Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

85. Despatch From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

No. 103

Tokyo, August 3, 1956.

REF

• Department’s Circular No. 12 dated July 11²

SUBJECT

• Embassy–USOM Comment on Military Assistance Program for Japan, USFY 1958³

This despatch is responsive to paragraph 4 of the referenced Circular.⁴

As was the case in the 1957 Military Assistance Program, the 1958 program provides, in accordance with the instructions contained in the Department of Defense (DOD) Program Guidance, an accurate assessment of the matériel which would be needed to meet the defense objectives for Japanese Fiscal Year 1957. Also, it is clear from our review of the program that a conscientious effort has been made to screen from the program those items which the Japanese Government is willing to supply, and able to supply within time limits set by the U.S. Department of Defense.

While it is thus felt that the 1958 program is fully consistent with DOD programming guidance, it is nonetheless clear that Japan is financially and physically able to bear a much larger share of anticipated defense costs. This situation, and an estimate of the extent to which Japan can be expected to increase its defense effort, are discussed in Embassy Despatch No. 100 dated August 3, 1956.⁵

Apart from the domestic political difficulties discussed in that despatch, there is no real incentive for Japan to take on a greater share of its own defense costs as long as the United States continues its present policy of disposing of less up-to-date equipment of U.S. Forces through the device of the Military Assistance Program. The Japanese are well aware of the reason why they are supplied with this equipment, and they expect the supply to be practically inexhaustible. Thus the Six-Year Plan, which is the present although unofficial basis for defense planning by the Japanese, is predicated on the assumption of continued massive U.S. end item assistance.

An important consideration to bear in mind when attempting to appraise Japan’s defense effort is the fact that the Japanese may not be convinced that the U.S. program for building up Japan’s defense forces is realistic. It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate accurately Japan’s thinking on this question. Certainly, however, some or all of the following considerations have occurred to the Japanese. These considerations represent a source of great confusion which mitigate against development of and implementation of a realistic Japanese plan for self defense.

1. The Japanese have never accepted U.S. ideas on the defense of Japan which originally provided for major emphasis on ground forces with major air and navy support to be provided by the United States. U.S. planning has shifted somewhat from this early stand, but even for JFY 1957 almost half of the Japanese defense budget for ground forces, most of which is required to provide the manpower to use ground force matériel supplied by the United States. The Japanese doubtless fear that Japan will not be defended on the beaches, and therefore the expenditure of nearly half of their defense agency budget on ground forces probably does not appeal to their estimate of sound relative priorities between the services.

2. Recent statements emanating from Washington tend to confirm the view that ground forces are becoming less important not only for Japan but for the United States as well. The idea of shifting to a greater dependence on modern weapons has received a tremendous amount of publicity, and the implications of this shift are not lost on the Japanese. The United States appears to the Japanese to have revised its own defense planning but still to be urging Japanese adherence to U.S. Force goals, which were determined five years or more ago, and which provide for what the Japanese no doubt think is an excessive emphasis on ground forces.

3. On numerous occasions the U.S. has emphasized that U.S. armed forces support would be withdrawn as Japan’s military strength increases. Usually, however, redeployment of U.S. forces for Japan has been undertaken for reasons quite unrelated to the direct defense of Japan, although the U.S. has insisted that the role of the U.S. in the defense of Japan has not been affected thereby. The end result of these troop movements is that U.S. combat forces contributing directly to Japan’s defense have been decreasing faster than Japan’s own forces have been increasing. From the Japanese standpoint this is not a realistic approach towards solution of the joint problem of defending Japan or of the implementation of plans therefor. Under these circumstances the Japanese would not know how to plan even if they were willing significantly to increase their support of their own forces.

Because of the foregoing considerations the Embassy and the USOM believe that a review of U.S. procedures for programming military assistance in Japan is needed. It is suggested that the review proceed along the following lines:

(a) Determine first whether or not Japan, in the future as in the past, is to be equipped substantially with less up-to-date U.S. military equipment. If the old procedures are to be followed (and the Embassy recognizes that there are many advantages in such programs), no special effort should be made to induce an increased effort on the part of the Japanese to produce similar weapons.

(b) If, however, such weapons will not be available from U.S. sources to equip additional Japanese units and maintain existing units, a new effort must be made to convince the Japanese that they must in fact assume a larger share of the cost of military hardware.

