Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

97. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 3, 1956.

SUBJECT

• United States Position on Japanese-Soviet Peace Treaty Negotiations

Japanese and Soviet Bargaining Positions

In the course of the London negotiations between Malik and Matsumoto, the Soviets receded in two minor respects from the territorial position taken at San Francisco: they are willing to return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan and instead of explicit recognition of Soviet sovereignty by Japan will accept treaty language defining the international boundary between the two countries. The Japanese have held out for recognition of their sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri, and the farthest they have expressed willingness to go is acceptance of treaty language like that of variant formulas—including a definition of Japanese territory without any definition of Soviet territory, and including recognition of Soviet sovereignty over the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, leaving Etorofu and Kunashiri under Japanese sovereignty (with or without Soviet occupation by analogy to Article 3 arrangements)—but they have not presented these formally to the Soviet Union because of the adamant Soviet stand.

Disunity and factional politics have prevented the Japanese from taking a firm stand in dealing with the Soviets. Although there have been effective measures taken in recent months to create public sentiment against the Soviet territorial position, there has been comparatively little public indignation against the Soviet Union’s blackmailing tactics, partly because the Japanese tend to be cowed by Soviet ruthlessness.

As indicated in the attached map and strategic analysis (Tab B),² the U.S.S.R. has important military installations on Etorofu and Kunashiri, which it would presumably be willing to give up only for a heavy price.

Japan has an excellent case that these two islands have historically always been Japanese, were never taken by Japan by force, and should in fairness be regarded as Japanese in the peace settlement. The islands have been described in Japanese and international usage as part of the Kurile chain, however, and it would be difficult to prove that they are not a part of the Kurile Islands as the term is used in the San Francisco treaty. (Historical study is attached as Tab C).³

In summary, the Japanese cards, which have not been well played, are the Soviet desire to have a full diplomatic mission in Japan and the possibility of dramatizing before Japanese and world opinion the contrast between Soviet “smiling diplomacy” and Soviet acts. The Soviet cards are the Japanese desires for return of prisoners, entry into the United Nations, and a reasonable fisheries arrangement. It appears that delay affects major Soviet interests much less than it affects major Japanese interests.

The Japanese were told in Moscow that without a territorial cession the Soviet Union would not release Japanese prisoners or allow Japanese admission to the United Nations. This represents a hardening of the Soviet position, possibly by reason of all that has taken place in the negotiations on the territorial question. An Adenauer formula would give the Soviets one of the main things they have wanted, however, a mission in Tokyo and full diplomatic intercourse. Although the Japanese who were in Moscow appear convinced it is too late, we cannot be sure that the door is in fact closed, but if such a resolution is possible, it is hard to estimate to what extent the Soviets would accede to Japan’s desires on prisoners, United Nations entry and fisheries.

What Can the United States Do To Help Japan?

United States good offices would clearly not of themselves avail, and Japan appears to lack the bargaining power to win any further Soviet concessions on the territorial issue. It would accordingly appear that something of definite value would have to be offered by a third power, such as an offer by the United States to surrender bases in Japan or Okinawa or ease security trade controls. This is out of the question.

The disadvantages to the United States of calling a conference of interested nations clearly outweigh any possible advantages. Nothing has occurred since San Francisco to make resolvable by international agreement the questions which could not then be resolved. The U.S.S.R. would have the choice of declining to attend, on the ground that the question should be resolved by the U.S.S.R. and Japan, or of attending and seeking to turn it into a general Far Eastern conference, involving the status of Taiwan, Korea, and perhaps the Ryukyus. The Soviet Union would presumably insist Communist China be invited.

It appears doubtful that the Japanese will derive practical advantage in their negotiation with the U.S.S.R. from Article 26 of the San Francisco treaty, first, because the Japanese themselves are reluctant to accept the applicability of this article and, second, because the U.S.S.R. might conclude that action by the United States under this article would hurt us politically without basically altering the strategic situation.

Other possible courses have been considered but appear infeasible, including United Nations trusteeship for Etorofu and Kunashiri, a United Nations expression on the rights of Japan and the U.S.S.R., and an effort to obtain Japanese admission to the United Nations through admission of Outer Mongolia.

What Should Be United States Position Vis-à-vis Japan?

If we cannot directly assist Japan in its negotiations, there may be steps which would strengthen our bonds with Japan by way of contrast with Soviet imperialism. Any demonstration of moral support would be of some value from this standpoint, such as a declaration that we believe Japanese claims to Etorofu and Kunashiri are just. Similar statements could well be obtained from other powers, as suggested by Ambassador Allison (Tab D).⁴

In the light of Japanese reactions, it appears wise to avoid any explicit statement of our rights under Article 26 and to assert simply that having renounced sovereignty over the territories, Japan does not have the right to determine the question, which is of concern to the community of nations, not to Japan and the Soviet Union alone. This formulation would enable the United States to reserve all its rights, whatever they may be, and to refuse to recognize Soviet sovereignty even if Japan should ultimately purport to do so. (See memorandum of Acting Legal Adviser, attached, Tab E).⁵

This formulation also would avoid the responsibility which the United States could assume if it states that it may assert sovereignty over Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. There is a serious possibility that in Japanese eyes this would place the responsibility for a breakdown of the negotiations squarely upon the United States. The decision whether to execute a treaty on Soviet territorial terms if none better seem obtainable is a grave one which should truly be made by Japan, and while it may be preferable from the standpoint of United States interests that it be made in the negative, that is only true if we are not chargeable with having forced the issue.

