U.S. POLICY TOWARD JAPAN
The National Security Council, Mr. H. Chapman
Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director,
Bureau of the Budget, at the 244th Council meeting on April 7, 1955,
adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5516, subject to the amendments thereto
which are set forth in NSC Action No.
1374–b.
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6.
Also enclosed, for information and reference, are a Financial Appendix
and an Appendix on “Certain Aspects of the Situation in Japan”,8 which were previously
circulated in NSC 5516.
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY PROPOSED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON JAPAN
General Considerations
Japanese Trends10
1. Japan’s relations with the United States will continue to be
heavily influenced by its dependence upon the United States for
economic, military, and diplomatic support; by its estimate as to
whether the United States will continue to demonstrate its will and
ability to resist Communist aggression without seriously endangering
Japan; by the fact that the United States is Japan’s largest foreign
customer and source of supply (20% of its export trade and 40% of
its imports); and to a lesser extent by a still substantial residue
of good will for the United States. Accordingly, Japan will almost
certainly seek to maintain its present alignment with the United
States.
2. Japan will endeavor to reduce its dependence on the United States
and will seek greater freedom of international action, including
expanded relations with the USSR and Communist China.
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3. Japan has the potential to assume a leading and stabilizing role
in Asia. It is unlikely to acquire sufficient strength to do so in
the next few years. The rapidity with which Japan attains such
strength will depend not only on its own efforts but also on the
nature and magnitude of United States support and assistance.
4. Japan will continue to move toward modification of the Occupation
reforms, particularly toward increasing centralization of
governmental power, but Japan will remain democratic with many
differences from prewar authoritarian and imperialistic
patterns.
5. Moderate conservative forces, which will be hampered by factional
differences and will tend toward greater nationalism, will probably
continue to dominate Japanese government and politics.
Left-of-center forces will probably offer stronger opposition than
in the past few years. The gradual revival of ultra-nationalist
forces will continue. A strong and effective government is not
likely to emerge during the next few years.
6. Although the Japanese Communist Party is not likely to gain
substantial parliamentary strength, it will continue to exercise an
important influence through its ability to aggravate popular
grievances, to exploit and infiltrate mass organizations and the
intellectual leadership of the non-Communist left, and to infiltrate
the government.
7. Japan does not appear to have an immediate balance of payments
problem, partly due to substantial though diminishing United States
special expenditures, and its economic position improved during
calendar year 1954. Over the long term, however, particularly in the
face of further decreases in United States special expenditures,
Japan faces a difficult economic situation of providing employment
and adequate living standards for its growing population through an
expansion of exports and development of its limited domestic
resources.
8. Japan will continue to develop its over-all defense forces at a
slow rate, and will seek to adjust the balance of these forces by
emphasizing the development of the air and naval components. Japan
will continue to rely upon substantial military aid from the United
States.
Basic United States
Interests
9. The strategic location and military and industrial potential of
Japan are such that the security of the United States would require
us to fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any
part of Japan by attack. Similarly, we would be obliged to assist
the Japanese Government, if necessary, to counter subversion or
insurrection.
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10. United States interests would best be served by a strong Japan,
firmly allied with the United States, and better able to serve as a
counterweight to Communist China and contribute to free world
strength in the Far East.
11. For the present, Japan’s alignment with the United States is
based partly on dependence on our support. As Japan’s strength
grows, dependence will lessen and should be replaced by a new sense
of common purpose, mutual interests and working partnership. A major
effort must be made to persuade Japan’s dominant conservative forces
that the satisfaction of the nation’s economic and defense
requirements and desire for prestige, as well as the stability of
the conservative position, depend on continuing cooperation with the
United States.
12. If a sense of mutuality does not develop as Japan’s strength
increases, basic United States interests with respect to Japan will
have to be reassessed. At present, however, it appears that a strong
Japan is a better risk than a weak Japan.
Basic Japanese Interests and
Objectives
13. Japan’s immediate objective is to strengthen its economic
position, with a probable long-term objective of recovering a
position of international influence and prestige. Japan considers
that increase of defense strength is of lower priority, partly
because it believes that its defense will be assured by the United
States. While political stability is desired by most Japanese, sharp
and persisting conflicts between rival personalities and factions
seriously retard its development.
