Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

37. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 28, 1955

SUBJECT

• Japanese Proposal Reported in Tokyo’s Telegram 201² for a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States to replace the present Security Treaty

This proposal is summarized in Tab A. It is a proposal which has been in the wind for a long time and directly and indirectly has been mentioned to us and to the Embassy in Japan informally over the last two years by Japanese government officials, Diet members and private citizens. Japanese Socialists and Conservatives alike have expressed themselves either publicly or privately or both as believing that the present treaty is unequal and that it should be revised. In my view we can, if necessary, maintain the present arrangements with Japan for some little time to come. But the pressure for modification of the arrangements will continue to arise. We should therefore consider seriously whether it is to our interest to explore secretly with the Japanese at this time the possibility of a mutual defense treaty. Some of the factors which need to be considered are:

1. Our present rights are wider than any we can possibly get. However, Tokyo’s 201 points out that to some extent these rights are illusory, as has been evidenced in the recent difficulties with the Japanese Government about statements in the Diet on the United States

2. A mutual defense treaty would involve us in an obligation to defend Japan, which we do not now have. However, the NSC policy says that “the security of the United States would require us to fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of Japan by attack”. (See paragraph 9, Tab B)³

3. There is a real question whether the present Japanese Government is strong enough to get a treaty of this sort through the Diet. Certainly before any public indication that such a treaty is in the wind, we would have to be assured that both Liberals and Democrats in Japan would unite to support the treaty.

4. Although the Japanese now have little to contribute to the mutual defense, they already have an authorized strength of 193,000 men in the armed forces, as compared with less than 100,000 for the Philippines. And the present Japanese Government is committed to a series of further increases over the next few years. In addition, the Japanese Government has recently been much firmer in its support of the necessary runway extensions and firing ranges for the United States forces and in its public recognition of the necessity of such measures for the defense of Japan.

5. It would be a great step forward toward our objective of tying Japan into collective security arrangements in the Pacific if we can get Japan publicly in a treaty to accept a collective defense responsibility.

6. In the current negotiations with the Soviet Union the Japanese have told the Russians that they do not intend to break their security ties with the United States. I believe that it would be highly useful to us and a serious blow to Russian objectives in the Far East if the Japanese were in the relatively near future to go beyond the present security treaty and commit themselves to a mutual defense arrangement with us.

Recommendation

I believe that the advantages cited above are significant enough that, despite the disadvantages cited, we should consider this whole question carefully with Defense. I therefore recommend:

(1) that copies of Tokyo’s 201 be given to Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford and General Taylor;

(2) that we discuss the whole question carefully with them in the near future; and

(3) if they agree, that we authorize Ambassador Allison to continue informal and personal discussions with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.⁴

[Tab A]

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO REPLACE PRESENT SECURITY TREATY⁵

The basic treaty would consist of mutual defense provisions like those of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines or the ANZUS treaty. The treaty would be valid for 25 years in order to cope with the Soviet-Communist Chinese alliance which runs until 1980. It would be renewable every five years thereafter.

In addition, certain supplementary arrangements or agreements would be involved:

1. Transitional arrangements for the withdrawal of United States ground forces within six years.

Comment: This is in accord with present NSC policy which provides for “a phased withdrawal from Japan of United States forces as consistent with United States and Japanese security interests”. (Paragraph 51, Tab B) The difficult problem would be for us to retain the right—if Defense considered it necessary or desirable to do so—to send our forces back in in case of emergency.

2. Mutual agreement on the date of withdrawal of United States air and naval forces, but at the latest six years after completion of the withdrawal of the ground forces.

Comment: General thinking here had been that United States air and naval bases would be retained in Japan indefinitely. Subject to advice from Defense, this is a point on which we would want a good deal more favorable arrangements than contained in this Japanese proposal.

3. United States bases in Japan and United States forces there to be utilized for mutual defense purposes only, under arrangements similar to those with the NATO countries.

Comment: The explicit limitation on the use of the bases which the present security treaty allows us to use “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” is clearly undesirable.

4. No further Japanese contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan.

Comment: Paragraph 51 of the NSC paper (see Tab B) provides that we should accept reductions of the Japanese contribution in relation to the buildup of the Japanese defense forces and the withdrawal of our own forces. Here it would probably be possible to negotiate a specific phased reduction over a period of years which would avoid the annual wrangle about the Japanese defense budget. We could also probably set some understanding that the amounts thus released would be devoted to the development of the Japanese defense forces.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/7–2855. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted in NA and concurred in by Murphy.
2. Telegram 201 [5 pages of source text] was not declassified.
3. Tab B, a series of pertinent quotations from NSC 5516/1, Document 28, is not printed.
4. Secretary Dulles wrote “OK JFD” in the margin beside the three recommendations.
5. Top Secret.