84. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State1
160. Kono called on me at his request last night in company with Frank Matsumoto to give me his views on situation in Japan after elections. He specifically asked what he told me be passed on to Secretary Dulles for he said it is most important that close and intimate relations be maintained by United States and Japan and that United States leaders be kept accurately informed of internal situation here. After pointing out manner in which Liberal-Democratic Party leadership [Page 191] failed in past election through their own disunity, lack of forcefulness, and confused policies, Kono went on to say that in all frankness he wished to point out that action of United States authorities in issuing Price Report on Okinawa and making public congressional hearings on military assistance programs and desire of United States to see constitutional change in Japan had played significant role in assisting Socialists increase their strength. He did not dwell on this at length however as he said there is no use crying over spilled milk and he seemed to feel important thing was what was done in future.
Kono outlined plans of party leadership over next month or two as follows: There is agreement Hatoyama should retire but only if suitable replacement can be found. Month of August will be devoted by party leadership to attempt to reach agreement on who successor should be. Kono said he and “so-called” mainline of party favored Kishi as successor but unfortunately there is in some quarters considerable opposition and it might take some time to achieve their end. There is even more opposition to Ishibashi who has been mentioned also as possible successor.
Around end of month or during early part September there will be major Cabinet re-shuffle. At this time Kono would leave Cabinet and take Kishi’s post as party Secretary General. Kishi would enter Cabinet although not decided in just what capacity. Apparently this Cabinet change will take place whether or not agreement has been reached on successor to Hatoyama. If successor has been picked by party leaders it will be necessary to call Diet into session in order to have new Prime Minister elected. It was not clear whether or not this would be done as soon as agreement on successor had been reached or whether Cabinet change would be first step with Hatoyama remaining in office for short time until normal session of Diet is convened in November. Kono believes putting Kishi in Cabinet will increase his chances become Prime Minister if August deliberations failed to agree on successor. Kono states next big public test for Conservatives will be Lower House elections which he anticipates will take place next spring. He is confident that Conservatives can win these elections and obtain ⅔ majority. One of reasons for failure in Upper House elections was abstention of many Conservatives from voting and Kono says this has been good lesson to party which will see to it that in future this does not happen. Kono at this point smiled and said, “Of course I assume there will be no more Washington help for Socialists”.
With respect to Soviet-Japanese negotiations Kono said that Shigemitsu was going to Moscow with instructions agreed on by party and these were to effect that he should insist as minimum on Soviet recognition of Japan’s residual sovereignty in southern Kuriles. Kono [Page 192] would not expand on this and he evaded definite answer to question as to what would happen if Soviets should refuse to meet this Japanese demand.
Kono then referred to conversation he had with Secretary Dulles last May in Washington and particularly to that part of it which he said had been agreed keep confidential. Kono apparently has in mind keeping this confidential primarily as regards other Japanese officials as in presence of Matsumoto he did not mention substance of this part of his conversation with Secretary but only requested that I assure Secretary Kono’s commitments would be carried out. He is presumably referring to his statement to Secretary that if diplomatic relations with Soviets resumed it would be necessary for Japanese Government to take firmer stand against Communists in Japan and to Kono’s commitment that he would convince Japanese Government of this necessity even if it meant adopting legislation to outlaw Communism.2
Kono then asked if I could give him any information about coming American elections and their probable result. I stated that it was impossible at this time and at this distance for me give him any more than what he was able to read in newspapers and news magazines. However I did say that in my opinion both American political parties were greatly interested in Far East in general and Japan in particular and whichever one proved successful in coming election Japanese Government could be assured of continuing deep interest by American Government in Japan and its problems. This concluded talk and as Kono departed he cautioned me against believing all political stories carried in Japanese press and said he would be glad to see me from time to time and give me real facts on internal political situation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.00/7–2056. Secret.↩
- Discussion of this subject is not recorded in the memorandum of Dulles’ May 19 conversation with Kono, Document 77. However, see Document 78.↩