Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

36. Letter From the Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)¹

Tokyo, July 19, 1955.

Dear Bob: I appreciated receiving the information on General Lemnitzer’s cable C–73002 of June 19² regarding his recommendation to retain installations in Japan for two divisions even after the ground forces are re-deployed. As you surmised, the cable was not brought to the attention of the Embassy by the Command.

I wonder what the status of this recommendation is in view of Secretary Wilson’s announcement at Quantico. This announcement hit Tokyo like a bombshell, completely surprising (and confusing) the Command as well as ourselves. (I would gather that you, too, had no previous warning.) In fact, Jeff³ was told this morning by General Rogers that the Command, on instructions from DA, and despite Presidential approval of redeployment plans, has been working on alternative redeployment plans involving the retention of some ground forces units in Japan, in addition to the airborne RCT. The fact that this planning has been going on was not disclosed to us until today and then only in the context of clearing Embtel 151.⁴ General Rogers, incidentally, did not mention General Lemnitzer’s plan to retain installation here if the ground forces are eventually pulled out.

Our hunch is that, if the Army fails—as is apparent—to gain a reversal of the redeployment decision, it will drive hard for a compromise permitting it to retain bases here on the contingency that by USFY ‘57 circumstances will permit it to bring back from Korea all or part of the ground forces now stationed there. Since this plan may appear attractive both from certain military considerations and as a bureaucratic compromise to appease the Army, I am afraid the Pentagon may be inclined to go along with General Lemnitzer’s recommendation. This would be most regrettable since, in effect, the Japanese would be asked to make the major sacrifices in order to satisfy the conflicting “appetites” of our military. It is most unrealistic to assume that the Japanese will docilely agree to our retention of “idle bases” for a rainy day; on the contrary, the Japanese would increasingly insist that bases here must serve Japanese interests only, i.e. not U.S. purposes only indirectly concerned with the defense of the Japanese homeland. The continual land hunger of the Japanese opens such a policy to vigorous and widespread criticism. Renewed vigor in the Japanese drive to contract our facilities has also resulted from the runway extension program. As noted in our telegram 152,⁵ the government is on the brink of a major effort, for face-saving purposes, to secure return of all unused facilities.

I think we must face up to the fact that in general the trend is definitely in the direction of restricting, rather than broadening, U.S. rights and bases in Japan. While the government will probably carry through on its commitment on the runways, it is likely to be very resistant toward any more such commitments or any base policies which promise to arouse public criticism. Furthermore, any effort we make to fight this trend head on by insisting on our “rights” is not likely to be successful and can only result in further aggravating our current relations with Japan to the detriment of our long-term base position here.

In view of General Lemnitzer’s position on this issue, I do not believe that there is much possibility for pressure from Tokyo to block his plan to retain facilities. Although we will contribute any items which might be helpful, it would appear that the burden of this issue falls on you in your contacts with OSD which, I would hope, could be backed up in the weekly meetings between State and the JCS. Let us know if we can be of additional assistance.

Sincerely,

John

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/7–1955. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Not printed.
3. J. Graham Parsons.
4. Telegram 151, July 19, reported on the impact in Japan of the redeployment decision and on the desire of the Japanese Government to discuss the decision with U.S. representatives. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56394/7–1955)
5. Dated July 19, not printed. (Ibid.)