Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1

244. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Shuff)¹

Washington, November 7, 1957.

Dear Mr. Shuff: I have carefully considered the proposal contained in your letter of October 18.² I would welcome an opportunity to discuss and explore this matter further since your proposal seems to imply a basic shift in our Military Assistance policy (MAP) towards Japan. We realize that the reduction in the over-all MAP appropriation made at the last session of Congress requires adjustments in many of our programs. However, we are most anxious that whatever adjustments or changes are required in our program for Japan be made with proper recognition of the fact that our MAP programs are important tools for achieving the political as well as the strategic objectives of United States policy towards Japan.

Without attempting to go into a detailed discussion of our views prior to our meeting, I believe that the following considerations should be kept in mind in viewing your proposal or any other major change in our MAP policy towards Japan.

Prime Minister Kishi is the first Japanese Prime Minister since the Peace Treaty to show evidence of a real willingness to tackle the problem of building an adequate defense force for Japan. During the past six months he has taken significant steps in this direction. He has directed and obtained Cabinet approval for both a basic defense policy and an official defense plan covering Japanese fiscal years 1958 through 1960. He has formulated a defense budget for Japanese fiscal year 1958 (beginning April 1, 1958) which would provide an increase of 28.5 percent in funds over those appropriated for JFY 1957. A further substantial increase in the forthcoming JFY 1958 defense budget would be required to support the proposal contained in your letter. It is difficult to see how Prime Minister Kishi could obtain the additional funds required.

As pointed out by Ambassador MacArthur (Embtels 1134 and 1135)³ the forthcoming few months may be critical ones for Prime Minister Kishi and it is in the interest of the United States to help him build a further record of positive achievement in preparation for the forthcoming elections. Conversely, we should examine with care any proposal for a shift in our MAP policy towards Japan if there is a likelihood of a possible adverse reaction therefrom on Prime Minister Kishi’s political posture.

A specific example of helpful action on our part would be prompt acceptance of the Japanese proposal to negotiate an arrangement for the production of the P2V–7 aircraft, which we understand the Chief of Naval Operations has recommended to your office. This proposal is the culmination of months of effort and discussion between United States and Japanese representatives in Tokyo. A large measure of the political benefit from this project will be lost if acceptance is delayed until after the elections. Furthermore prompt action on our part is needed if the Japanese Government is to include provision for this program in the JFY 1958 budget which will be finalized in late December for presentation to the Diet when it convenes in January.

In our discussions in June with Prime Minister Kishi it was made clear to him that the United States would no longer make suggestions to Japan concerning steps to be taken by Japan in its defense build-up unless requested by the Japanese. Only recently assurances were given to the Japanese by Secretary Wilson, Ambassador MacArthur and other United States officials that there is no change in our MAP policy towards Japan.

The Japanese Three-Year Defense Plan has been formulated on the basis of certain assumptions as to the continuance of military assistance from the United States. For us to indicate a basic change in MAP policy towards Japan at this juncture would tend to discredit the policies which the Prime Minister has enunciated and could very well result not only in a reduction in the proposed JFY 1958 defense budget but also in a sweeping downward reappraisal by the Japanese Government of the Three-Year Defense Plan.

In the light of the foregoing we question the wisdom of sending a mission to Tokyo to discuss with the Japanese the proposal outlined in your letter until there has been basic inter-agency agreement, taking into account the views of Embassy Tokyo, CINCPAC and COMUS Japan, on the policy to be followed by the United States in its MAP relations with Japan. We believe that any discussions with the Japanese Government regarding our policy toward Japan should be initiated by our Embassy and military representatives in Tokyo rather than by a mission from Washington such as you propose. We have requested the Embassy’s views on the proposal and assume that you have requested the views of CINCPAC and COMUS Japan.

I understand that Mr. Sprague will be in Tokyo early next week. I believe that it would be helpful if he were to discuss this matter with Ambassador MacArthur.⁴ I would also like to discuss it with Mr. Sprague upon his return to Washington.

Meanwhile, I urge that we move ahead quickly to give an affirmative response to Embassy Tokyo’s telegram 982⁵ and that arrangements be made for the early dispatch to Tokyo of such naval representatives as may be required to negotiate the details of a cost sharing arrangement for the production of the P2V–7 aircraft in Japan.

Sincerely yours,

Walter S. Robertson⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/11–757. Confidential. Drafted in NA on November 6 and cleared in draft with U/MSA.
2. Not found. In a November 6 memorandum to Robertson, Parsons stated SHUFF had “proposed (a) that the Japanese Government be informed that the United States is planning grant aid of about $50 million for FY 1958 with their requirements for subsequent years to be financed by the purchase by Japan from the United Sates for yen of military equipment under the provisions of Section 103 (c) of the new MAP legislation; and (b) that a Defense negotiating team be sent to Japan which would include representatives of the three services to discuss the naval aircraft program proposed by the Japanese, fighter and other aviation programs and other military procurement programs such as the five-year Far East vehicle production program.” (Attached to the source text)
3. Documents 239 and 240.
4. See telegram 1359, infra.
5. In telegram 982, October 3, the Embassy described the formal Japanese proposal for a joint P2V program (received that day), endorsed the program, and asked for instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5–MSP/10–357)
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.