14. Japan currently considers alignment with the United States and
cooperation with the democratic nations to be in its national
interest, because it believes that in this way it is more likely to
attain a position of international importance and economic strength
and because it expects that the United States will if necessary
defend Japan against attack.
15. At the same time, Japan believes that, within the limits of its
alignment with the United States and despite its historical fear of
Russia and strong dislike of Communism, it should seek to ease
friction, develop trade and broaden relations with Communist China
and the Soviet Union.
16. Japan is beginning to display a desire for greater freedom of
international action. This tendency reflects a nationalist trend,
rooted in racial pride, a longing for national prestige and a desire
for greater maneuverability in the event of conflict between
Communist China or the USSR and the United States. Development of
the healthier and more positive aspects of Japanese nationalism is
essential to Japan’s
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recovery as a major power. Accommodation of this nationalism within
the context of the U.S.-Japanese alignment is a basic problem of our
policy.
Principal Conflicts Between United
States and Japanese Interests and Objectives
17. U.S. Bases. Japan recognizes the need for
continued military protection by the United States. However, Japan
does not regard the threat of aggression against it as seriously as
does the United States. Consequently, while the Japanese look upon
U.S. bases in Japan as protection for Japan, they also regard them
as serving U.S. strategic interests and as dangerously exposing
Japan to nuclear attack in the event of war. Furthermore, Japanese
policy is colored by serious doubt as to whether an acceptable
defense of Japan is possible in the event of nuclear war.
18. Japanese Rearmament. Partly because it
discounts the danger of direct aggression, Japan puts the
development of political stability and economic strength ahead of
the development of military power, and resists U.S. efforts to
increase total Japanese defense expenditures.
19. Communist China. Japan’s development of
closer relations with the Communist bloc will probably eventually
cause serious friction with the United States. The Japanese believe
their international interests will be served through early
development of closer contacts and expanded trade with the Communist
bloc. Pressures in this direction will continue. Currently Japan is
restrained from going beyond certain limits by the possible effect
on relations with the United States and on trade with Nationalist
China and the Republic of Korea.
20. Other sources of conflict are:
- a.
- Japanese resistance to United States private investment in
Japan.
- b.
- The Japanese need for trade and the present imbalance of
United States-Japanese trade which drives them to want to
sell more to the United States than we want to
accept.
- c.
- The Japanese sensitivity on nuclear development which
leads them to oppose the testing of nuclear weapons in the
Pacific and to be vulnerable to Communist-sponsored
movements for the banning of nuclear weapons.
- d.
- Irredentism over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.
- e.
- Resentment over the continued imprisonment of Japanese war
criminals.
- f.
- The nature of a settlement of Japan’s GARIOA obligation.
- g.
- Relationships with Japanese trade unions regarding the
terms and conditions of their members’ employment through
the Japanese Government for services to U.S. forces.
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Building Japanese
Strength
21. Japan has limited economic, political and psychological resources
with which to accomplish the demanding tasks of rebuilding internal
political strength, economic viability and defense capacity. There
is inevitable competition for these limited resources among social,
economic and defense programs. A domestic political struggle over an
increase in the defense forces is creating cleavages within the
country and weakening the political position of the conservative
elements. Both economic austerity and the defense program are
essentially unpopular with many segments of the Japanese public, and
require major political efforts if they are to be achieved.
22. The United States has limited capacity to influence Japanese
action. Our bargaining tools and resources of good will and
persuasion should be fully applied but carefully apportioned to
accomplish our objectives most effectively.
23. While the requirement for an optimum level of defense readiness
will continue to exist, it must be recognized that the Japanese
Government will in fact determine the total size and composition of
the military forces which Japan will support.
24. The security interests of both Japan and the United States
require continuing progress by the Japanese toward greater political
stability, economic viability and defense strength. Achievement of
greater conservative political stability will mean that a Japanese
Government can take austere and sometimes unpopular measures
necessary to build economic strength and defense forces. Achievement
of greater economic strength will mean increased resources available
to devote to defense purposes. The amount and timing of the build-up
of Japanese military forces should be related to the necessity for
developing political and economic stability, as well as military
strength, in Japan. The United States should avoid pressing the
Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of
political and economic stability.
