93. Notes Prepared in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs1
WEEKLY NOTES TO TOKYO FOR WEEK ENDING AUGUST 24, 1956
1. Dulles–Shigemitsu Talks—London
Rarely have we been so baffled as by the developments on this subject over the past week. The Secretary’s statement to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu that the United States would reserve its rights under Article 26 of the Peace Treaty should Japan recognize Soviet sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kuriles, was not a staffed position but rather one which the Secretary himself enunciated prior to his departure for London. The then occasion was a request to us by the Japanese Embassy to indicate what the U.S. position would be in this eventuality. The Legal Adviser’s office has dug up a theory in Hyde’s International Law2 which would support the Secretary’s view that Japan has a residential sovereignty (a different concept we think than residual sovereignty in the Ryukyus but possibly the inspiration for the latter) in the Kuriles and Sakhalin until the sovereignty which she has renounced is transferred to another country. Japan’s recognition of Soviet sovereignty would possibly perfect the Soviet claim, which is consistent with the Secretary’s position that Japan would be conferring a special advantage upon the Soviet Union not extended to signatory powers. There is another possible theory, that Japan has surrendered its interest in the San Francisco Treaty and thereafter has nothing to say about it—a theory which is less dangerous politically but perhaps not so effective. We have had a working group with representatives from CA, EE,L and S/P, as well as NA, preparing a position for the Secretary, should he talk again to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu in this country, or for our own discussions with Mr. Shimoda of the Treaty Bureau, who will be in Washington August 27 and 28. The general purport of the position is not to change what the Secretary has already said but to dilute it a little and permit the Japanese to make up their own minds as to what course they will take, rather than place on our shoulders the responsibility for a breaking off of the negotiations which they might decide upon in their own interests in any event. At this writing we are trying to decide whether to recommend a clarification [Page 211] at the Secretary’s press conference tomorrow3 or silence. The latter is probably preferable, but it may not be easy to dodge.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]