NA
	Mr. Norred, NA
	Mr. Bond, UNP
	Miss Brown, UNP
	Mr. Henderson, FE/P
	Miss Bacon, FE
	Mr. Nunley, EUR

Mr. Murphy recalled that the group had discussed the NNSC problem in 1954 after it became apparent that the Armistice might last indefinitely, and again in 1955. At that time it was hoped the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC might negotiate a solution with the Communists, although we recognized that their concern not to jeopardize their neutrality made it unlikely that they would press the Communists to agreement by making clear their intention otherwise to withdraw. Mr. Murphy stated that the only result thus far of the Swiss-Swedish efforts was a reduction of the teams in each zone from five to three, to which the UNC agreed in August 1955.² In October 1955 the Swiss and Swedish members proposed removal of these three remaining teams to the Demilitarized Zone,³ but the proposal was rejected by the Communists with the counterproposal in January 1956 that the teams be reduced from three to one in each zone.⁴

Mr. Murphy recalled the demonstrations in the Republic of Korea last year against the NNSC. The United States had successfully persuaded the Republic of Korea to halt these demonstrations to facilitate the Swiss-Swedish negotiations. However, he emphasized, the Republic of Korea, directly affected by the NNSC operations, could not be expected to bear with the situation indefinitely. Moreover, the United States, as the Unified Command, felt strongly action to eliminate the onerous inequity of the NNSC operations could not be postponed indefinitely.

Mr. Murphy informed the group that on April 9 the British Chargé in Peking had received a note from the Chinese Communists addressed to the Sixteen,⁵ copies of which had already been distributed to them. This note was intended obviously to halt negotiations on the NNSC. The United States had prepared a draft reply,⁶ which was circulated at the meeting, which rejected the Communist proposal for a new conference on Korea but made clear our willingness to consider any Communist proposals consistent with UN objectives. The United Kingdom, he noted, was willing to transmit the reply on behalf of the Sixteen.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the draft reply, among other things, described the inequities of the NNSC situation and stated that the UNC would announce its position in the MAC. He emphasized the importance of dealing with this issue in our reply to the note.

Mr. Murphy went on to say that we now had information that the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC had reached a firm decision not to withdraw from the Commission without agreement of both sides, and that they intended to accept the Communist proposal to reduce the teams to one in each zone and permit this team to visit the other two ports of entry as required. In his view these facts spoke for themselves as to the practicality of any further approach to the Swiss and Swedes other than to offer them a final choice between withdrawing voluntarily now or doing so when the UNC escorts the Czechs and Poles to the Demilitarized Zone. Mr. Murphy explained that we had requested the Swiss and Swedes to delay their reply to the Communists until after our consultations with the group. However, we had already informed them that the Communist proposal would be unacceptable to us because (a) it would not reduce our difficulties and would create new problems; (b) there was no reason to believe that the Communists would not continue to introduce matériel and personnel without reference to the ports of entry provisions of the Armistice Agreement; and (c) the UNC would be forced either to close all but one port of entry, at considerable expense with the result a less efficient logistical system susceptible to breakdown and highly vulnerable in the event of a Communist renewal of hostilities with air attacks, or to be subjected to constant demands for inspection of the other ports.

Mr. Murphy informed the group that the United States, at approximately the same time as the reply of the Sixteen was delivered to the Chinese Communists, proposed that the UNC make a statement in the MAC reciting the history of the NNSC problem and the exhaustion of all means to remedy it and announcing that it will no longer permit, as long as the Communists are in default, activities of the NNSC within the territory under its control. Therefore, the teams will be moved to the Demilitarized Zone where they can continue to receive reports. Mr. Murphy stated that our action would be based upon Communist violations and obstructions of the Armistice Agreement, particularly its reporting and inspection provisions, and will be stated to be a provisional suspension of our performance under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing NNSC operations in our area, while the Communist side remains in default. In the view of the United States these actions constituted legal relief to which we are entitled and was the minimum necessary.

Mr. Murphy recognized that those present would wish to consult their respective governments. However, the matter was urgent, and he suggested the group meet again May 9, at which time he hoped they would have received instructions. He also noted the possibility of press inquiries concerning the present meeting and suggested that nothing be said beyond stating that the meeting was a routine one to review the Armistice situation. Mr. Murphy requested any immediate comments.

Sir Hubert Graves (UK) asked whether the group agreed it would be appropriate for a single note to be addressed to Peking by the UK Chargé on behalf of the Sixteen. There was agreement on this procedure. He noted another procedural problem arising on notes addressed to the Chinese Communists. The United States draft referred to the “Communist side” and to the “Chinese Communists”. His Government’s experience was that, for the note to be accepted, the reference must be to the “Government of the People’s Republic of China”. In place of the reference to the “Communist side” he proposed the phrase “the Chinese and the North Korean side”.