Objectives
25. Preservation of the security and independence of Japan.
26. A Japan allied to the United States.
27. A prosperous, strong Japanese economy, having, within the free
world, access to adequate sources of food and raw materials,
adequate markets for its industrial and other products, and
satisfactory economic relations.
28. A politically stable Japan maintaining the principles of
representative government.
29. A Japan capable of defense against internal subversion and
external aggression.
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30. A Japan willing and able to contribute to the security of the
Pacific area.
31. The inclusion of Japan in arrangements in the Pacific area for
purposes of mutual security and economic benefit.
Courses of Action
32. The following courses of action should be carried out in such a
way as to contribute most effectively to the solution of Japan’s
long-run economic problem and to its ability to assume an increasing
role in strengthening and stabilizing Asia.
Political
33. Promote the development of an effective, moderate conservative
government in Japan as basic to the accomplishment of U.S.
objectives.
34. Consult with the Japanese Government as an equal on matters of
mutual interest, such as Communist strength and intentions in the
Far East; countermeasures to be taken by Japan, the United States
and the other free nations; political and economic policies in
Southeast Asia; Japan’s defense planning and United States military
assistance; and general international developments.
35. Endeavor to develop a community of interests between Japan and
the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the Philippines
through offer of United States good offices to help resolve
outstanding problems and by encouragement of joint cooperation;
encourage the conditions necessary to form as soon as possible and
them participate in a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement
including these four nations, eventually linked with the Manila Pact
and ANZUS.
36. Encourage the development of cooperative relations between Japan
and other free nations and associate Japan, to the extent feasible,
with multilateral activities carried on in connection with the
Manila Pact; and encourage Japan to undertake broader amd more
effective participation in the Colombo Plan and the United Nations
specialized agencies.
37. Broaden by personal contact, exchange of views and feasible
support, the understanding and cooperation of those elements already
well-disposed to the United States, in particular business men,
government officials, and officers of Japan’s defense forces; and
also seek to develop and expand contacts with Socialist leaders and
trade union officials of moderate views to win their confidence and
understanding.
38. Encourage and as appropriate assist the Japanese Government to
take effective internal security measures striking at the
organizational basis of Communist power and undermining Communist
financial and political strength.
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39. Encourage the development of a moderate trade union movement.
40. Make full use of U.S political means and, as practicable and
appropriate, economic and military aid, including offshore
procurement contracts, in order to induce private Japanese groups,
particularly employers and unions, to combat Communism
vigorously.
41. Expand U.S programs for offsetting Marxist attitudes among
intellectual leaders of the non-Communist left and for enlightening
the general public and in particular intellectual groups on the
Communist danger.
42. Take the position with the Japanese Government that the United
States does not object to the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the USSR, but does oppose establishment of diplomatic relations
with Communist China and would object strongly to political
association by Japan with Communist nations in such actions as
non-aggression pacts or efforts to facilitate entry of Communist
China into the United Nations.
43. Support Japan’s claim against the Soviet Union for sovereignty
over the Habbomai Islands and Shikotan; do not concede the Soviet
Union’s claim to sovereignty over the Kurile Islands and Southern
Sakhalin.
44. Support and encourage Japan’s claims against the Soviet Union and
Communist China for repatriation of former military personnel and
civilians and for cessation of seizures of Japanese fishing
vessels.
45. Seek to associate Japan with United States and international
planning for cooperative development of the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy; make nuclear equipment and training facilities for peaceful
uses available to Japan and exchange nuclear information under
appropriate conditions.
46. Expedite the parole of those Japanese war criminals subject to
United States control, in a manner not inconsistent with the German
war prisoner program, with a view to elimination of this issue if
possible no later than the beginning of 1956.
47. Continue to press efforts to gain Japan’s fuller association with
and membership in the United Nations.
Military
48. Encourage and assist Japan to develop military forces which will
eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the
defense of Japan. The amount and timing of the build-up of Japanese
military forces should be related to the necessity for developing
political and economic stability, as well as military strength, in
Japan. The United States should avoid pressing the Japanese to
increase their military forces to the prejudice of political and
economic stability.
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49. Consult with the Japanese Government about the rate of Japan’s
defense build-up and the scope of United States military assistance,
in order to make a realistic appraisal of what forces Japan is
willing to support.