Recommendations:

(1) That you call in Ambassador Tani and state the views of the United States along the lines of the attached aide-mémoire, giving him the aide-mémoire. (Tab A)

(2) That the following additional points be made orally:

(a) The Government of the United States has considered seriously whether a determination of the territorial questions referred to above could be assisted by an international conference of the interested powers, but has concluded that such a conference would not conduce to a solution of the problem at this time.

(b) The information available to us does not permit a conclusion whether any further Soviet concessions would be made but our experience indicates that only patience and resoluteness can exact the final Soviet position. Soviet strategic interest makes it unlikely that the Soviet Union will surrender control of Etorofu and Kunashiri, but this does not necessarily affect the possibility of a treaty formula by which Japan does not purport to relinquish sovereignty.

(c) It is not clear to us why the Soviet position on the availability of the Adenauer formula has hardened and it appears possible that this is a bargaining device and that the door is not closed. Members of the Japanese delegation can probably judge this better, however, than we can.

(d) The record of broken Soviet promises indicates that utmost caution should be exercised before assuming that Japan’s desires on prisoners, United Nations admission, and fisheries would be met even if a treaty is concluded.

(e) The United States is willing if the Japanese desire to make public its position as stated in the aide-mémoire.

(f) The United States is willing, if the Japanese desire, to give diplomatic support to requests by Japan to other nations to make declarations along similar lines.

3. That Ambassador Allison be fully informed so that he can communicate the same position in Tokyo.⁶

[Tab A]

DRAFT AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Pursuant to the recent conversations in London between the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, the Department of State has reviewed the problems presented in the course of the current negotiations for a treaty of peace between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, and on the basis of such review makes the following observations:

The Government of the United States believes that the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union should be formally terminated and normal diplomatic relations established. Such action has been overdue since 1951, when the Soviet Union declined to sign the San Francisco Treaty.

Although Japan is fully qualified for membership in the United Nations the Soviet Union has cynically used its veto to exclude Japan. The Soviet Union has flagrantly violated its obligation to return Japanese prisoners of war. It has callously conditioned arrangements governing fisheries on the execution of a treaty of peace. The United States regards these actions as incompatible with the pretensions of the Soviet Union to friendship with Japan and believed they give ground for concern with respect to the manner in which the Soviet Union can be expected to conduct its future relations with Japan.

With respect to the territorial question, as the Japanese Government has been previously informed, the United States regards the so-called Yalta agreement as simply a statement of common purposes by the then heads of the participating powers, and not as a final determination by those powers or of any legal effect in transferring territories. The San Francisco Peace Treaty (which conferred no rights upon the Soviet Union because it refused to sign) did not determine the sovereignty of the territories renounced by Japan, leaving that question, as was stated by the Delegate of the United States at San Francisco, to “international solvents other than this treaty”.⁷

It is the considered opinion of the United States that by virtue of the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan does not have the right to determine the sovereignty over the territories renounced by it therein, and that this is not a matter to be resolved by agreement between Japan and any single Allied Power. The United States would not be bound to accept any action of this character and would have to reserve all its rights.

The United States has reached the conclusion after careful examination of the historical facts that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri (along with the Habomai Islands and Shikotan which are a part of Hokkaido) have always been part of Japan proper and should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty. The United States would regard Soviet agreement to this effect as a positive contribution to the reduction of tension in the Far East, and speaking for itself would be inclined in that event to review its position with respect to the remainder of the Soviet claim.

[Tab B]

Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)⁸

Washington, August 29, 1956.

Dear Walter: In answer to your letter to me dated August 25, 1956,⁹ concerning the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the following information is forwarded.

An Army division headquarters and the principal air base in the Kuriles are located on the island of Etorofu. The administrative headquarters of the Southern Kuriles and a fighter air base are located on the island of Kunashiri.

The military advantages to the Soviet Union of holding the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri are that these islands provide:

(a) Additional bases close to Japan and within range of North Pacific shipping lanes;

(b) A contribution to the defense in depth of the Maritime Provinces and the island of Sakhalin;

(c) A potential in the effective closure of the Sea of Okhotsk, and consequently La Perouse Straits, to non-Soviet shipping; and

(d) As peacetime surveillance stations, valuable information on air and sea traffic, and meteorological conditions useful in planning the defense of the area.

Therefore, from a military point of view, it is considered that the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri are strategically important to the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

Raddy¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.941/9–356. Confidential.
2. The map was not found attached. The remainder of Tab B is printed below.
3. Entitled “United States Policy With Respect to the Kurile Islands: 1944–1952”, August 1956, and prepared by Herbert Spielman, Policy Studies Branch, Historical Division. This study was forwarded to NA on September 1. Paragraph 5 of the “Conclusions” section reads:

   “5. In most United States documents which deal with the subject, Kunashiri and Etorofu are recognized as being a part of the Kuriles, and the Japanese Prime Minister, speaking to the San Francisco conference convened to sign the peace treaty, specifically referred to these two islands as being ‘Of the South Kuriles’.”

   The quotation in paragraph 5 is from remarks made by Prime Minister Yoshida at the Eighth Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, held September 7, 1951. See Department of State, Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 277.

4. Tab D was not found attached, but see the penultimate paragraph of Document
5. Reference is to a memorandum from John M. Raymond to Robertson, September 3, not found attached. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.941/9–356)
6. The approval line on the source text bears no indication of action.
7. The delegate was Dulles; the quotation is from the verbatim minutes of the Second Plenary Session, September 5, 1951; see Japanese Peace Conference, p. 78.
8. Secret.
9. Not found
10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.