Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

77. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, May 19, 1956¹

Washington, May 19, 1956

SUBJECT

• Conversation of Japanese Agricultural Minister Kono with the Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Ichiro Kono, Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry
• Ambassador Masayuki Tani, Embassy of Japan
• Minister Shigenobu Shima, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. James V. Martin, Jr., Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs

The Secretary received the Japanese representatives at his home and heard from Mr. Kono the results of his negotiations with the Soviets in Moscow² and his impressions of the new political relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union. The meeting lasted for an hour and twenty minutes.

Mr. Kono said that negotiating with the Russians had been rather exhausting but that it had not been bad while he was negotiating with the Minister of Fisheries, Ishkov.³ Later, however, the head of the Treaty Division and the head of the Far Eastern Division of the Soviet Foreign Office entered the discussions and tried to deny to the Japanese what Bulganin had promised them. The Soviet argument as put forth by Premier Bulganin, said Mr. Kono, was that Russia, which was defeated in 1905 by Japan and again defeated by Germany in World War I, was determined to reap the spoils of victory from World War II and Japan would have to give up what it had taken in 1905. The Secretary interposed the remark that the United States had had something to do with Soviet victory over the Japanese in World War II and that the Soviets had in fact not entered the war until the week in which the Japanese surrendered. Kono said that his own response to Bulganin’s blunt argument was that if this was the only treatment which the Japanese were to receive, there was nothing to do but go home; and it was at this point that Bulganin had agreed to an interim fisheries arrangement.

Mr. Kono showed on a map where the interim fisheries agreement area was and the abstention line of the Tripartite Agreement,⁴ namely, 175° W. longitude, which had been drawn when the Tripartite Agreement was negotiated in Tokyo in 1951, on the assumption that it divided the eastern salmon stock from the western salmon stock and it could be changed only after agreement among the three parties following a 5-year trial. Last fall at the Tripartite meeting at Tokyo, however, the Japanese had promised that they would not increase their take this year near the line. Nevertheless, as a result of the Moscow negotiations the Japanese felt compelled to move two groups from the Okhotsk Sea to the zone east of Kamchatka. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the American fishermen might object if their salmon catch should be reduced as a result of increased Japanese salmon catch to the westward of the line. Mr. Kono said that he really was not worried about the fisheries problem between the United States and Japan because in any case Japan must reduce its catch compared with last year.

Mr. Kono, proceeding to the political subject of Japanese-American relations in the light of the developing relationships between Japan and the Soviet Union, asked for the Secretary’s remarks. The Secretary said that while there was little he could add to what he had said on this subject in Tokyo last March, the United States intended to do everything possible to improve those relations. While there were some problems, especially in the economic field, and the exercise of tolerance was necessary, he saw no serious obstacle to good relations. Mr. Kono stated that Bulganin had suggested the resumption of Japanese-Soviet relations on the Adenauer formula⁵ and that this course of action appeared inevitable to the Japanese. However, it was his earnest wish to strengthen the solidarity between Japan and the United States. The Secretary asked what compensation or advantage Japan would get in return for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Mr. Kono named three advantages: the repatriation of Japanese detainees, permission to fish in the northern waters, and the Soviet pledge to support Japan’s entry into the United Nations. The Secretary said that the USSR had made a token repatriation of West German prisoners upon resuming relations with that state but that repatriation had not been very successful thereafter. Mr. Kono observed that the official Soviet figure for West German detainees was 12,000 and that they had in fact repatriated this number, although the West Germans claimed an additional 100,000. In the case of Japan, he said, the USSR admits holding 1200 detainees. The Japanese estimate of an additional 10,000 is inaccurate, in Kono’s estimation. The Secretary remarked that if the number of Japanese detainees was only 1200, there should be no great problem, and Mr. Kono agreed to this saying that the further detention of these people would be of no advantage to the Soviets. With regard to entering the United Nations, Mr. Kono said UN status would be very important for Japan in that even fisheries problems could be brought up there. The Secretary observed that if the Japanese did not gain UN entry now, they would have to pay a further heavy price for that advantage. Mr. Kono said that there would be no exchange of ambassadors without Japanese entry into the United Nations.

The Secretary stated that there was some evidence that internal changes in the Soviet Union indicate a greater degree of nationalism and a lesser degree of emphasis upon international communism. If the Soviet Union were to pursue its purely nationalistic goals, it was more important than ever that the United States and Japan be closely allied to prevent predominant Russian power in the western Pacific from reducing Japan to a very subordinate position. The United States-Japanese partnership was valuable and although the United States had filled the role of senior partner as a result of the war, he hoped that these roles could be reversed in the west Pacific. Mr. Kono said that he also had observed changes in in the Soviet Union and had gained the impression by the actions of the people marching in Moscow on May Day that they had become detached or removed somewhat from their leaders.⁶

Mr. Kono and the Japanese Ambassador gave their approval to the Department’s statement to the press, which was made available to the press services after the meeting:

[Here follows the press statement.]

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Martin on May 24.

   Earlier on May 19, Kono met with Murphy, Robertson, and other Department officers for more detailed discussion of the Japan-Soviet fisheries negotiations. (Memorandum of conversation by Hemmendinger and Warren Looney; Department of State, Central Files, 661.946/5–1956)

2. Soviet-Japanese negotiations, which had been suspended after September 13, 1955, resumed in London on January 17, only to be broken off, at Soviet insistence, on March 20. On March 21, the Soviet Union announced certain restrictions on Japanese salmon fishing. In March and April 1956, the Department was preparing, after consultation with the Japanese, to issue a statement denouncing these restrictions as contrary to international law, when, on April 9, the Soviets agreed to a Japanese request to negotiate the salmon question. Japan then asked the United States not to issue the statement, and the United States agreed. After negotiations held in Moscow, at which Minister Kono led the Japanese Delegation, Japan and the Soviet Union signed on May 14 a sea rescue agreement and an interim fisheries agreement, to take effect either simultaneously with a peace treaty or when diplomatic relations should be established. Also on May 14, the two countries announced that negotiations on normalization of relations were to recommence no later than July 31. Documentation is ibid., Central File 661.946.
3. A.A. Ishkov.
4. Reference is to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, with Annex and Protocol, signed by Canada, the United States, and Japan at Tokyo on May 9, 1952. For text, see TIAS 2786; 4 UST 380.
5. Reference is to the decision taken in September 1955 by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union to resume diplomatic relations without agreeing on territorial issues outstanding between them and without signing a formal peace treaty.
6. At the May 31 meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles reported to the Council on developments affecting U.S. security. The section of the memorandum of discussion concerning Japan reads: “Mr. Dulles indicated that the negotiations between Japan and the USSR were not making notable progress. It appeared, however, that the Soviets were gradually wearing down the Japanese in their opposition to a renewal of diplomatic relations in the absence of a peace treaty. Hatoyama seems to favor what is called the Adenauer formula.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, June 1; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)