50. Based upon such an appraisal, reexamine United States goals for
Japanese forces and the timing for their achievement, United States
military assistance programs to Japan, and the deployment of United
States forces in the area; in order to ensure that the minimum
requirements for the security of Japan are met.
51. Develop with the Japanese Government a general understanding on a
long-range plan for the build-up of Japanese defense forces, a
phased withdrawal from Japan of United States forces as consistent
with United States and Japanese security interests, and related
reductions of the Japanese contribution to the support of United
States forces in Japan; and make such understanding public at a
suitable time. In such understanding, seek to obtain Japanese
agreement that the amounts released by any reductions in Japanese
contributions to the support of U.S. forces in Japan will be devoted
to the development of Japanese defense forces.
52. Maintain ground, naval and air facilities in Japan which, with
the cooperation of Japanese forces, will serve to deter or resist
aggression.
53. Continue to develop arrangements with Japan for coordinated
military planning and operations, and transfer responsibilities to
Japan’s defense forces as rapidly as consistent with United States
security interests.
54. During the present international tensions in the Far East,
maintain the degree of control and authority over the Ryukyu and
Bonin Islands now exercised pursuant to Article 3 of the Peace
Treaty with Japan. In the interest of good relations with Japan,
consider Japanese requests for fuller relations with the Ryukyu and
Bonin Islands in such areas as trade, cultural relations, and
interchange of nationals, and accede to such requests so far as
consistent with United States security or other interests in the
area.
55. Work with the Japanese Government in seeking to improve labor
relations involving indigenous personnel furnished to United States
facilities.
56. Develop with Japan a program for Japanese development of defense
and defense-supporting industries and support such a program by
offshore procurement with Defense and Mutual Security funds.
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Economic
57. Encourage Japan to expand and stabilize its economy so that it
will be self-supporting and capable of maintaining gradually
improving living standards and defense forces and of contributing to
the strength of the free nations of Asia.
58. Encourage the Japanese Government to continue and strengthen
appropriate measures of self-help to eliminate non-essential
imports, maximize savings, and channel capital into essential areas
of the economy.
59. Actively support Japan’s accession to GATT and promote the expansion of trade between Japan
and other free nations, including the United States, in accordance
with GATT principles through the
general lowering of tariffs and the removal or relaxation of other
government-imposed trade restrictions.
60. Assist the Japanese economy through the appropriate extension of
public credit to Japan, the use of technical assistance, the use of
local currency proceeds of agricultural surpluses and the widening
of opportunities for the investment of Japanese capital.
61. Promote the expansion of Japan’s trade through United States
participation in programs of economic development in free Asia; give
particular emphasis to development projects which would tend to
increase sound intra-regional trade; use Japan as a source of supply
to the extent practicable in connection with United States-financed
aid programs; encourage Japan to contribute to the development of
South and Southeast Asia by providing technical assistance and
financing.
62. Urge Japan to continue to cooperate with the multilaterally
agreed level of export controls on trade with Communist nations;
endeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions in such manner as
to preserve and foster Japan’s willingness to retain the present
level of controls; and seek to prevent Japan’s becoming dependent
upon Communist areas for essential food and raw material supplies
and export markets.
63. Encourage and assist the expansion, rehabilitation and
modernization of Japan’s industries on a sound economic basis;
encourage and assist competitive enterprise and improvement of the
productive, managerial and marketing efficiency and labor relations
of Japanese industry, especially through technical assistance.
64. Encourage Japan to follow internationally accepted trade
practices; avoid cartel arrangements; prevent the pirating of
designs, infringement of patents and other unfair practices by
Japanese businessmen, and to publicize actions taken in this
respect.
65. Encourage Japan to relax or remove legal and administrative
barriers and to improve the climate for private investment, domestic
and foreign.
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66. Keep the Japanese Government advised of impending major
developments affecting United States expenditures in Japan so as to
help the Japanese Government avoid any sudden adverse impact on the
Japanese economy.
67. Take appropriate steps, with due regard for security
considerations, to exchange technical and scientific information on
a reciprocal basis.
68. Urge Japan to settle as soon as possible GARIOA claims and other property and
claims matters arising from the war and Occupation; and assist
through good offices the settlement of Japan’s reparations
obligations.
69. Relate United States support and assistance to Japan to Japan’s
actions with respect to the matters discussed in paragraphs 58, 62,
64, and 65 above.
