78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan1
2606. Your 2759.2 Sebald discussed matter with Secretary and will be prepared convey Secretary’s views on meeting with Japanese leaders as circumstances may require. Will not however carry message from President or Secretary.
In meantime following comments may be helpful in any discussions your part with Government leaders and may in your discretion be communicated orally to them. In course of discussions with Kono, opportunity for which United States Government appreciated, United States officials did not express opposition to resumption diplomatic relations or conclusion peace treaty on part Japan because this regarded as matter for Japanese Government decision and United States views on particular issues concerned with Japanese-Soviet relations have previously been made known to Japanese Government. However United States Government is concerned that Japan may accede to resumption diplomatic relations USSR without obtaining adequate returns. In this regard Department officials somewhat reassured by Kono statements that Japan would insist upon Soviet support Japan’s U.N. entry prior resuming relations and that Japanese Government well aware dangers increased Soviet subversion and intends take stringent internal anti-Communist measures.
With respect Communist China suggest you reiterate as occasion affords points made your discussion with Shigemitsu and in particular reasons why closer relations Communist China very different from normalization relations USSR.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.946/5–2456. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted in NA and approved by Sebald who signed for Hoover.↩
- In telegram 2759, May 24, Allison stated: “Shigemitsu last night expressed regret that press reports of Kono’s visit to US had apparently given Japanese people impression that leaders of US Government have no objections and in fact approved results of Kono’s negotiations in Moscow which are confidently expected to result in reopening of diplomatic relations between Japan and USSR.” Allison noted that from the U.S. point of view “most dangerous result of Kono’s activities is spur it has given to those who wish to go on and normalize relations with Communist China.” Allison recommended that Sebald, then expected on a visit to Japan, should be given a message “from Secretary and perhaps also from President” for private transmission to Japanese leaders, concerning what the result would be if future action was taken by Japan toward normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China. (Ibid.)↩