Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Aldrich’s Residence, London, August 24, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹

USDel/MC/92

London, August 24, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States Delegation
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Bohlen
  • Mr. Ringwalt
• Japanese Delegation
  • Mamoro Shigemitsu

SUBJECT

• Japanese-Soviet Treaty Negotiations

Mr. Shigemitsu presented to the Secretary a memorandum on “The Present Status of the Negotiations for the Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.”² He said that the problem of the Kuriles is one for the countries signatory to the San Francisco Treaty. The question is whether Japan is entitled to give title of them to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wishes to draw a boundary south of Etorofu and Kunashiri. Japan has already given up at least the northern part of the Kuriles to the Soviet Union. The future of the whole Pacific area depends on the outcome of the negotiations with the Soviet Union. Other independent countries have an interest in the general situation in the Pacific. If the Secretary could call a conference of countries interested in the Pacific area, the matter could be settled. He said that Article 26 of the San Francisco Treaty has a limitation of three years. The Secretary countered by saying that the three-year clause puts a time limit on the right of other countries to acquire the same rights as the signatories of the Treaty. Since his conversation with Mr. Shigemitsu of August 19,³ the Secretary had cabled Washington and Tokyo about the Japanese desire that a conference be called. Unfortunately, many are absent from Washington at present and they are preoccupied with other problems, including the Suez Conference and the National Conventions. The territorial problem is complicated—a conference might bring in Taiwan as well as the Kuriles.

In reply to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that one never knows how firm Soviet views are until a question has been placed firmly before them. Until it is placed squarely before them, one cannot guess their reaction. If a given area is important strategically, the Soviets never give in. In reply to a query from Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Shigemitsu said the Soviets wanted a firm agreement about relinquishment of the islands in question. Mr. Shigemitsu said that the Soviet Union has air bases on Etorofu and Kunashiri. There were formerly about ten thousand fishermen resident on the islands, but they were expelled by the Russians, and the only residents now are Soviet officials. The legal question is clear. The Japanese surrendered this territory under the San Francisco Treaty with the Allies, among whom the Soviets were not included.

The Secretary remarked that under the surrender terms the Japanese are entitled only to the full main islands. The Senate, however, had expressed an “understanding” at the time of ratification that the title to the Kuriles did not pass to the Soviet Union. Habomai and Shikotan were not considered part of the Kuriles, and the United States expressed that view at San Francisco. It is difficult to contend that Etorofu and Kunashiri are not part of the Kuriles. At the time of the San Francisco Treaty, the Yoshida government had asked the United States to take the position that Habomai and Shikotan were not part of the Kuriles. They did not make a similar request in respect of Etorofu and Kunashiri.

Mr. Shigemitsu said that the Soviets insist that they are occupying the islands with the consent of the United States and the United Kingdom and that Japan must accept the decision of these Allies. Mr. Bohlen recalled that there had never been any determination at Yalta what comprised the Kuriles. There was a list of Japanese Islands to be surrendered but the covering document referred to territory “stolen by Japan.”

Mr. Shigemitsu recalled that when the Soviet Union occupied the Kuriles, they advanced as far away as Urup and asked General MacArthur whether they might occupy Habomai and Shikotan. This was to forestall their evident intention to occupy Hokkaido as well. The Secretary suggested that if the Soviet Union were anxious to have a treaty, with consequent diplomatic representation in Tokyo, they might give in eventually on the territorial question but that if the military value of the islands were substantial and the sea passage south of these islands were strategically important, the Soviets probably would not give in. He would study the problem from a technical, historical and military standpoint and pass his conclusions to the Japanese.

On taking leave, Mr. Shigemitsu stated that his Government would have to decide soon, as the treaty had become a matter of internal politics. He said he would return to Japan through New York, and would arrive in Tokyo on September 3.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 746. Secret. Drafted by Ringwalt.
2. Not printed.
3. See Document 89.

4. Dulte 31 from London, August 24, marked “For Acting Secretary and Robertson”, reads as follows:

   “In view of Shigemitsu’s appeals, I suggest we have the historical division make a study to see whether there is any plausible basis for considering the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu as not necessarily part of ‘the Kuriles’ as that word has been used in the various war conferences and Japanese peace treaty. Also please ask Defense people to give an estimate of the strategic importance to Russia of these two islands against which we can appraise practical liability of the Soviet Union making any concession. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.0221/8–2456) Concerning the Historical Division’s study, see footnote 3, Document 97.