Office of the Historian

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan1

Washington, August 1, 1955—7:15 p.m.

205. Eyes only Ambassador Allison. Your 2012 and 269.3 I can see both pros and cons to moving in direction replacing present US-Japan [Page 81] Security Treaty with mutual defense pact. In any event however we would have to be certain Japanese Government could deliver Diet ratification which would be true only if there were firm assurance both Democrats and Liberals would support it. I do not want to open up the treaty we have when we are not sure of a treaty to replace it.

I am sending three copies your 201 to Defense and will discuss subject thoroughly with them before making more substantive reply.

Meanwhile I suggest you tell Shigemitsu this obviously most important and difficult subject which will require careful thought and which you are referring your Government. In order help your Government’s consideration you will be glad pass along any further elaboration Shigemitsu’s ideas. Whole subject will be most closely held in US Government—as you assume it is in Japanese Government—to prevent any hint reaching public it being considered.4

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/8–155. Top Secret. Drafted in NA, cleared in draft by Dulles, and approved by Robertson who signed for Dulles.↩
  2. See footnote 2, supra.↩
  3. In telegram 269, August 1, Allison reported that the Japanese Diet had adjourned without passing certain defense measures. He attributed this partly to the impact in Japan of “premature” publicity with regard to deployment of atomic-capable weapons in Japan and Okinawa. These events, he continued, might make it impossible for Shigemitsu to proceed with his plan for revision of the Security Treaty. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/8–155)↩
  4. In telegram 300 from Tokyo, August 3, Allison stated he had spoken to Shigemitsu on that day along the lines suggested in telegram 205, had urged Shigemitsu to obtain some support for his plan from the Liberal Party, and had “discouraged any thought it might be possible for final action to be taken” during the projected visit of Shigemitsu to Washington. (Ibid., 794.5–MSP/8–355)↩