139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden1

1157. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC. Stockholm’s 10282 repeated Bern 28 London 68 Paris 72 Tokyo 22 Seoul 20. Bern’s 11623 repeated Stockholm 40 Seoul 21 Tokyo 20. Request Embassies Stockholm and Bern reiterate U.S. views on Communist counterproposal given our 11454 to Stockholm 1879 to Bern and elaborate as follows:

(1) If ports of entry reduced one each side this would require complete reorganization UN Command logistical activities at considerable expense and ultimately result in inefficient, if not altogether unworkable, logistical arrangements easily susceptible to breakdown. Logistical system based on one port of entry would make UNC highly vulnerable in event Communists renew hostilities with air attack. If U.S. continued some use of other ports Communist side and Communist members NNSC obviously would demand frequent inspections and moving teams would create more difficult problem than present fixed teams. (2) For foregoing reasons U.S. would regard action based on ChiCom proposal as unacceptable. (3) Since ChiComs instead of replying to Swedes and Swiss addressed their latest proposal to 16, U.S. sees no reason Swedes and Swiss associate themselves with unacceptable ChiCom proposal before 16 have replied. (4) Urge Swiss and Swedes delay action until 16 decide on reply. (5) We plan inform them of position of 16 before reply to ChiCom’s made.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/5–156. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Norred; cleared with UNP, EUR, and L/UNA; and approved by Sebald. Also sent to Bern and repeated to Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Paris.
  2. In telegram 1028 from Stockholm, April 28, the Embassy reported that the Swedish Government continued to hope that the United States would support the proposal to reduce the NNITs to one team each in North and South Korea. (Ibid., 795.00/4– 2756)
  3. Supra.
  4. In telegram 1145 to Stockholm, April 26, the Department instructed the Embassy to inform the Swedish Government that the proposed reduction of NNITs to one each in North and South Korea would not eliminate existing problems with the NNSC but would create new problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/4–2556)