91. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Hemmendinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Embassy Tokyo’s Estimate of Japanese Developments in the Next Five Years
Embassy Tokyo’s telegram 309 of August 82 sent in response to the Department’s request for political forecast to be used in the preparation of the NIE paper on Japan, gives a sobering evaluation of current trends which provide a real challenge to American diplomacy. This evaluation by the Embassy corroborates the Department’s own analysis which formed the basis for the OCB Progress Report on Japan that was adopted in June.3 It was our own estimate in NA that the basic policy paper on Japan would require revision when next reassessed. Embassy Tokyo’s comments should be most helpful to the Department in laying out lines of policy which correspond more closely to the real political and economic situation.
[Page 206]The Next Year or Two
Embassy Tokyo looking at the next year or two anticipates continuation of conservative factionalism and the falling away of disgruntled individuals from the conservative party, but regards a complete split in the conservatives as improbable. However, as a result of their losses to the Socialists in the recent Upper House election the conservatives—and the Government—are expected to pay greater attention to measures having popular appeal, such as the Okinawan land problem and to shelve less popular measures. The replacement of Hatoyama, however, should bring more capable and energetic leadership. Kishi is regarded as the most probable successor to Hatoyama. However, Kono is trying to postpone the Hatoyama succession until spring, though favoring a cabinet reshuffle before the next Diet session this fall.
Forecast for Next Five Years (until 1961)
There is no “automatic trend” in favor of the Socialist Party and at present no prospect of extreme left or right gaining greatly in strength. The socialists are not likely to gain except in the event of conservative deterioration through disunity and incompetence but the indirect influence of the socialists on conservative policy will be considerable, i.e., Conservatives will be impelled to say and do things considered popular. The balance of probability lies in the direction of continued though somewhat halting evolution of moderate conservatism in Japan but the margin between Conservative program and Conservative deterioration is probably not great and therefore international influences though marginal can add up to “just that critical difference” between meager success and failure. This point was graphically illustrated when “ill advised and ill timed United States Government action strengthened the Socialists.”
On the international scene the next five years will probably be marked by the completion of Japan’s reentry into the world by joining the United Nations, settling reparations, establishing diplomatic relations with USSR and its major satellites and probably official relations “short of diplomatic status” with Red China. Japan’s growing economic independence from the United States is likely to increase and Japan’s military dependence on the United States is likely to weaken further, so that “Japan can less and less be taken for granted.” Japan five years hence can have one of four possible postures toward other nations, and which one it is will depend much upon what the United States does and says: 1. voluntary alignment with United States; 2. alignment with a neutral Asian-African bloc; 3. a pragmatically independent role basically pro-Japanese and 4. alignment with the Communist orbit, particularly Red China. There is much to persuade Japan to follow the third course but most Japanese Conservatives believe [Page 207] Japan’s interest can be best served by developing an enduring partnership with the United States. Alignment with the Communist orbit is unlikely because of basic differences in outlook and interests which will tend to become intensified and more obvious as the relationship becomes more intimate. Japan already fears Russia and will probably dislike Red China even more in 1961 than it does today. Embassy Tokyo states that the most plausible guess is “that Japan will be a sensitively independent, though often hesitant and weak, member of the community of nations, who has diluted her ties with the United States and tries for the most part to play the role of friend to all, antagonist on none”. Japan’s future alignment with the United States rests to a large extent upon the treatment by the United States of such problems as those associated with the Bonins, Ryukyus, presence of United States forces in Japan, war criminals, and trade with the Communist bloc.
Japan’s willingness to enter into any realistic regional collective security arrangement by 1961 cannot be counted upon unless we have succeeded in developing greater mutuality of purpose or unless some international crisis provides the spur. The Embassy believes the United States still has a substantial chance to influence Japan to become an equal, voluntary and enduring partner.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/8–856. Secret. Drafted by Martin.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 82.↩