(c) Before making any such attempt, however, it is suggested that a complete review of Japanese force goals be undertaken in conjunction with the Japanese.

(d) The Embassy and the USOM believe that a reappraisal of Japan’s defense requirements, if undertaken in conjunction with the Japanese, might lead to a de-emphasis of ground forces. It is possible that the Japanese would agree to an increase in total defense expenditures if the United States would agree to a reduction of ground force goals. The Japanese are now meeting U.S. objectives for air forces, including naval air forces, and are very close to U.S. objectives for surface naval forces. Moreover, for these forces Japan is supplying a large and increasing part of the required hardware. If the ground force goals were thought to be more realistic, the Japanese Government might be willing and able to pass a larger defense budget even over inevitable Socialist opposition. If such an effort were successful, the volume of U.S. end item support to Japan’s defense forces could be reduced.

(e) Finally, it is suggested that the United States is not taking full advantage of the potential leverage which would be available for the furtherance of U.S. military objectives in Japan if our programming procedures were more flexible. After more than five years of large-scale U.S. support, it is not surprising that the Six-Year Plan is predicated on the assumption of a continuation of such support.

As indicated in the initial paragraph of this despatch, it is felt that the MAAG program for 1958 is entirely consistent with DOD programming guidance. Therefore the Embassy and the USOM have little to offer by way of comments on details of the program. The MAAG report points with justifiable pride to the successful joint program for the production of T–33 and F–86 aircraft in Japan. In the Navy section of the report, reference is made to unsuccessful efforts to develop a similar joint program for the production of naval aircraft in Japan. These efforts have been observed closely and it is believed that the prospects for a Naval aircraft production program remain good despite the fact that the Defense Agency rejected the recent offer by the U.S. side. The essence of the Japanese position is that the U.S.-proposed joint program for the production of naval aircraft fails to provide reasonable assurance of continued U.S. support of the program. Indications are that the Japanese Government, subject of course to the availability of funds in future years, might support a Five-Year joint program. They expect the same kind of U.S. support, that is, a declaration of a U.S. policy, subject to the availability of funds during the program period. It is also believed that serious and prompt consideration should be given to the possibility of a joint program for the production of the Nike in Japan. Indications are that sample quantities of various guided missiles will be made available to Japan in the near future for research purposes, and the MAAG program for 1958 proposes to re-equip four AAA battalions with the Nike at a cost of $72,000,000 to the U.S. It is altogether possible that the Japanese would welcome a joint production program as well as a joint research and development program. All of the arguments in favor of F–86 production in Japan would seem to apply, with greater force.

In commenting on the MAAG Program for USFY 1957, the Embassy and the USOM opposed a proposal to supply the Japanese with large quantities of ammunition. It is noted that the 1958 program contains no such proposals and that the quantities called for are relatively modest and of low priority. In most cases it would appear that the quantities which the U.S. would furnish are not sufficiently large to justify economical production in Japan. The alternative to inclusion of these quantities in the MAAG program would be their purchase by the Japanese from sources outside Japan. It is felt that the Japanese would not provide budgetary support for such purchase.

As directed in the DOD programming guidance, the MAAG has given very careful consideration to the subject of spare parts. The Embassy and the USOM feel that the MAAG has successfully carried out the spirit of these instructions. Spare parts for the ground forces are almost entirely in priority category II, and it is only with reference to aircraft spare parts that a significant allocation of funds is called for in the 1958 program. There can be no question that the Japanese are making a reasonable effort to supply aircraft parts. The fact that most of these parts will go into aircraft being produced in Japan during the next several years is a necessary development. It is reasonable to assume that Japan will assume support of its own aircraft as rapidly as possible.

For the Ambassador:

Outerbridge Horsey
Deputy Chief of Mission

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/8–356. Secret.
2. Circular 12, a joint State–Defense–ICA message, dated July 10, is not printed. (Ibid., 700.5–MSP/7–1056)
3. A copy is attached to a memorandum from Robert C. Yost of FE to Hemmendinger. (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/8–856)
4. In paragraph 4 of circular 12, the participating agencies asked U.S. missions in countries with Military Assistance Programs for comments on political and economic implications of the programs as submitted by the MAAGs.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/8–356)