Mr. Murphy recognized these problems, expressed tentative agreement with the British suggestions, but noted the need to consider Taipei in this regard. He thought a satisfactory form of words could be found without too much difficulty.

Sir Hubert circulated to the group the attached summary of HMG’s views on the Chinese Communist note.⁷

Mr. Murphy inquired whether all agreed there should be no conference. Mr. Baydur (Turkey) expressed doubt that a conference would be helpful. Mr. Muller (Belgium) concurred. Mr. Glazebrook (Canada) likewise considered that a conference would not be fruitful. Canada was concerned, however, by a problem to which it had previously drawn attention, the possible relationship between the NNSC and the Control Commission in Indo-China, for which Canada had a certain responsibility. Mr. Millet (France) also doubted whether a conference would serve any useful purpose. At the same time he noted two considerations regarding the proposed NNSC action: its possible influence on the situation in Indo-China, and the necessity of not giving the impression that the UNC is violating the armistice and of making clear that only a temporary suspension is involved. France, he indicated, wished to see a last effort made in Bern and Stockholm to persuade the Swiss and Swedes to leave, although he agreed with Mr. Murphy’s comment that the record showed no prospect for the success of such a move.

Mr. Han (ROK) expressed appreciation for Mr. Murphy’s comments regarding the forbearance of his Government. He regarded the present situation as a very dangerous one; the ROK objected strongly to the continued presence of the NNSC in its territory and opposed any further delay in achieving a solution.

Mr. Murphy asked whether Mr. Glazebrook or Mr. Millet would elaborate on the possible relationship between the ICC in Indo-China and the NNSC. Mr. Glazebrook suggested that similar principles were involved. The situation in Viet-Nam was transitional and delicate. The two armistices had been built up over a considerable period and neither was 100 percent satisfactory. The issue was whether acting on the unsatisfactory aspects of the Korean Armistice might tend to derogate from the support of the other.

Mr. Muller stated that Belgium opposed any unilateral action on the NNSC problem that appeared to depart from the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Han rejoined that the real question was whether we could permit one side to continue indefinitely to violate the Armistice.

In reply to Mr. Muller’s question whether withdrawal of the teams to the Demilitarized Zone implied complete liberty for the UNC to do as it pleased, Mr. Murphy indicated that our intention was to deal exclusively with the NNSC teams. He repeated that we proposed simply to suspend provisionally our performance under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement governing the NNSC, while the Communist side remains in default. As in all contracts this represented the minimum relief to which we were legally entitled in the face of continued deliberate violations by the other side.

Mr. White (New Zealand) stated his Government agreed a conference would serve no useful purpose. It also recognized the unsatisfactory NNSC situation, but he was without instructions as to how this problem might be handled. He asked whether by referring in the note to the NNSC problem it was intended that all Sixteen would be taking common responsibility not only for the note but also for the proposed NNSC action. Mr. Murphy replied that all the governments contributing to the UNC would mutually share the responsibility. The issue was one of mutual concern.

Baron van Voorst (Netherlands) agreed that the conference proposal should be rejected but questioned the proposed NNSC action on the ground that some kind of control should continue. Mr. Sebald pointed out that our proposal involved merely suspension of the presence of the teams in the south but retention of the existing system in principle. Mr. Blakeney (Australia) likewise felt a conference would not be useful but was concerned as to the methods and tactics on the NNSC problem.

Sir Hubert inquired as to the planned timing and asked specifically whether it was intended to remove the teams simultaneously with the announcement in the MAC or later. Mr. Murphy expressed the view that the actions should be more or less concurrent but requested views on this point.

Mr. Murphy asked again whether all present agreed there should be no conference. Mr. Calingo (Philippines) said he had received no instructions. Mr. Cavalierato (Greece) stated that his Government saw no point in a conference.

It was agreed to meet again May 9.⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–756. Secret. Drafted by Elizabeth A. Brown on May 7.
2. See Document 85.
3. See Document 89.
4. See Document 111.
5. See Document 131.
6. Attached to Document 133.
7. Not printed. The note expressed the British view that a conference on Korea “would clearly be abortive and might do more harm than good”. In framing a reply to the Chinese note, the British Government suggested that “it should suggest a willingness to consider concrete proposals, provided there is some indication of a readiness on the Chinese-North Korean side to come towards the United Nations position”.
8. Minister Han remained after the meeting to tell Sebald that he had instructions to inform the United States and the members of the Sixteen that the Republic of Korea considered that the NNSC should be dissolved, and that the proposal to withdraw the NNITs to the demilitarized zone was, therefore, unacceptable. Sebald sympathized with the point of view advanced by Han, but he noted that anything beyond the solution proposed would meet with “irrevocable opposition” among the Sixteen. (Memorandum of conversation by Hemmendinger, May 4; Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Memos and Memcons NNSC 1956)