Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Korea, Volume XXIII, Part 2

117. Memorandum of Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 9, 1956¹

Washington, February 9, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–5.]

6. U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea (Progress Report, dated November 30, 1955,² by OCB on NSC 5514 and NSC 170/1)

At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing of the contents of the reference Progress Report, the President inquired about the size of U.S. forces currently stationed in Korea. Admiral Radford replied that this force consisted of two divisions. The President then inquired how much money we were putting into Korea annually, both in economic and military assistance. Director Hughes³ replied that this amounted to approximately $1 billion a year. The President said that South Korea was getting to be a pretty expensive plaything. He then asked whether we were keeping the twenty ROK divisions in active status, and Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired whether there was any conceivable way out of this terrible dilemma. Are we to be saddled with payments of $1 billion annually to South Korea from now on out indefinitely?

The President replied that the crux of the problem was Communist China. After referring to the problem of having had to fight an “unwinnable” war in Korea, he added that to retreat from Korea now would cost the United States its entire position in the Far East. He desperately wished, nonetheless, that there were some way for the United States to extricate itself from this swamp of spending. If Red China, speculated the President, should finally get out of North Korea, release our prisoners, and act decently, how in the world could the United States continue to avoid recognizing Communist China? It was a real problem, and the President repeated his belief that all our Far Eastern problems focused up in Korea.

Secretary Dulles said that with respect to the problem of President Rhee’s death, this could conceivably end up in a situation which would enable the United States to deal more rationally with the problem of Korea. In point of fact, the South Koreans should be willing to depend far more completely on the deterrent power of our air atomic capabilities. We are well aware that we possess this capability, but President Rhee is not satisfied with anything less than seeing military power in place along the armistice line. Of course, this was understandable in the light of President Rhee’s own bitter experience. If, however, Rhee should die and we could get through the immediate crisis which would follow, we might end up with a better situation. Until then, it was hard to see what else we can do in Korea than what we are doing.

Secretary Humphrey said that he was somewhat reluctant to raise so explosive a matter, but it was part of the same general problem. Now that we are under less terrific pressure from Communist China, was any thought being given to the problem of what we will do about Quemoy and the Matsus?

Secretary Dulles indicated that Secretary Humphrey was quite mistaken in his assumption that we were under less pressure at the moment from Communist China with respect to the offshore islands and Taiwan. In point of fact, the pressure was so severe that the talks which were going on in Geneva at the Ambassadorial level might well be broken off this very day. The Chinese Communists were insisting on their right to take Taiwan, and proposed to take it by force if necessary. We have tried desperately to get them to change this position, but we had failed. Accordingly, this was far from a quiescent period with respect to the problem.

Secretary Robertson brought up the problem of inducing the teams of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to withdraw to the demilitarized zone. He said that there were encouraging indications that the Swiss and the Swedes will withdraw their members by the end of February. If this did not occur, Secretary Robertson warmly recommended unilateral action by the United States to this end.

In support of Secretary Robertson’s position, Admiral Radford noted that President Rhee’s moratorium on South Korean demonstrations against the teams was scheduled to end on the 9th of March. He and General Lemnitzer felt so strongly about the necessity of getting rid of these teams that they had called on President Rhee recently and informed him that he could probably count on the withdrawal of the teams to the demilitarized zone before the 9th of March. Admiral Radford stated his belief that it was essential to get the teams into the demilitarized zone by that date.

Admiral Radford then turned to the problem of those provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement which prevented the United States from sending into South Korea any new military matériel. This was getting to be an increasingly grave problem, especially for the Air Force, which could send in no new planes in replacement of old ones that had worn out. The Army was also beginning to feel the pinch. New troops sent to Korea as replacements had to be retrained in the use of the old equipment which they had to use in Korea.

Admiral Radford then stated his conviction that unless Korea was reunited there was no hope whatever for a viable Korean economy. Accordingly, he recommended that in any forthcoming disarmament negotiations with the USSR, we should press them to permit the unification of Korea.

Admiral Radford concluded his remarks by paying tribute to President Rhee, whom he believed more of an asset to the United States than a liability. For all his faults, Rhee was the George Washington of Korea, and the people of Korea strongly supported him. There was no alternative to his forceful control of the country except, perhaps, military control.

Secretary Humphrey observed that Admiral Radford had painted a very dismal picture.

Dr. Flemming⁴ said he wished to put a question to the Secretary of State. If the negotiations at Geneva with the Chinese Communists were in fact broken off, was it likely that the Chinese Communists would move promptly against Quemoy and the Matsus?

Secretary Dulles replied that available intelligence indicated no immediate likelihood of such a Chinese Communist move. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists were continuing to develop their capabilities for such an operation, and Secretary Dulles believed that they could amass sufficient forces in a matter of a couple of weeks to seize these offshore islands if they decided to do so. He did not think, however, that they would resort to force in the near future, even if the negotiations were broken off. It was more likely that they would continue to go on as they have been, although with more threatening noises.

The President observed that in a couple of private conversations with Sir Anthony Eden during the latter’s recent visit,⁵ the Prime Minister had said in effect that he lived in terror that a situation might arise in which the United States found itself obliged to go to war and that he, Eden, would be unable to come to the support of the United States because of British public opinion. The President wondered whether these remarks were a back-handed reference to Quemoy and the Matsus.

Secretary Dulles thought that the President’s surmise was quite likely to have been correct. He pointed out, however, that in their propaganda the Chinese Communists persistently and carefully avoided any suggestion of taking Quemoy and the Matsus except within the total picture of their determination to take Taiwan by force if necessary.

Secretary Humphrey said that he nevertheless believed it likely that if the Chinese Communists finally decided to try to seize Taiwan, they were quite likely to move against Quemoy and the Matsus first. If they stopped there for a while they would certainly put the United States on the spot.

Governor Stassen wondered whether the Chinese Communists might not seek a meeting between Secretary Dulles and Chou En-lai during the course of the Secretary’s forthcoming visit to the Far East.

The National Security Council:⁶

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

[Here follows agenda item 7.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 10.
2. Document 102.
3. Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
4. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.
5. Prime Minister Eden visited the United States, January 30–February 3.
6. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1519. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)